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INTRODUCTION
America is at war. Every day, millions of men and women walk the
front lines, hoping that their next step will not be their last. Entire
neighborhoods lie in ruin, riddled with bullet holes and smelling of
decay. The sounds are deafening: the bellow of hovering helicopters;
the shrill wail of approaching sirens; the thunderous crack of sporadic
gunfire. Fleeting moments of peace are abruptly shattered by the
chaos of warfare.
Even blameless inhabitants of the ravaged neighborhoods must
hide in broad daylight. They do not easily forget the lesson of inno-
cent victims caught in the cross fire: Stray bullets do not ask whose
side you are on. Youngsters are too frightened to play outside. The
elderly become prisoners in their own homes. Parents who have given
up all hope for themselves can only pray that a better life awaits their
children. Most, however, realize that their sons and daughters are
condemned to a life little different from their own. Hope is in short
supply; despair is not.
The war measures days by body count. Lifeless corpses steadily
flow into the morgues, yet more keep coming. The colored faces are
different than mine, but they were no less human. Most were barely
old enough to vote; some were too young to drive. Behind each face
is a story-undoubtedly a tragedy. However, the war does not stop to
recount these stories. The war cares only for morbid statistics and not
the lives behind the faces. Would things be different if they looked
more like me? Would it have mattered if I was the one lying on the cold
slab? Would anybody have cared?
The "War on Drugs" divides our country. The battlegrounds are
our inner cities. The victims are a generation of minorities slaugh-
tered on our streets and imprisoned in our jails. The spoils are billions
of dollars in black-market profits. The enemies are ourselves.
Every generation has its defining moment. For our grandparents, it
was the Great Depression and World War II; for our parents, it was
Vietnam. After a decade of disenchantment and apathy, our genera-
tion (pejoratively known as "Generation X") is slowly accumulating
political power and searching for its place in history.
The drug war, however, is championed by the gentry of a previous
generation. They are unmoved by empirical data and pragmatic sug-
gestions; anything short of absolute prohibition is deemed "morally
scandalous."' Rhetoric replaces reason, while lurid claims drown out
1. Donald Baer, A Judge Who Took the Stand, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 9, 1990, at 26
(quoting William Bennett).
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scientific evidence. Former "drug czar" William Bennett would be-
head drug dealers.2 Nancy Reagan branded casual users "accom-
plice[s] to murder,"'3 and the erstwhile police chief of Los Angeles,
Daryl Gates, opined that even occasional drug users should be "taken
out and shot."'4
All hope is not lost. Moral and intellectual unanimity has slowly
begun to dissipate. A few influential leaders and scholars have re-
belled against conventional prohibitionist dogma, including former
Secretary of State George Schultz;5 Nobel laureates Milton Friedman
and Gary Becker;6 commentator William F. Buckley;7 Baltimore
mayor Kurt Schmoke;8 sociopolitical author Thomas Sowell; 9 scientist
Carl Sagan;10 and federal judges Richard Posner, Jack Weinstein,
Whitman Knapp, William Schwarzer, Robert Sweet, Harold Greene,
and James Paine.1' These individuals are among the courageous van-
guard of drug peace, setting the stage for armistice in our day.
Ending the drug war, this author believes, is the challenge of our
generation. The analysis that follows demonstrates how this conclu-
sion was reached.
2. Crackmire, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 11, 1989, at 7 (quoting from an interview with William
Bennett on The Larry King Show, June 15, 1989).
3. Stephen Chapman, Nancy Reagan and the Real Villains in the Drug War, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6,
1988, § 4, at 3.
4. The War on Drugs Is Lost, NAT'L REV., Feb. 12, 1996, at 34, 43 (editorial of Joseph D.
McNamara).
5. See Robert Scheer, The Drugs War's a Bust, Feb. 1994, at 49 (on file with author).
6. See Hugh Sidey, The Struggle with Ourselves, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 32.
7. See The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 35.
8. See id. at 40.
9. See Joshua W. Shenk, Why You Can Hate Drugs and Still Want To Legalize Them, WASH.
MONTHLY, Oct. 1995, at 32, 38.
10. See Converts to Curiosity, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 1989, at 33.
11. Baer, supra note 1, at 26 (Sweet); Rebecca Carr & Phillip J. O'Connor, Teens Say Pot Is
Drug of Choice, Cm. SUN TIMES, Sept. 17, 1995, at 18 (Posner); Rae Corelli et al., A New War of
Words: Drug Legalization Is Winning Converts, MACLEAN'S, Jan. 22, 1990, at 39 (Sweet); The
Enemy Within, ECONOMIST, May 15, 1993, at 31 (Greene, Knapp, and Weinstein); Ted Gest, The
Growing Movement to Legalize Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 22, 1990, at 22, 22
(Sweet); Michael Ruby, Should Drugs Be Legalized?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 20, 1993,
at 80 (Sweet); Sniffing Victory, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1991, at A31 (Paine); The War on Drugs Is
Lost, supra note 4, at 44 (Knapp, Sweet, and Weinstein); Stephen Wisotsky, A Society of Sus-
pects: The War on Drugs and Civil Liberties, U.S.A. TODAY, July 1993 (magazine), at 17
(Greene and Schwarzer); Wrong on Drugs, Jurist Urges Marijuana Legalization, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 18, 1995, at B6 (Paine, Posner, and Sweet).
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I. HISTORY
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
-George Santayana 12
A. Before the War
Until our own century, drug consumption was largely unfettered by
government regulation. a3 The pursuit of intoxication was viewed as a
mild vice, not the scourge of man.' 4 "For most of human history,"
remarked historian Stanton Peele, "even under conditions of ready
access to the most potent of drugs, people and societies have regu-
lated their drug use without requiring massive education, legal and
interdiction campaigns."'1 5 Drug criminalization was an infrequent en-
deavor, marked by both barbarous enforcement and unequivocal
failure.16
The drugs legally available at the turn of the century mirror the
current selection on the streets. Opium, man's first narcotic, was
widely used in eighteenth-century America for medicinal purposes.' 7
Opiates' 8 were used for nearly every possible ailment: dysentery, in-
12. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON ON THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS 284
(1905).
13. James Ostrowski, The Moral and Practical Case for Drug Legalization, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 607, 612 (1990).
14. Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. L. REV. 571, 571-72
(1995).
15. Loren Siegel, Decriminalize Drugs Now: Even Some Conservatives Agree That It's Not as
Dumb an Idea as It Sounds, Jan. 1989, at 57 (on file with author).
16. See, e.g., David Boaz, A Drug-Free America-or a Free America?, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
617, 617 (1991) ("In the sixteenth century the Egyptian government banned coffee. In the seven-
teenth century the Czar of Russia and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire executed tobacco
smokers. In the eighteenth century England tried to halt gin consumption and China penalized
opium sellers with strangulation.") (citations omitted).
17. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 1 (Ex-
panded ed. 1987); see also Prohibiting the Importation of Crude Opium for the Purpose of Manu-
facturing Heroin, H.R. 7079, 68th Cong. (1924) ("Opium has been recognized from time
immemorial as a narcotic. Its value or the value of its derivatives, in medication, has been recog-
nized for centuries; in fact, it has often been said that the practice of medicine without the aid of
opium or its derivatives would be a very unhappy calling indeed.").
18. According to one commentator:
The most important opiates are opium, morphine, heroin, and codeine.... Opium is a
raw natural product-the dried juice of the unripe capsule of the opium poppy
(papaver somniferum). Morphine is the chief active ingredient in opium.... Heroin
(diacetylmorphine) is produced by heating morphine in the presence of acetic acid....
Codeine is also found in small quantity in opium....
EDWARD M. BRECHER ET AL., LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS: THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON
NARCOTICS, STIMULANTS, DEPRESSANTS, INHALANTS, HALLUCINOGENS, AND MARIJUANA-IN-
CLUDING CAFFEINE, NICOTINE, AND ALCOHOL 1 (1972). It should be noted that opium, mor-
phine, heroin, cocaine and marijuana are legally classified as narcotics. However, cocaine and
marijuana medically are not narcotics.
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flammation, rheumatism, cholera, food poisoning, parasites, lockjaw
and delirium tremens.19 Doctors prescribed opium casually and with-
out concern for potential addiction, calling it "God's Own
Medicine, '2 0 "which the Creator himself seems to prescribe."' Mor-
phine was first derived from opium in 1803 and was widely and liber-
ally used as an anesthetic.22 Named after the Greek god of dreams,
this narcotic was stronger and more predictable than opium, with
fewer immediate side effects.23
Eventually, the medical profession had two other powerful narcot-
ics at their disposal. By 1885, cocaine had been hailed by medical ex-
perts as a potent anesthetic and stimulant.24 It was used to treat
depression, anxiety, sexual disorders, hayfever, sinus problems, head-
aches, and even to cure opiate addiction.2 5 Heroin, originally com-
pounded by a British scientist in 1874, was officially "discovered" in
1898 by a Bayer Company chemist in Germany. 26 Named for its "he-
roic" properties, it allegedly provided nonaddictive relief for coughs,
congestion, asthma, bronchitis and catarrh.2 7
Despite unrestricted availability, narcotics addiction was a negligi-
ble phenomenon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Several
factors, however, amplified the perception of addiction. The genesis of
American drug anxiety traditionally has been seen as an ancillary ef-
fect of the Civil War, in which morphine was extensively used in the
treatment of injured soldiers.28 Although its effects progressed slowly,
the most detrimental repercussions came after the war, when soldiers
came home with the so-called "army disease. '29
[Following the civil war the abuse of medicinal opium and its chief
derivative, morphi[ne], set in and spread thickly, or thinly, but over
almost the entire country. There are few families some member of
which has not become an addict .... Opium and morphine habits
contracted at that time [during the Civil War] by those who had
19. H. WAYNE MORGAN, DRUGS IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1800-1980 3-4 (1981);
MUSTO, supra note 17, at 1.
20. MORGAN, supra note 19, at 1.
21. MUSTO, supra note 17, at 1.
22. ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION 38 (1982).
23. See TREBACH, supra note 22, at 16.
24. Id.
25. Stephen R. Kandall & Wendy Chavkin, Illicit Drugs in America: History, Impact on
Women and Infants, and Treatment Strategies for Women, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 615, 619 (1992).
26. TREBACH, supra note 22, at 39.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 38.
29. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT. DRUG ABUSE,
DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME 190 (1986) [hereinafter AMERICA'S HABIT].
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some real use for the drugs too often extended as an unnecessary
and pernicious habit to younger members of families or associates.30
The addiction process, both before and after the war, was facilitated
by a new medical invention-the hypodermic needle.31
The Civil War theory of addiction provides only a partial explana-
tion. "Careless prescribing of physicians" in the Reconstruction Era
was commonplace. 32 Medical practitioners believed that opiates were
"cure-alls," providing immediate relief from disease and injury.33 It
was not until the late-1870's that addiction from medical administra-
tion was considered, and only toward the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury had the medical world concluded that opiates were in fact
addictive. 34
Physicians, however, were not the only source of narcotics. Drug-
stores, as well as grocery and general stores, sold narcotics over-the-
counter without a doctor's prescription.35 Habit-forming drugs could
be ordered from manufacturers by mail, also without a prescription.36
In addition, hundreds of patent medicines contained opium, morphine
or cocaine. 37 Opiate-laced tonics, syrups, and elixirs made implausible
curative claims,38 and popular beverages contained significant quanti-
ties of cocaine.39
30. HAMILTON WRIGHT, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL OPIUM COMMISSION AND ON THE
OPIUM PROBLEM AS SEEN WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS, S. Doc. No. 61-
377, at 47 (1910) [hereinafter REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N].
31. As the U.S. Public Health Service reported:
[T]he advent of the hypodermic method of administration of drugs, which came into
general use about the time of the Civil War ... was at first said to be a method of
administering morphine without danger of causing addiction. In so far as addiction is
concerned, this discovery proved to be a curse rather than a blessing.
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, 39 PUB. HEALTH REP. No. 20, THE PREVALENCE AND TREND OF
DRUG ADDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND FACTORS INFLUENCING IT 1179, 1198 (1924).
32. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 47.
33. DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA BEFORE
1940 47 (1982).
34. MORGAN, supra note 19, at 27.
35. BRECHER, supra note 18, at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. COURTwRIGHT, supra note 33, at 56; DEALING wITH DRUGS: CONSEOUENCES OF GOV-
ERNMENTAL CONTROL 9, 12 (Ronald Hamowy ed. 1987) [hereinafter DEALING WITH DRUGS].
Notably, Coca-Cola contained cocaine from 1886 until 1903, when caffeine replaced the narcotic.
BRECHER, supra note 18, at 270-71. Sadly, many of the habitu6s were infants, addicted to opiate
syrups administered by their mothers. Id. at 5. The practice of "dosing children with opiates" to
induce calmness was commonplace and was criticized by, among others, Karl Marx. Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
[Vol. 46:483488
1997] OUR VIETNAM 489
In modern times, the principal sources of nineteenth-century nar-
cotic addiction no longer exist.40 The logarithmic advancement of
medicine has eliminated doctor-induced addiction.4 1 Moreover, with
the passage of the first Pure Food & Drugs Act in 1906,42 full disclo-
sure of psychoactive ingredients became federally mandated. Ameri-
cans began to avoid narcotic-laced patent medicines due to the
required disclosure of addictive ingredients. 43
1. Morality
The final two factors influencing the perception of narcotics were
unaffected by scientific enlightenment and linger to this very day.
Although legal, the use of narcotics was looked upon with disdain-an
immoral vice that any strong-willed person could avoid.4 National
publications detailed the "[1]ate hours, dance halls, and unwholesome
cabarets" of the drug culture.45 The public viewed the addict as a bur-
den on society, as well as an impediment to the political and economic
advancement of the nation:
[T]he confirmed victim of the narcotic habit is a pitiable object ....
An outcast, an Ishmaelite, often depraved, always deplorable.., he
is a disgrace to his family and friends, a nuisance to his medical
adviser, and sometimes a menace to the community. A mental,
moral, and physical wreck, obsessed with his desire for his "dope,"
full of deceit, intrigue, and trickery, which have enabled him to get
it .... 46
40. Ethan Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs? History Answers: Yes, AM. HERITAGE,
Feb.-Mar. 1993, at 41, 45 [hereinafter Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?].
41. Id. at 45-46.
42. Pure Food & Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 384, 34 Stat. 175 (1906), amended Pub. L. No. 307, 37
Stat. 416 (1912).
43. See Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?, supra note 40, at 46 ("Sales of patent
medicines containing opiates and cocaine decreased significantly thereafter-in good part be-
cause fewer Americans were interested in purchasing products that they knew to contain these
drugs.").
44. As one commentator articulated:
The gentleman who would not be seen in a bar-room, however respectable, or who
would not purchase liquor and use it at home, lest the odor might be detected upon his
person, procures his supply of morphi[ne] and has it in his pocket ready for instantane-
ous use. It is odorless and occupies but little space .... He zealously guards his secret
from his nearest friend-for popular wisdom has branded as a disgrace that which he
regards as a misfortune.
BRECHER, supra note 18, at 6-7 (citation omitted).
45. TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS, AND MORAL JUDGMENT
11 (1970).
46. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, 30 PUB. HEALTH REP. No. 14, THE HARRISON AN-
TINARCOTIC LAW. THE EFFECT OF ITS ENFORCEMENT ON THE DRUG ADDICT 979, 980 (1915).
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This perceived moral bankruptcy was exacerbated by the addict's
association with violent crime: "The man who uses heroin is a poten-
tial murderer, the same as the cocaine user; he loses all consciousness
of moral responsibility, also fear of consequences. '47 Congressional
hearings abound with testimony on nefarious thugs and gangsters.
When "members of the gang [prepare] to commit murder or robbery
they see that they are well charged [i.e., on narcotics] before they
go."'48 The United States Secretary of State opined in 1910 that nar-
cotics have:
proved to be a creator of criminals and of unusual forms of violence
and ha[ve] been a potent incentive in driving the primitive classes of
the community all over the country to abnormal crimes. Thoughtful
persons ... have reached the conclusion that the time has arrived
for a strict federal control of the traffic.49
The vision of the deplorable narcotics addict, whether criminal or
merely depraved, was antithetical to the brash American individualist.
The drug user was unproductive-or socially counterproductive-and
thus defied the fabled Protestant work ethic and competitive drive.
This, to the true capitalist, was the greatest sin of the habitu. 50
2. Racism
Moral totalitarianism worked parallel to and in combination with
another infamous American philosophy-functional racism. Chinese
laborers, pejoratively known as "Coolies," had been brought to the
western United States for railroad construction.51 The harsh condi-
tions and intense work lured the Chinese workers into "opium dens"
to escape local abuse and suppress their longings for home.52 Antago-
nistic Caucasian leaders, however, vilified Chinese laborers as the
cause of high unemployment and ascribed all social and economic ills
47. Prohibiting the Importation of Crude Opium for the Purpose of Manufacturing Heroin,
H.R. 7079, 68th Cong., at 49 (1924).
48. Id.
49. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 2.
50. Drug use, however, was only one of the depravities condemned by the nineteenth-century
equivalent of the Moral Majority:
[A] variety of new laws prohibit[ed] all sorts of "unhealthy" conduct, including sexual
conduct .... [S]tatutes in both Indiana (enacted in 1881) and Wyoming (enacted in
1890) ... included the following language in their criminal codes: "Whosoever entices,
allures, instigates or aids any person under the age of twenty-one years to commit mas-
turbation or self-pollution shall be deemed guilty of sodomy."
Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE L.J.
2593, 2606-07 (1994) (citation omitted).
51. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 37.
52. See CouRrwrirr, supra note 33, at 64.
[Vol. 46:483
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to Asians and their culture. 53 Hate-mongers used political muscle to
force legislators to pass ignoble regulations aimed directly at the Chi-
nese immigrants.54 For example, in 1875, San Francisco banned the
operation of opium dens, allegedly to prevent the spread of opium
smoking to the Caucasian population and the debauchery that took
place in these drug lairs.55 Some scholars, such as the late Professor
John Kaplan of Stanford Law School, maintained that the ulterior mo-
tive was even more base-to strip Chinese workers of all solace and
drive them from the continent.5 6
A similar regulation was passed a year later in Virginia City, Ne-
vada, prohibiting the keeping of an opium den.57 Neither of these mu-
nicipal ordinances was effective in eliminating the Chinese opium
smoker or the illegal sanctuaries they frequented. 58 Five years after
the Virginia City ordinance was enacted, Nevada passed a state-wide
ban on not only opium dens, but on all opium smoking within its bor-
ders.59 Within a decade, eighteen other states had passed similar leg-
islation, based on racism or moral altruism. 60 In Idaho, for example,
53. See BRECHER, supra note 18, at 42.
54. AMERICA'S HABIT, supra note 29, at 188 n.3. Infamous legislation included a health and
safety code which effectively banned Chinese laundries and a statute which essentially allowed
the Commissioner of Immigration to extort money from Chinese Immigrants. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357 (1886); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1875).
55. AMERICA'S HABIT, supra note 29, at 188; BRECHER, supra note 18, at 42. "The intent of
physicians, legislators, and other social reformers who lobbied for these laws was to protect
whites from what was commonly regarded as a loathsome Oriental vice." DEAUNG WITH
DRUGS, supra note 39, at 12-13.
56. John Kaplan, A Primer on Heroin, 27 STAN. L. REV. 801, 804 (1975). Kaplan writes:
It was thought that prohibition of opium smoking would... deprive the Chinese of this
drug in the United States and so cause their return to China. A parallel hope was that
insofar as opium provided the Chinese with their energy and ability to tolerate hardship
. . . its prohibition would deprive the aliens of an unfair advantage over American
workmen.
Id.
57. BRECHER, supra note 18, at 43.
58. Id.
59. The statute read:
From and after the last day of March, eighteen hundred and eighty-one, it shall be
unlawful for any person or persons, as principals or agents, to have in his, her or their
possession any opium pipe, or part thereof, or to smoke opium, or to sell or give away
for such purpose, or otherwise dispose of any opium in this state, except druggists and
apothecaries; and druggists and apothecaries shall sell it only on the prescription of
legally practicing physicians.
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, PUB. HEALTH BULL. No. 56, DIGEST OF LAWS AND REGULA-
TIONS IN FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO THE POSSESSION, USE, SALE, AND MANU-
FACTURE OF POISONS AND HABrr-FORMING DRUGS 160 (1912) (citing Nevada State Laws, Sale
and Use of Cocaine and Narcotics, § 4811 (1899)).
60. See DEALING wIm DRUGS, supra note 39, at 12-13.
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segregationist legislators made it a crime for "any white person" to
maintain or frequent an opium den.61
Nineteenth-century narrators and politicians claimed that the Chi-
nese opium smoking habit was spreading both geographically and
demographically. 62 Addiction allegedly disseminated from the de-
spised Chinese indentured servants to the African-American caste
and eventually into privileged society.63 Whether among Boston
Brahmans or the elite of San Francisco, haphazard panic swept
through the Caucasian upper class.64 The non-Chinese opium smoker
was identified with the "criminal underworld"-the prostitute, pimp,
gambler, and petty criminal.65 As a result, Chinese immigrants be-
came the scapegoat for increased crime, squalor and uncleanliness. A
report to the governor of California, for example, bordered on the
genocidal: "[A] marked decrease has been noted in the number of
Asiatic immigrants ... because of their inability to secure the opium
necessary to satisfy their cravings. Hence we are in this manner in-
strumental in ridding the community of this class of undesirable
citizens." 66
African-Americans were the brunt of similar racial propaganda.
Addiction among African-Americans during the nineteenth century
was rare and led one southern doctor to declare that "the colored man
is not as susceptible to the habit as the white." 67 However, as antidrug
evangelism spread, so did the myths of rampant addiction among Afri-
can-Americans. For example, a 1903 report by the American Pharma-
ceutical Association stated that "[tihe negroes, the lower and immoral
classes, are naturally most readily influenced, and therefore among
them we have the greater number [of addicts]." 68
Of particular concern to the early twentieth-century bigot was the
effect of cocaine on African-Americans. Testimony before the House
of Representatives in 1910 epitomized their view: "[African-Ameri-
cans on cocaine] have an exaggerated ego. They imagine they can lift
this building, if they want to, or can do anything they want to. They
61. Id. at 13.
62. See id. at 12-13.
63. See CouRTwRIGrr, supra note 33, at 64.
64. See id.; DEALING wnrH DRUGS, supra note 39, at 12-13.
65. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 33, at 64.
66. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 57 (citations omitted). A quarter of a
century later prejudicial juxtaposition would again be invoked-cannabis and Mexicans-result-
ing in the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 238 (1937).
67. MORGAN, supra note 19, at 34.
68. Id. at 92.
[Vol. 46:483
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have no regard for right or wrong. '69 One racist delusion held that
African-Americans on cocaine were impervious to .32 caliber bul-
lets.70 The malevolently gullible police departments of the South re-
sponded by switching to .38 caliber firearms and redoubling efforts to
subdue African-American society.71 Southern racists may not have
been moved by logic, but the image of African-Americans becoming
"oblivious of their prescribed bounds and attack[ing] white society"
was sufficiently inflammatory. 72
Although distinct in locale and invectiveness, racist drug propa-
ganda shared two common traits. First, each narcotic was invidiously
associated with a particular race. African-Americans were "cocaine-
crazed Negroes," Asians were "opium-addled Coolies," and, in the
1930's, Hispanics were "reefer-mad Mexicans. ' 73 Second, racists be-
lieved that narcotics would instigate sexual aggression, or at least sex-
ual interest, by "colored" men against sheltered Caucasian damsels. 74
Tales of Asians doping, seducing, and abducting innocent Caucasian
females were sensationalized by cowardly demagogues. 75 San Fran-
cisco law enforcement allegedly "found white women and Chinamen
side by side under the effects of this drug-a humiliating sight to any-
one with anything left of manhood. '76
The racist myth of African-American men lusting for Caucasian
women-a favored theory of southern slave-owners-was rekindled
by images of "cocaine-crazed Negro rapists. ' 77 These asinine beliefs
69. Importation and Use of Opium: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
61st Cong. 12 (1911) (statement of Dr. Christopher Koch) [hereinafter Importation & Use
Hearings].
70. See MusTo, supra note 17, at 7.
71. In the words of one commentator:
One of the most terrifying beliefs about cocaine was that it ... made blacks almost
unaffected by mere .32 caliber bullets, [and] is said to have caused southern police
departments to switch to .38 caliber revolvers. These fantasies characterized white fear,
not the reality of cocaine's effects, and gave one more reason for the repression of
blacks.
Id.
72. Id. at 6.
73. See MORGAN, supra note 19, at 93-94 ("The Near Easterner had symbolized apprehen-
sions about the adverse personal and social effects of cannabis use. Stereotypes of the Chinese
had summarized fears about the social dangers of opium smoking. In decades to come the Mexi-
can and marihuana, and the African-American or Puerto Rican and heroin would figure in the
debate. This imagery revealed apprehensions about these ethnic groups and a desire to control
their behavior or isolate them.").
74. STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR
TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 10 (1993).
75. Joseph L. Galiber, A Bill to Repeal Criminal Drug Laws: Replacing Prohibition with Reg-
ulation, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831, 851 n.96 (1990).
76. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 74, at 83.
77. See id. at 93-94.
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conformed to the prejudices of a significant portion of Caucasian
America and gave credence to their desire to segregate and suppress
ethnic and racial minorities. The converse was also true-drug abuse
by the "inferior races" gave added credibility to any irrational fear of
narcotics. As Professor David Courtwright asserted in his treatise on
early American drug addiction, "[W]hat we think about addiction
very much depends on who is addicted. 78
The typical narcotic user was, in fact, not a social, racial or eco-
nomic outcast. 79 Caucasians were overrepresented and African-
Americans were underrepresented in the addict population.8 ° Most
habitu6s were native born (with the exception of Chinese workers),
concentrated in the upper and middle classes.8' Male drug users were
typically professionals and female users were socialites; both became
addicted between the ages of twenty-five and forty-five.8 2 Women,
however, comprised between sixty and seventy-five percent of the
user population.8 3 Historically, it was considered inappropriate for
cultured women to drink alcohol.8 4 Opium, therefore, served as an
acceptable "euphoric agent"-a way for "embittered and disillusioned
women [to] drown[ ] their sorrows. '85
The number of addicts in the United States prior to 1914 is dis-
puted. Estimates range from 100,000 to 1 million habitues nation-
wide.86 The most cited, and possibly the most accurate, survey was
conducted by Lawrence Kolb and A.G. Du Mez of the U.S. Public
Health Service.8 7 Using a compilation of the best estimates by various
state and federal agencies, Kolb and Du Mez placed the peak addict
78. COURTWRIGrr, supra note 33, at 3.
79. Id. at 36-42.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. BRECHER, supra note 18, at 17.
84. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 33, at 60-61.
85. Id. at 60. Somewhat appropriately, the racist was joined by the chauvinist in characteriz-
ing drug addiction. A nineteenth-century theorist pronounced that a "[w]oman is more nervous,
has a finer organization than man, [and] is accordingly more susceptible to most of the stimu-
lants." MORGAN, supra note 19, at 39 (citation omitted). The 1902 Committee on the Acquire-
ment of the Drug Habit reiterated this notion in concluding that women, as well as African-
Americans, easily yield to drug abuse. MUSTO, supra note 17, at 17. This presumption came as
no surprise to the sexist, male-dominated gentry, who thought the female sex frail and inferior.
It was never considered that a large percentage of drug addiction among women was caused by
the over-prescribing, exclusively-male medical profession.
86. Musro, supra note 17, at 17.
87. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, 39 PUB. HEALTH REP. No. 20, THE PREVALENCE AND
TREND OF DRUG ADDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND FACTORS INFLUENCING IT 1179, 1179
(1924).
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population at 264,000 at the turn of the century. 88 Sheer numbers,
however, did not instigate change; narcotics were not social or eco-
nomic menaces, and drug prohibition was not at issue.89 Only through
a unique sequence of events, a wave of popular morality, and the rise
of dynamic government officials did the "abolition of the opium evil"
make the public agenda.
B. Federal Involvement
Federal regulation of opium importation and sale was first at-
tempted in areas of clear and complete federal jurisdiction, the territo-
ries and possessions of the United States.9° In 1899, a congressional
act made it unlawful to sell opium without a medical prescription and
to frequent an opium den in the Alaskan Territory.91 Similar federal
legislation was passed with respect to the Panama Canal Zone and
Guam.92 In 1898, the United States acquired the Philippines as a re-
sult of the Spanish-American War and inherited the island-state's per-
ceived opium crisis. 93 Governor (and future U.S. President) Taft
appointed an Opium Investigation Committee to study and recom-
mend appropriate solutions.94 After considering the recommenda-
tions of the committee, Congress enacted a stringent opium statute for
America's latest territorial acquisition.95
Two significant federal laws were enacted in 1906. In May of that
year, Congress passed the District of Columbia Pharmacy Regula-
tion.96 This legislation permitted the sale of narcotics only by regis-
tered pharmacists pursuant to a prescription. 97 Further, the legislation
barred physicians in our nation's capital from prescribing narcotics to
habitu6s unless attempting to cure the addiction or to treat a medical
88. Id.
89. BRECHER, supra note 18, at 7.
90. The first mention of a narcotic in federal legislation was in the tariff act of July 14, 1832,
which declared that opium was free from duty. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at
29. Ten years later, opium was placed on the tariff list with a duty of $.75 per pound. Id. at 81.
The tariff on crude opium fluctuated between $1.00 and $2.50, while the duty on smoking opium
reached $12.00 per pound at the close of the nineteenth century. Id. at 81-82. Morphine duties
never surpassed $2.50 per pound, and cocaine was taxed at twenty-five percent ad valorem. Id.
at 81-83 (all statistics compiled by Hamilton Wright, U.S. Opium Commissioner, 1909).
91. Id. at 25.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 62-63.
94. DEALING wrrIH DRUGS, supra note 39, at 48.
95. The Act of March 3, 1905, immediately banned nonmedicinal opium use for all native
Filipinos and allowed a three-year safe-harbor for all non-Filipinos. Philippine Tariff Revision
Law, ch. 1408, No. 80, 33 Stat. 928, 944 (1905).
96. District of Columbia Pharmacy Regulation, ch. 2084, 34 Stat. 175 (1906).
97. Id. § 11.
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ailment.98 Records of drug prescriptions were required to be kept for
three years and were subject to inspection at all times. 99
In June, Congress enacted the Pure Food & Drugs Act of 1906,
which required that all medicines containing narcotics be labeled as
such and criminalized the sale of adulterated and misbranded drugs. 100
Although the Pure Food & Drugs Act did not prohibit the sale of
nonmedicinal drugs, it diminished the use of narcotic-laced patent
medicines by informing the public of habit-forming ingredients and
preventing inadvertent addiction. 01
Internationally, the United States had negotiated treaties regarding
opium trade with Siam, Korea, and Chinal 02-with the latter country
providing the most interesting and catalytic relationship. An 1858
Sino-American treaty removed opium from the contraband list, al-
lowing American merchants to export opium directly into China. 0 3
Twenty-two years later, China and the United States rescinded this
pact and agreed to a reciprocal prohibition of drug trafficking.'04 The
necessary legislation was not passed by Congress until 1887 o5 and was
subsequently contravened by American citizens importing opium into
the United States and immediately selling it to Chinese immigrants. 106
A later treaty attempted to address the prevailing morphine issue,
stipulating that the United States would prohibit the export of mor-
phine and hypodermic syringes to China, while the Chinese govern-
ment would agree to prevent the manufacture of this narcotic and
injection devices within its borders. 0 7
Within China, opium addiction had become a national epidemic. 08
Opium was blamed for the Empire's decline in education, science,
technology, and military strength and was viewed as a symbol of for-
eign domination by way of narcotics trade.'0 9 The Emperor's edict of
1906 abated opium use in China through inhumane enforcement. 110
Despite its draconian methods, the Chinese anti-opium movement
98. Id. § 12.
99. Id. § 11.
100. Pure Food & Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 384, § 2, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), amended by Pub. L.
No. 301, 37 Stat. 416 (1912).
101. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 19.
102. Id. at 13-15.
103. Id. at 13-14.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 14.
106. Id. at 16.
107. Id. at 15.
108. MUSTO, supra note 17, at 29.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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was supported by American missionaries in the Far East, including the
Right Reverend Charles Brent, Bishop of the Philippine Islands."'
Bishop Brent had served on the Taft Opium Investigation Committee
and was convinced that the United States was morally obliged to come
to China's aid.'1 2 In a July 24, 1906, letter to President Roosevelt,
Brent first suggested an international meeting on opium:
From the earliest days of diplomatic relations with the East, the
course of the United States of America has been so manifestly high
in relation to the traffic in opium that it seems to me almost the duty
of our Government, now that we have the responsibility of actually
handling the matter in our possessions, to promote some movement
that would gather in its embrace representatives from all countries
where the traffic in and use of opium is a matter of moment.
113
The Roosevelt Administration looked at this proposal with eco-
nomic pragmatism rather than philanthropic concern. The inferior
status and cruel treatment afforded the Chinese immigrants in
America destabilized relations between China and the United
States. 114 Chinese merchants had proposed an embargo on all Ameri-
can imports in retaliation, causing profound concern among manufac-
turers, exporters, and government officials in the United States. 1 5 A
United States instigated international conclave to assist China in its
battle against opium was viewed by some commentators as an ideal
method to quell anti-American sentiment. 16
Invitations were forwarded to China, France, Germany, Great Brit-
ain, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Siam, Persia, Turkey,
Austria-Hungary, and Italy.1 7 All but Turkey agreed to send dele-
gates and thirteen nations, including the United States, were repre-
sented." 8 The delegates converged on Shanghai on February 1, 1909,
with the objective of scrutinizing "the opium problem, in all of its
moral, economic, scientific and political aspects, not only as seen in
the Far East but also in the home territories of those participating."' 19
The American delegation, however, faced a rather embarrassing di-
lemma-its government was attempting to enlighten other nations on
the evils of opium and the need for tight restrictions, while hypocriti-
cally failing to regulate narcotics production and interstate trade
111. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 64.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citation omitted).
114. DEALING wrr DRUGS, supra note 39, at 50.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 65.
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within its own borders. According to one report, "vast amounts of...
drug[s] have poured in ever-increasing quantities into the United
States, while the opium-smoking habit.., appears to have been en-
couraged by the tariff and excise laws permitting its importation and
manufacture. 1120 To save face, Congress enacted legislation banning
the importation of smoking opium eight days after the International
Opium Commission had convened. 121 Although the legislation was
limited in scope and effect, its passing "was an urgent and necessary
act if the American Government was to appear ... with fairly clean
hands."122
As members of a "commission," the delegates had no power to bind
their respective countries to an international agreement. 123 The Inter-
national Opium Commission did, however, adopt several resolutions
relating to international and national opium legislation. 124 Eight
months later, the United States proposed an international opium con-
ference in order to conventionalize the propositions upon which the
commission agreed.125 The International Opium Conference assem-
bled at The Hague on December 1, 1911,126 and after nearly two
months of negotiations, the delegates signed an opium convention
with the authority of an international treaty.127 Each participating na-
tion agreed to give the resolutions full legal force within its jurisdic-
tion. 28 For pragmatic reasons, however, the convention was not given
immediate effect. 129 It was agreed that the convention would not be-
120. REPORT RELATIVE TO CONTROL THE OPIUM TRAFFIC, S. Doc. No. 61-736, at 4 (1911)
(citation omitted).
121. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 52-53.
122. Id. at 54.
123. PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON, ABOLMON OF THE OPIUM EVIL, H.R. Doc. No. 63-33,
at 2 (1913).
124. The resolution reads:
[T]he International Opium Commission recommends that each delegation move its
own Government to take measure for the gradual suppression of the practice of opium
smoking in its own territories and possessions.... [Ilt is also the duty of all countries to
adopt reasonable measures to prevent at ports of departure the shipment of opium...
to any country which prohibits the entry of any opium.... [I1t is highly important that
drastic measures should be taken by each government in its own territories and posses-
sions to control the manufacture, sale, and distribution of this drug, and [any other drug
which is] liable to similar abuse and productive of like ill effects.
REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 65-66.
125. Id. at 72.
126. H.R. Doc. No. 63-33, at 3.
127. SECOND INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONFERENCE, S. Doc. No. 63-157, at 12 (1913).
128. H.R. Doc. No. 62-861, at 1.
129. See H.R. Doc. No. 63-33, at 3 ("Since it was found that [the issues resolved] affected not
only the revenue and economic interests of the 12 powers with oriental relations whose repre-
sentatives had assembled at The Hague, but also the major part of the other nations of the world,
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come effective until thirty-four other nations had added their signa-
tures to the protocol. 130
Because a few nations were yet to present their approval by 1913, a
second international conference was held at The Hague to put into
operation the necessary diplomatic machinery for the securing of the
remaining signatures and ratifications of the international conven-
tion.131 A third and final conference was held a year later, resulting in
a compromise which allowed ratifying governments to enforce the
convention even though some obliged nations had yet to sign the
protocol. 132
C. Dr. Hamilton Wright and the Campaign for Domestic
Narcotics Legislation
The international meetings created a framework and a point of de-
parture from which federal legislators could forge a comprehensive,
domestic, anti-narcotics law-if they so chose. More significantly, the
International Opium Commission and its progeny had produced a sin-
gular public figure with the necessary talents, political alliances and
tenacity to force the issue through Congress: Dr. Hamilton Wright.
Born in Cleveland in 1867, Dr. Wright received moderate acclaim for
his medical research on the beriberi epidemic among the Straits
Settlements. 133
After he was appointed to the U.S. delegation by President Theo-
dore Roosevelt in 1908, Dr. Wright immediately launched an investi-
gation into American drug use and abuse.1 34 The methods of this
often cited study have generally been discredited due to the leading
nature of the survey questions and the misrepresentation of drug con-
sumption and addiction within the United States.135 "Wright greatly
exaggerated the extent of opium consumption... [yet] they provided
the conceptual basis for remedial legislation regarding the problem in
the first two decades of the twentieth century," remarked historian
Arnold H. Taylor. 136 It is difficult to determine whether Dr. Wright
was driving the anti-narcotics movement toward success, or whether
the conference came to the conclusion that to make its convention effective, it was necessary to
secure adherence thereto by the other nations of the world.").
130. See id.
131. S. Doc. No. 63-157, at 10-12.
132. DEALING WITH DRUGS, supra note 39, at 51.
133. MORGAN, supra note 19, at 98.
134. Id. at 99.
135. E.g., id. at 100.
136. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 33, at 30.
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the movement was propelling "the father of American narcotic laws"
to the fame and fortune he desired.137
In Dr. Wright's report on the International Opium Commission, he
placed emphasis on the United States maintaining its status as a virtu-
ous and moral archetype for the rest of the world.138 The report
pointed to the laws of Italy, Spain, Austria-Hungary and Germany as
being effective in averting massive drug addiction: "Owing to efficient
government regulation and the good sense of their people they are not
confronted with the problem that confronts us today. '139
The Taft Administration, however, could only urge Congress to pass
domestic federal laws regarding narcotics. 140 As noted above, the
Opium Commission was only authorized to make recommendations
on potential legislation.' 4' In his annual message to Congress on De-
cember 7, 1909, President Taft stated that "[c]ollateral investigations
of the opium question in this country lead me to recommend that the
manufacture, sale, and use of opium and its derivatives in the United
States should be, so far as possible, more rigorously controlled by
legislation."'1 42
After the Opium Commission's recommendations had been con-
ventionalized in 1910, the Executive Branch was in a stronger position
to press Congress to enact domestic legislation. Article 9 of the Inter-
national Opium Convention required that signatory nations "shall use
their best efforts" to limit or abolish the manufacture of narcotics,143
and Article 11 stated:
The contracting powers shall take measures to prohibit in their in-
ternal commerce all transfer of narcotics. The convention had all
the makings of an Article VI treaty under the United States Consti-
tution and therefore, the Administration reasoned, Congress had
the procedural as well as the moral responsibility to initiate en-
abling legislation.'"
137. DEALING WrrH DRUGS, supra note 39, at 14; MORGAN, supra note 19, at 98.
138. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 51 ("[I]t became apparent.., that there
was a large misuse of opium in the continental United States. When this had been sufficiently
demonstrated by the opium commission, it became the bounden duty of our Government to take
some steps to clear up the home problem.... Otherwise the American people stood to be
accused of living in a glass house that no doubt would have been shattered on their heads.").
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1.
141. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing the power of the Opium
Commission).
142. REPORT RELATIVE TO CONTROL THE OPIUM TRAFFIC, S. Doc. No. 61-736, at 1 (1911).
143. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, art. 9, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. No. 612:
L.N.T.S. 187.
144. APPROPRIATION FOR ERADICATION OF OPIUM EVIL, H.R. Doc. No. 62-861, at 39-40
(1912).
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More than a year later, Secretary of State P.C. Knox sent a tactful
message to the Speaker of the House, reminding Congress that legisla-
tion was "necessary to enable the United States to redeem pledges
entered into by virtue of the international opium convention. ' 145 Dr.
Wright, in his report on the 1910 International Opium Conference,
was somewhat more blunt in assessing Congress' efforts:
[I]n spite of repeated urging by the Executive, the Congress so far
has failed favorably to consider carefully drafted measures aimed to
bring the continental United States into line and in accord with the
principles now embraced by the International Opium Conven-
tion.... Congress should speedily consider and pass the legislation
so urgently needed to redeem the position of this Government, and
to place it in the advanced line achieved in domestic legislation by a
majority of the interested nations. 146
In 1913, the White House renewed the previous administration's call
for "the enactment of the requisite antidrug legislation to which this
Government is pledged internationally." 147
Perceived international obligation was not the only force behind the
movement for domestic narcotics legislation. The aforementioned
moral totalitarianism coalesced in the last decade of the nineteenth
century, forming what is now known as the "Progressive Move-
ment. 1 48 Its core ideal was that the nation's morals could and should
be shaped by federal legislation. 49 The Movement's leaders-a
broad-based league of mainstream reformers and ministers-at-
tempted to abate the evils of the Industrial Revolution and the
avowed concomitant vices.150 The progressive agenda included exces-
sive child labor, impure food and medications, wage and hour ex-
ploitation, prostitution, gambling, and alcohol.' 5' The reformers
successfully lobbied Congress, culminating in, inter alia, the Mann
Act, 5 2 the Anti-Lottery Act,153 and the Volstead Act.154
As the leading anti-narcotics reformer, Dr. Wright drew upon the
rhetoric of the Progressive Movement, initially characterizing drug
abuse as a moral evil and arguing that nothing short of complete abo-
145. Id. at 2.
146. Id. at 33-34, 36.
147. PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON, ABOLMON OF THE OPIUM EVIL, H.R. Doc. No. 63-33,
at 1 (1913).
148. DEALING wmiT DRUGS, supra note 39, at 46.
149. Id.
150. STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC
PoucY 179 (1990).
151. Id.
152. See id. (discussing the Mann Act).
153. Id. (discussing the Anti-Lottery Act).
154. Id. (discussing the Volstead Act).
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lition would suffice.155 While this plea had resonance with some na-
tional politicians, it was insufficient to garner the necessary support.
Ever the political chameleon, Dr. Wright recognized that national leg-
islators were relatively apathetic toward narcotics criminalization. 156
His testimony before Congress, therefore, was blatantly formulated to
secure the votes of southern legislators: 157
It has been stated on very high authority that the use of cocaine by
the negroes of the South is one of the most elusive and troublesome
questions which confront the enforcement of the law in most of the
Southern States .... In the South the drug is commonly sold in
whisky dives .... The combination of low-grade spirits and cocaine
makes a maddening compound. . . .It has been authoritatively
stated that cocaine is often the direct incentive to the crime of rape
by the negroes of the South and other sections of the country.1 58
Negrophobic representatives fervently opposed any federal intru-
sion on state powers, believing that this would eventually lead to en-
forcement of the African-Americans' civil rights against the will of
their state. 159 However, when expressed in terms of African-Ameri-
can uprisings and the rape of Caucasian women, all states' rights con-
cerns were abandoned. 160 Dr. Wright also included tales of "Oriental
vice" intended to arouse the anti-Chinese sentiment in western con-
gressmen: "One of the most unfortunate phases of the habit of opium
smoking in this country is the large number of women who have be-
come involved and were living as common-law wives of or cohabiting
with Chinese in the Chinatowns of our various cities."' 161 In a later
appearance before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Dr.
Wright repeated his racially charged admonitions. 162 Emphasis was
placed upon the corrupting influence of Chinese immigrants, the dan-
ger of the cocaine-crazed African-Americans, and the criminality of
the minority addict-"thereby creat[ing] a public opinion against the
use" of narcotics. 63
Notwithstanding the perceived international obligation and Dr.
Wright's moral and racial appeals, proposed legislation stalled in com-
155. See DEALING wrrH DRUGS, supra note 39, at 55.
156. See id. at 57.
157. COURTWRIGHT, supra note 33, at 82-83.
158. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 49-50.
159. DEALING wITH DRUGS, supra note 39, at 55.
160. Id.
161. REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 45.
162. Importation & Use Hearings, supra note 69, at 23 passim.
163. Id. at 503; see also MORGAN, supra note 19, at 106-07 (discussing the testimony before the
Ways and Means Committee).
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mittee.164 Drug manufacturers, physicians, and pharmacists were di-
vided on the issue of domestic narcotics regulation, 165 despite claims
to the contrary by Dr. Wright.166 Moreover, legitimate constitutional
questions were raised. The prescribing, dispensing, and consumption
of narcotics was considered to be solely within the jurisdiction of the
states. 167 Federal legislation which placed the pharmaceutical com-
pany, the pharmacist, and the physician under federal policing powers
was considered by many to be outside the scope of congressional
authority. 168
164. See Importation & Use Hearings, supra note 69, at 501-10.
165. The medical profession was severely fragmented on the issue of domestic drug legisla-
tion. Those who backed the Progressive Movement and the anti-narcotics cause supported strict
laws and complete abolition. MORGAN, supra note 19, at 109. Others believed in medical auton-
omy and that the best judges of medical issues are physicians, not legislators and federal agen-
cies. Jim Stipanuk, The High Priesthood: Room Under the E Pluribus Umbrella, 22 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 703, 704 (1990). Still others preferred a middle ground, with "grandfathered" legislation and
benevolent treatment of those already addicted. Testimony before the House Committee on
Ways and Means was indicative of this highly divisive issue in the medical community. Importa-
tion & Use Hearings, supra note 69, at 37 passim. Medical representatives from both sides of the
debate, from private and government positions, with varying degrees of expertise, praised or
condemned the proposed legislation. Id. Legislators were left with enough evidence to medi-
cally support the passage or defeat of an anti-narcotics law, leaving only a purely political deci-
sion to be made.
166. See, e.g., REP. ON INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 35, 46, 59 (arguing that import-
ers and manufacturers supported domestic legislation); 50 CONG. REC. 2187, 2202 (1913) (nam-
ing the individuals, organizations, and companies supporting domestic legislation).
167. See MUsTo, supra note 17, at 9.
168. Id. Supreme Court cases, however, had recently upheld federal legislation prohibiting
the interstate transportation of foreign lottery tickets, Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903),
contaminated eggs, Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911), and women for im-
moral purposes, Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913). Further support was offered by the
passage and subsequent successful defense of the 1906 Pure Food & Drugs Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat.
768 (1906) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1906), repealed by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938)). With these decisions in mind, the Progressive
leadership turned to the issue of Congress' constitutional powers. Secretary of State P.C. Knox
suggested that "restrictions upon illicit traffic in opium and other habit-forming drugs" could be
permitted "through the power over interstate commerce and the power of taxation." REP. ON
INT'L OPIUM COMM'N, supra note 30, at 4. Dr. Wright suggested that legislation based on Con-
gress' power to tax was more likely to survive judicial challenge, thus "placing the interstate
traffic in such drugs under the control of the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Treasury De-
partment." Id. at 60. He understood that Congress would not favor a bill based on strict prohi-
bition, or one that created new federal powers or vastly extended their current jurisdiction.
MORGAN, supra note 19, at 106. The best bet was U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1 which states that:
"The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes." The key proponents of anti-narcotics
legislation would later accept this advice.
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D. The Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act 169
The political climate changed nearly overnight-and with it, the
prospects for domestic narcotics legislation. Democrats took control
of the House of Representatives for the first time in nearly two de-
cades,170 and Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated as President of the
United States. In referring to the stalled legislation, President Wilson
expressed complete support for domestic narcotics regulation in his
first message to Congress:
At this vital period of the movement, to fail to take the few final
steps necessary definitively and successfully to conclude the work
would be unthinkable, and I therefore trust that there may be no
delay in the enactment of the desired legislation, and the conse-
quent mitigation if not suppression of the vice which has caused
such world-wide misery and degradation. 171
The primary patron of the pending legislation was the legendary Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan, President Wilson's Secretary of State. As "a
man of deep prohibitionist and missionary ... sympathies,' 172 Bryan
pressed for the bill's passage, "thus placing this Government on a
rightful position before the world."'1 73
Against claims that it was schematically tortuous and inconsistent in
key portions, 174 the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act 175 was enacted with-
out much fanfare on December 14, 1914,176 and took effect on
169. Harrison Act, 38 Stat. 785, §§ 1-12 (1914), amended by 40 Stat. 1130, § 1006 (1919)
(repealed 1939).
170. DEALING WITH DRUGS, supra note 39, at 54; MusTo, supra note 17, at 44.
171. PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON, ABOLmON OF THE OPIUM EVIL, H.R. Doc. No. 63-33,
at 1 (1913).
172. BRECHER, supra note 18, at 49.
173. H.R. Doc. No. 63-33, at 5.
174. MUSTO, supra note 17, at 55.
175. Representative Francis Burton Harrison of New York, a cultured Tammany Hall Demo-
crat, was the initial sponsor and namesake of the "cornerstone of narcotic law and policy in
America." Id. at 54; TREBACH, supra note 22, at 118. Representative Harrison succinctly de-
scribed the short history of the Act as it first entered congressional debate:
The bill H.R. 6282 [the Harrison Act] is the outcome of a long series of conferences
between members of the Committee on Ways and Means and officials of the State and
Treasury Departments and representatives of the various trades which will be affected
by the enforcement of the provisions of this bill.
The legislation, as I recollect it, was first proposed to the House by bills introduced,
respectively, by the gentleman from Illinois [, Mr. Mann,] and the gentleman from Ver-
mont, Mr. Foster, now deceased .... Upon the decease of the gentleman from Ver-
mont, who was one of the most useful and most admired and one of the finest Members
of this House, I was asked by the representatives of the State Department, who had
kept in touch with the legislation in all its phases, to introduce the same bill, and I did
so in the last Congress.
50 CONG. REC. 2187, 2201 (1913).
176. See MORGAN, supra note 19, at 107.
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March 1, 1915, with almost no public or journalistic scrutiny.177 Con-
temporary commentators on the Harrison Act agree that its debate
and passage-after years of delay and tremendous exertion-was an-
ticlimactic. 178 Discussion focused on international commitment, not
domestic virtues. 179 Even though special interest groups exerted cus-
tomary political pressure, Congress did not consider addiction, medic-
inal, and prohibition-versus-taxation issues.180
Contrary to contemporary beliefs, the Harrison Act 181 did not insti-
177. See id. at 109.
178. See id. at 107.
179. BRECHER, supra note 18, at 48.
180. MORGAN, supra note 19, at 107.
181. The Harrison Act, in its final ratified form, was comprised of twelve sections and was
entitled "An Act to provide for the registration of, with collectors of internal revenue, and to
impose a special tax upon all persons who produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in,
dispense, sell, distribute, or give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or prepara-
tions, and for other purposes." Ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785, 785 (1914), revised by ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1130
(1919) (repealed 1939). Section 1 required the registration and annual special tax payment of all
individuals in the narcotics chain of distribution. Further, the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, was empowered to create and enforce
"needful rules and regulations for carrying the provisions of this Act into effect." Id. at 785-86.
Section 2 made it unlawful for anyone to sell narcotics without a legal order blank, and a copy of
this prescription had to be saved and open to official inspection for two years. These blanks
were to be sold and recorded by the I.R.S. to registered individuals, and it was illegal for anyone
else to attain or use the forms. The most notable clause stated "[n]othing contained in this
section shall apply . . . [to the] dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a
patient by a physician ...registered under this Act in the course of his professional practice
only." Id. at 786-87 (emphasis added). The significance of this sentence will be discussed below.
Section 3 declared that an I.R.S. collector can, at any time, demand an inventory of drugs
received by a registered individual within the previous three months, as well as the names of
each purchaser/patient and the quantities of narcotics received. Id. at 787-88. Section 4 made
any interstate drug transfer by an unregistered individual illegal. Id. Section 5 allowed drug
enforcement agents to inspect the records required by Sections 2 and 3. Id. at 788. Section 6
exempts patent medicines with less than two grains of opium, one-fourth of a grain of morphine,
one-eighth of a grain of heroin, and one grain of codeine. Id. at 789. Section 7 stated that
previous tax laws are not altered or rescinded by this Act. Id. Section 8 made possession of
illicit narcotics presumptive evidence of criminal liability, with the burden of proof on the de-
fendant. Id. Section 9 provided that a violation of the Act can be punished with a fine of up to
$2,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years. Id. Section 10 authorized the appointment of
necessary employees by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Id. Section 11 appropriated
$150,000 to execute the Act. Id. Finally, Section 12 stated that the Act did not impair, alter,
amend, or repeal either the Pure Drug and Food Act of 1906 or the Opium Exclusion Act of
1909. Id. at 790.
The Harrison Act was amended in 1919. The assessment of the special tax was increased, and
a new, one cent per ounce commodity tax on opium and coca transported in the United States
was added. Further, an official stamp was required to be affixed to all legal packages of narcot-
ics, and lack of the stamp was presumptive evidence of a criminal violation. Ch. 18, 40 Stat.
1130, 1131 § 1006 (1919) (repealed 1939).
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tute drug prohibition. 182 Rather, the Harrison Act had three discrete
nonpunitive goals. First, it sought to regulate the marketing of drugs:
[T]he Harrison Narcotic Act on its face was merely a law for the
orderly marketing of opium, morphine, heroin, and other drugs-in
small quantities over the counter, and in larger quantities on a phy-
sician's prescription.... It is unlikely that a single legislator realized
in 1914 that the law Congress was passing would later be deemed a
prohibition law.' 83
Second, the Harrison Act provided revenue for the federal govern-
ment. 184 In 1914, the U.S. Public Health Service opined that the Har-
rison Act was "not in any way designed to be a regulatory measure
but is intended primarily as a revenue measure."'1 85 Author Richard
Ashley reiterated this belief in 1972: "[The Harrison Act was] a clas-
sic example of an uninformed Congress and an uninformed public be-
ing manipulated by a bureaucracy for its own ends .... The act was
passed as a revenue and record-keeping measure and nothing
more.,"186
Third, the Harrison Act was enacted to meet American treaty com-
mitments from the aforementioned international narcotics commis-
sions, conferences, and conventions. 8 7 Rather than addict prevention
or moral interdiction, the Harrison Act was "on its face no more than
an economic regulation, and was never intended to prohibit the use or
sale of narcotics.' 88
E. Judicial Challenges, Mutating Goals, and Beyond
Enforcement of the Harrison Act was entrusted to the Internal
Revenue Service of the Treasury Department. 189 The I.R.S. was well-
182. See DUKE & GROSS, supra note 74, at 84 ("[T]he Harrison Act fell far short of outright
prohibition of cocaine and opiate distribution. First, it exempted potions and patent medicines
sold over-the-counter and by mail order if the concentrations were below specific limits. Second,
pharmacists could sell the drugs on prescription by a physician, and physicians could prescribe
them. Physicians could also distribute the drugs themselves, and were not even required to keep
records of their distributions on house calls. Drug distribution had become medicalized in
America.").
183. BRECHER, supra note 18, at 49.
184. See id.
185. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, 29 PUB. HEALTH REP., SALE AND USE OF COCAINE AND
NARCOTICS 3180, 3181 (1914).
186. TREBACH, supra note 22, at 119 (citation omitted). Attorney Rufus King and Professor
Troy Duster agree that the Harrison Act was not prohibitory on paper and was not intended to
be a comprehensive regulation. Id. at 119-20.
187. Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501,
508 (1990); see also supra notes 90-168 and accompanying text (discussing historical purposes for
drug legalization).
188. Schmoke, supra note 187, at 508 (citation omitted).
189. Harrison Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 §§ 1-3, 10 (1914).
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equipped for the task of investigating and prosecuting violators of the
Act-smuggling, tax evasion, and courtroom challenges were its
forte.190 Considering the colossal burden of annual income tax filings,
Congress determined that the I.R.S. was capable of handling the regis-
tration of nearly 220,000 physicians, dentists, veterinarians, and retail
druggists and over 1,500 manufacturers, importers, and wholesalers.191
Only months after becoming operative, slight deviations from the
legislative intent began to contort the Harrison Act's purpose. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue promulgated regulations for en-
forcing the domestic anti-narcotics law.192 These rules, however, were
prohibitory and bore little relation to the Harrison Act's original
goals.193 Rather than "orderly marketing" or taxation regulations, the
Act as interpreted began to take on the semblance of a criminal
statute.194
These gradual mutations did not go unnoticed. Within weeks of ini-
tial enforcement, the Department of Justice faced direct challenges to
the propriety of the administrative dictates and the constitutionality of
the Harrison Act itself.195 On May 12, 1915, a Pennsylvania district
court questioned the legality of federal narcotics control. 196 "This is a
revenue act; and unless it is such .... it would perhaps violate the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States."'1 97 The court
190. MusTo, supra note 17, at 121.
191. Id.
192. See COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS
No. 35. RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION, MANUFACTURE, PRODUCTION, COMPOUNDING, SALE,
DISPENSING, AND GIVING AWAY OF OPIUM OR COCA LEAVES THEIR SALTS, DERIVATIVES, OR
PREPARATIONS THEREOF (1915).
193. The first set of rules stated:
(1) "In personal attendance" meant that a physician must be away from his primary
place of business.
(2) A consumer cannot register under the law, and therefore can only procure illicit
narcotics from a physician.
(3) Possession of narcotics without proof of acquirement through legal distribution
channels is prima facie evidence of a violation.
(4) Only a "normal" dosage of narcotics would be considered a valid prescription.
See MUSTO, supra note 17, at 122 (summarizing the contents of the Internal Revenue Regula-
tion). The most controversial regulation attempted to define in the course of his professional
practice only: "In cases of treatment of addicts these prescriptions should show the good faith of
the physician in the legitimate practice of his profession by a decreasing dosage or reduction of
the quantity prescribed from time to time." Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
194. See id. at 128.
195. See id. at 123-28.
196. See id. at 125.
197. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 225 F. 1003, 1004 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
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held that prosecution of a consumer for mere possession was not con-
sistent with the legislation. 198
Less than a month later, a district court in Tennessee held that the
sheer quantity of narcotics otherwise legitimately prescribed was not
enough to sustain an indictment against a physician.199 Similarly, only
four months after its effective date, a Montana district court judge
brazenly called for the repeal of the Harrison Act, using language usu-
ally reserved for "cruel and unusual punishment" challenges under the
Eighth Amendment.200
The Harrison Act's journey from presidential pen to the United
States Supreme Court steps took less than a year. In United States v.
Jin Fuey Moy, the defendant, a Pittsburgh physician, had prescribed a
dram of morphine sulphate to Willie Martin, an opium addict.201 The
indictment charged a conspiracy to issue narcotics neither in good
faith nor for medicinal purposes, but solely to satisfy a drug addict's
appetite.202 The government argued that the Harrison Act was rati-
fied to fulfill a treaty obligation under the International Opium Con-
vention and, as such, was well within the limits of congressional power
and was part of "the supreme Law of the Land" under Article IV of
the United States Constitution.2 03 The Court, however, rebuked this
proposition: "The statute does not purport to be in execution of a
treaty, but calls itself a registration and taxation act. The provision
198. Id. at 1005. The court stated:
The unlawful act . . . charged against the defendant . . . [consists of] having in the
possession and under the control of [the defendant] certain drugs. The indictment,
therefore, cannot be sustained, unless the having in the possession ... certain drugs is
an unlawful thing and a violation of the act of Congress.
... I think that the word "person" should be held to refer to the persons with whom
the act of Congress is dealing; that is, the persons who are required to register and pay
the special tax in order to import, produce, manufacture, deal in, dispense, sell, or dis-
tribute [and not the consumers of drugs].
Id.
199. See United States v. Friedman, 224 F. 276, 278 (W.D. Tenn. 1915) ("[T]here is no limit
fixed to the amount of said drugs that a physician may prescribe, nor is there any duty imposed
upon him, other than to keep a record of all such drugs dispensed by him, and the name and
address of the patient, except those to whom he may personally administer, and that he must
preserve the records for a period of two years.").
200. See United States v. Woods, 224 F. 278,279-80 (D. Mont. 1915) ("[Violation of the Act is]
a mere legal infraction, and not a true crime, [the punishment] is a consequence shockingly
disproportionate to the offense, is antagonistic to sound criminal economics, and is abhorrent to
justice. ... [T]he inevitable result being resentment and prejudice against courts and govern-
ment, law and order, and impairment of and danger to the general well-being of society. All
these evils could and ought to be avoided by repeal of [the Harrison Act] and its arbitrary stamp
of felony and infamy upon so many petty violations of laws of the United States.").
201. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. at 399.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 401 (refering to U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2).
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before us was not required by the opium convention, and [will not be
interpreted as being] entitled to the supremacy claimed by the govern-
ment for treaties .... ,,204 Without the deference of international
treaty, the Court considered the Harrison Act to be nothing more
than a revenue statute.205 Because Congress could not have intended
"to make the probably very large proportion of citizens who have
some preparation of opium in their possession criminal," the Court
held that mere possession of narcotics was not sufficient to charge
conspiracy. 20 6
The Court's decision in Jin Fuey Moy was an extreme blow to the
Treasury Department's enforcement of the Harrison Act. The Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue denounced the Court for making "it
practically impossible to control the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs by
unregistered persons. '20 7 The three years following Jin Fuey Moy,
however, would so alter public sentiment through social change as to
force the Court to reconsider its decision.208 American leaders be-
came convinced that drug maintenance programs were futile and, in
fact, counterproductive; the anti-alcohol crusade had been fulfilled by
the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution; World War I had cre-
ated a new brand of nationalism, which had no place for narcotics or
addicts; and the Bolshevik Revolution generated a "Red Scare" which
engulfed the entire nation.209 Narcotics were associated with perver-
sion and rebellion; addiction was considered unpatriotic.210
The United States Supreme Court was not sequestered from this
social upheaval, and the events of the previous three years unavoid-
ably influenced its decisions. On March 3, 1919, the Court decided
two cases which "effectively foreclosed any possibility of a more hu-
mane policy toward drug addicts. ' 211 The first, United States v.
Doremus,21 2 held that neither the use of the taxing power nor the
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 402.
207. MUsTo, supra note 17, at 130 (citation omitted).
208. See id. at 131-32.
209. See id. at 133-34.
210. Id.; see also Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?, supra note 40, at 46 ("In the after-
math of World War I, many Americans, stunned by the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia and
fearful of domestic subversion, turned their backs on the liberalizing reforms of the ... [preced-
ing] era. In such an atmosphere the notion of tolerating drug use or maintaining addicts in the
clinics that had arisen after 1914 struck most citizens as both immoral and unpatriotic. [This fear
also] was motivated in no small part by [narcotics] association with feared and despised ethnic
minorities, especially the masses of Eastern and Southern European immigrants.").
211. Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?, supra note 40, at 46.
212. 249 U.S. 86 (1919). The case involved a registered physician who sold five hundred one-
sixth grain tablets of heroin to a known drug addict, with the sole purpose of "gratifying his
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states' concurrent jurisdiction made the Harrison Act unconstitu-
tional.213 In the second case, Webb v. United States, 214 the Court held
that a physician could not prescribe narcotics solely to alleviate the
discomfort of addiction: "[T]o call such an order for the use of mor-
phine a physician's prescription would be so plain a perversion of
meaning that no discussion of the subject is required. ' 215 As a result,
physicians were criminally banned from prescribing narcotics to their
drug-addicted patients. 216 This holding was preposterous, however,
given approved medical theories and overt congressional intent.217
Although the Court continued to hear cases brought under the Har-
rison Act, its review was wholly cursory.218 By 1919, narcotics prohi-
bition became a reality-in spite of the sixty-third Congress' true
appetite for the drug as an habitual user thereof." Id. at 90. The physician was indicted under
Section 2 of the Harrison Act for selling drugs not "in the course of his professional practice."
Id. at 91-92.
213. Id. at 93-95. As the Court articulated:
If the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing
authority conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the sup-
posed motives which induced it.
... Nor is it sufficient ... that the same business may be regulated by the police
power' of the State.
... That Congress might levy an excise tax upon [manufacturers, doctors or dealers]
cannot be successfully disputed.
... We cannot agree with the contention that [the Harrison Act is] beyond the power
of Congress..
Id. (citations omitted).
214. 249 U.S. 96 (1919). Webb involved a physician-defendant prescribing narcotics in large
quantities to drug addicts that would be subsequently filled by a pharmacist-defendant. Id. at 98.
There was no evidence of any medical examination by the doctor nor any inquiry into the size of
the prescription by the pharmacist. Id. The pharmacist purchased thirty times more morphine
than the average retail druggist and he had sold narcotics sixty-five hundred times in less than a
year. Id. The doctor charged fifty cents for each prescription and had written over four thou-
sand prescriptions during the same period. Id.
215. Id. at 99-100.
216. DEALING wiTH DRUGS, supra note 39, at 128.
217. See Schmoke, supra note 187, at 509-10 (discussing medical and congressional
perspectives).
218. In the next six years, the United States Supreme Court issued decisions upholding the
use and extension of the Harrison Act. In Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920), the
Court said explicitly what had been implicit in Doremus and Webb-prescribing and supplying
narcotics to an addict for his addiction violated the Act. As the Court articulated:
Manifestly the phrases "to a patient" and "in the course of his professional practice
only" are intended to confine the immunity of a registered physician, in dispensing the
narcotic drugs mentioned in the act, strictly within the appropriate bounds of a physi-
cian's professional practice, and not to extend it to include a sale to a dealer or a distri-
bution intended to cater to the appetite or satisfy the craving of one addicted to the use
of the drug. A "prescription" issued for either of the latter purposes protects neither
the physician who issues it nor the dealer who knowingly accepts and fills it.
Id. at 194 (citing Webb v. United States, 294 U.S. 96 (1919)).
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intent.219 Until 1960, the Harrison Act remained the cornerstone of
American narcotics regulation, experiencing alterations only in its
penalty scheme.220 The drug user and his supplier, however, were
driven completely underground. Organized crime created a black
market for narcotics, eventually becoming a billion dollar "indus-
try. ''221 Government matched this threat with an ever-expanding en-
forcement bureaucracy, powered by its own billion dollar budget.222
During the 1960's, a schism grew between those who pitied and
wished to rehabilitate the addict and those who detested and wished
to incarcerate him as a criminal. The latter group dominated the fed-
eral government and pushed for further and stronger anti-narcotics
legislation. In 1970, a comprehensive statute was enacted, replacing
the Harrison Act and creating a sweeping strategy to control drug use
and abuse.22 3 In 1972, President Nixon declared the first War on
Drugs.224 A decade later, President Reagan redeclared the drug
war.2 25 In 1988, President Bush re-redeclared the War on Drugs.2 26 It
is yet to be seen whether President Clinton will re-re-redeclare official
hostilities toward narcotics.
The rest is literally history. One only needs to look around to real-
ize the ubiquity of current anti-narcotics laws. However, in spite of
escalating law enforcement efforts, fundamental questions remain un-
changed and unanswered. In 1926, the Illinois Medical Journal made
the following argument:
In the following term, the Court tackled the issue of federalism and narcotics regulation. Min-
nesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921). The defendant had been convicted
under a Minnesota state narcotics law for trafficking and selling illicit drugs. Id. at 42. The
question on appeal was whether the state "statute conflicts with the terms and provisions of the
federal Harrison Anti-Narcotics Drug Act .... and is therefore beyond the power of the State to
enact." Id. at 45. The Court held that, even though "the State has no power to enact laws which
will render nugatory a law of Congress enacted to collect revenue," Minnesota's law (and implic-
itly the narcotics laws of other states) was consistent with and merely augmented the Harrison
Act. Id. From this point on, the federalism and states rights concerns were nullified and con-
flicting jurisdiction claims were moot.
219. See DUKE & GROSS, supra note 74, at 85-86. In 1937, the Marijuana Tax Act added
marijuana to the Harrison Act's list of illicit drugs. See id. at 90-93 (discussing two popular
theories about why marijuana was made illegal).
220. Kaplan, supra note 56, at 805.
221. See infra notes 229-41 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of how a black
market for illicit drugs is created).
222. See infra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
223. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 19, 21, 26, 31, 40, 42, 46, 48, 49
U.S.C.).
224. See Taylor Branch, Let Koop Do It: A Prescription for the Drug War, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 24, 1988, at 22.
225. Id. at 25.
226. George Church et al., Thinking the Unthinkable, TIME, May 30, 1988, at 12, 13.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
The Harrison Narcotic law should never have been placed upon
the Statute books of the United States. It is to be granted that the
well-meaning blunderers who put it there had in mind only the idea
of making it impossible for addicts to secure their supply of "dope"
and to prevent unprincipled people from making fortunes, and fat-
tening upon the infirmities of their fellow men.
As is the case with most prohibitive laws, however, this one fell
far short of the mark. So far in fact, that instead of stopping the
traffic, those who deal in dope, now make double their money from
the poor unfortunates upon whom they prey .... The doctor who
needs narcotics used in reason to cure and to allay human misery
finds himself in a pit of trouble. The lawbreaker is in clover.
... It is costing the United States more to support bootleggers of
both narcotics and alcoholics than there is good coming from the
farcical laws now on the statute books.
As to the Harrison Narcotic law.. . [p]eople are beginning to ask,
"Who did that, anyway?" 227
Seventy years, thousands of lives, and billions of dollars later, Ameri-
cans are still asking the same questions. Is it not time to start getting
some answers?
II. ECONOMICS
The harm that is done by drugs is predominantly caused by the fact
that they are illegal.
-Milton Friedman 228
A. The Black Market
So how do you create a black market, anyway? It is actually quite
simple, as Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke asserted before a congres-
sional committee: "The black market is a result of the manufacture
and sale of [drugs] being criminalized[;] profits from drug sales are
enormous because the substances cannot be obtained legally. '2 29 In
general, a successful underground market requires only a few ele-
ments. First, a heavily demanded product must be banned by the gov-
ernment-narcotics and their criminalization certainly suffice. 230
227. Stripping the Medical Profession of Its Powers and Giving Them to a Body of Lawmakers:
The Proposed Amendment to the Harrison Narcotic Act-Everyone Seems to Know About Doc-
toring Except Doctors, 49 ILL. MED. J. 446, 447 (1926).
228. Church et al., supra note 226, at 14.
229. SELECT COMM. ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 101ST CONG., LEGALIZATION OF
ILLICIT DRUGS: IMPACT AND FEASIBILITY (A REVIEW OF RECENT HEARINGS) 11 (Comm. Print
1989) (summary of testimony of Baltimore mayor, Kurt Schmoke) [hereinafter IMPACT AND
FEASIBILITY].
230. See Murray E. Jarvik, The Drug Dilemma: Manipulating the Demand, SCIENCE, Oct. 19,
1990, at 387 ("When highly addictive drugs are proscribed from use and no alternative is avail-
able, a potential illicit market is created.").
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Second, there must be an ample supply of the product to meet the
consumer's demand. As detailed below, the supply of narcotics is
nearly bottomless while statutory prohibition serves as a feckless
liturgy.231
Third, suppliers must be guaranteed a profit margin commensurate
with the "costs" accompanying prohibition. These costs include vast
quantities of capital, land, and labor solely compelled by the existence
of prohibition, as well as the nonquantifiable risks of violence and in-
carceration. 232 The income from illicit drug trafficking, however, is
more than commensurate with these costs. The profit margins are
among the widest in the world, with a few pesos of powder or leaves
transformed into hundred-dollar packages on American streets.233
Similarly, the gross profits are simply astonishing-billions of dollars
in untaxed proceeds. 234 In the words of former police chief and cur-
rent Hoover Institution research fellow Joseph McNamara: "It's the
money, stupid. '235
After 35 years as a police officer in three of the country's largest
cities, that is my message to the righteous politicians who obsti-
nately proclaim that a war on drugs will lead to a drug-free
America. About $500 worth of heroin or cocaine in a source coun-
try will bring in as much as $100,000 on the streets of an American
city. All the cops, armies, prisons, and executions in the world can-
not impede a market with that kind of tax-free profit margin. It is
the illegality that permits the obscene markup, enriching drug traf-
fickers, distributors, dealers, crooked cops, lawyers, judges, politi-
cians, bankers, and businessmen.236
Put these elements together, let the market simmer for a few de-
cades, and Adam Smith's "invisible hand" will do the rest. The logic
is impeccable: where sizeable demand for a product cannot be ful-
filled by a legal source, the heretofore dormant black market will
boost supply to meet demand. 237 The captains of this illicit industry
will be drawn in by extraordinary profits which dwarf any and all po-
tential risks.238 More importantly, this logic has already been force-
231. See infra notes 242-58 and accompanying text (discussing the startling numbers on just
how big the black market has become); see also Church et al., supra note 226, at 14 ("Laws to
stop supply do not prevent anyone who really wants cocaine or heroin from getting it.").
232. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 656.
233. Shenk, supra note 9, at 32-33.
234. See infra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing the profits made by the American
drug dealer).
235. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 42.
236. Id.
237. Jarvik, supra note 230, at 387.
238. Barnett, supra note 50, at 2622.
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fully tested. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution 39
(a.k.a., alcohol prohibition) was intended to eradicate liquor produc-
tion and consumption.2 40 Instead, the black market and its concomi-
tant profits rose to meet demand for the liquid vice, utterly frustrating
congressional goals.241
So how big is the narcotics black market? Colossal, gargantuan, and
mammoth are all apt descriptors; illicit drug traffic has become the
world's most lucrative enterprise. 242 The current value of the interna-
tional drug trade has been estimated between $130-150 billion, eclips-
ing the gross national product of all but a few nations.243 The United
States, of course, figures prominently within the international scheme.
Harvard political economist (now Labor Secretary) Robert Reich has
said "that [the] narcotics [trade] is one of America's major industries,
right up there with consumer electronics, automobiles and steel."'244
In fact, domestically grown marijuana is the second largest cash crop
in the United States, behind only corn.245 Some experts even argue
that the sheer size of America's drug market substantially affects the
United States' trade deficit. 246
The black market tracks the government, only a few steps behind its
every move. Within hours of launching the latest Drug Enforcement
Agency anti-narcotics "program," smuggling cartels throughout the
western hemisphere will have initiated their own counter-program;
every concoction by the United States government has a black-market
antidote.247 In the end, therefore, enforcement efforts are largely fu-
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
240. Barnett, supra note 50, at 2608.
241. See Scheer, supra note 5, at 50 ("Somebody should have reviewed the lesson of [Alcohol]
Prohibition: Suppression of taste defined as vice inexorably drives up profits and increases the
supply to meet the demand.").
242. See Laurence Gonzales, Why Drug Enforcement Doesn't Work: Government Failure in
Drug Control, Dec. 1985, at 104 ("There is more money in illegal drug traffic than in any other
business on earth.") (on file with author).
243. IMPACT AND FEASIBILITY, supra note 229, at 16 (statement of William Chambliss, Ph.D.,
Professor, George Washington University); Branch, supra note 224, at 22, 26; The War on Drugs
Is Lost, supra note 4, at 44 (editorial of the Honorable Robert W. Sweet).
244. Corelli et al., supra note 11, at 39.
245. Gonzales, supra note 242, at 105; James Lieber, Coping with Cocaine, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Jan. 1986, at 39, 43.
246. Gonzales, supra note 242, at 105.
247. "The war is often painted as a vast chess game with multi-billion dollar consequences....
For every law enforcement move there is a smuggling countermove. Smugglers often respond to
Customs actions 'by using counter-intelligence, decoy shipments, and such disinformation as
false tips."' D. Brian Boggess, Exporting United States Drug Law: An Example of the Interna-
tional Legal Ramifications of the "War on Drugs," 1992 BYU L. REV. 165, 184 (1992) (citation
omitted).
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tile, with each United States narco-dollar directly transformed into
underworld drug profits.248
The biggest winners in the drug war are the organized crime syndi-
cates. Internationally, mass producer-distributors like Columbia's
Cali drug cartel turn over $100 billion per year.2 49 Domestically, ille-
gal drugs provide organized crime with more than half of its in-
come. 250 American drug dealers rake in between $50-60 billion in tax-
free profits, with the lower figure being "a safe estimate. '251 Further,
because the underground market is viciously capitalistic and Darwin-
ian, individuals within the chain of distribution are the recipients of
staggering revenues.2 52 Individuals are not receiving the proverbial
six-figure salary-they are receiving individual remuneration starting
at a comfortable $100 million per year. Moreover, the top players can
pocket this amount in only a couple of months.253
Even the small-time drug dealer stands to make exorbitant amounts
of money from his illegal trade. More than ninety percent of a nar-
cotic's street value is pocketed by American drug merchants in the
post-production chain of distribution.254 The price of illegal narcotics
is typically marked up twelve times after entering the United States
248. See Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 645 ("At best, intensified law enforcement simply boosts
the black market price of drugs, encouraging more drug suppliers to supply more drugs.").
249. Sniffing Victory, supra note 11, at A31.
250. Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, SCIENCE, Sept. 1, 1989, at 939, 941 [hereinafter Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition].
251. Ellen Benoit, Drugs: The Case for Legalization, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 3, 1989, at 32, 33;
Peter J. Riga, The Drug War Is a Crime: Let's Try Decriminalization, COMMONWEALTH, July 16,
1993, at 6; Shenk, supra note 9, at 33.
252. Benoit, supra note 251, at 33.
253. Gonzales, supra note 242, at 105. Gonzales gave several examples that illustrate the
amounts of money involved in drug trafficking:
In one case-the arrest of Paolo LaPorta in Philadelphia-the DEA took $2,500,000
in cash and assets. Another suspect was photographed using a hand truck to wheel a
cardboard carton containing $4,500,000-a single deposit-into a bank. He was ar-
rested shortly thereafter. In another case, Donald Steinberg grossed $100,000,000 in
1978-about half the DEA budget for that year. Isaac Kattan, a money launderer,
processed more than $200,000,000 a year. When he was arrested, he had $383,404 on
his person. Kattan had many money-counting machines. Today it is customary for
drug traffickers to weigh their money rather than count it.
One of Columbia's top drug barons, Gonzalo Rodriguez, is said to make $20,000,000
a month. That's $666,667 a day.... Pablo Escobar, the mastermind of a Columbian
drug empire[, has a] personal army estimated at more than 2000 men [and his] personal
wealth may well exceed two billion dollars. Roberto Suirez Gomez is the ruler of a
renegade state high in the forests to the east of the Andean Mountains in Bolivia. The
peasants who live there are his serfs. They produce coca. Suarez is thought to earn
some $33,000,000 a month.
Id.
254. See Mark A.R. Kleiman, Snowed In: The Cocaine Blizzard, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 23,
1990, at 14, 15 ("Of the five dollar retail price of a rock of crack cocaine, only about fifty cents
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and forty-three times after processing in the producing country.2 55
Because the cost of production is a fraction of a percentage of the
retail price, 256 the markup on narcotics can range as high as 20,000
percent-leaving ample room for the "entrepreneur" on the streets to
profit.257 The astronomical proceeds distort the risks and eschew law-
ful employment. Potential incarceration is ignored, while murderous
"negotiations" are accepted as just another cost of doing business.258
High profits at the local or street level have at least three perni-
cious, ancillary effects. First, drug dealers and their minions are easily
replaced by a seemingly inexhaustible throng of gangsters.2 59 The
number of potential "pushers" is practically infinite; each incarcerated
drug dealer is succeeded by another hoodlum from the odious under-
world queue.2 60 Even high-level drug racketeers are expendable,
making the "celebrated arrests of drug kingpins [mere] Pyrrhic victo-
ries. '2 61 Ironically, some local kingpins are imprisoned based on tips
furnished by the successors to their drug business. 262
goes to growers, processors, and importers. The rest-ninety percent of the total-is added after
the drug reaches the United States.").
255. Benoit, supra note 251, at 33.
256. See Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition, supra note 250, at 940 ("The foreign export price of
illicit drugs is ... a tiny fraction of the retail price in the United States[,] (approximately 4% with
cocaine, 1% with marijuana, and much less than 1% with heroin) ... ").
257. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 44 (editorial of the Honorable Robert W.
Sweet).
258. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 678. As Ostrowski noted:
Drug sellers are simply more highly motivated than those who are paid to stop them.
This is not a criticism of drug enforcement personnel-it is just a fact. Drug sellers
make enormous profits selling drugs-more money than they could make at other ille-
gal activities (otherwise they would already be engaging in those other activities), and
much more money than they could make at legal jobs. They are willing to risk death
and long prison terms to make this profit. They are professionals, on the job 24 hours a
day, and able to pour huge amounts of capital into their enterprises as needed. They
are willing to murder competitors, informers and police as needed.
Id.
259. Riga, supra note 251, at 6; Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CIii.
LEGAL F. 25, 26 n.8, 40 n.39 (1994); Chi Chi Sileo, Is It Time To Just Say No to the War on
Drugs?, lNsIoHr, Feb. 7, 1994, at 6; James Q. Wilson & John J. Dilulio, Crackdown: Treating the
Symptoms of the Drug Problem, NEW REPUBLIC, July 10, 1989, at 21.
260. See Shenk, supra note 9, at 35 ("If sticking a drug dealer in jail meant fewer dealers on
the street, perhaps this wave of incarceration would eventually do some good. But it doesn't
work like that: Lock up a murderer, and you have one less murderer on the street. Lock up a
dealer, and you create a job opening. It's like jailing an IBM executive; the pay is good, the job
is appealing, so someone will move into the office before long. Clearing dealers from one neigh-
borhood only means they'll move to another. Busting a drug ring only makes room for a
competitor.").
261. Sileo, supra note 259, at 6.
262. Wilson & Dilulio, supra note 259, at 23.
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Second, the plentiful and immediate nature of drug profits attracts
the young from schools, playgrounds, and ballparks into the sordid
underbelly of the black market. Instead of being on the fast track to
college and a lawful career, these invidiously seduced children are
placed on a one-way track to the state penitentiary or local morgue. 263
Drug dealers have become perverted heroes to many youngsters,
standing out "as symbols of success to children who see no other op-
tions. '264 Historically, children did not become dealers until after
they became drug users.265 Today, the lure of money entices the
young before they even use narcotics.266 "If you sell drugs, you [have]
anything you want[ ]," related one young dealer.267 "Any girl, any
friend, money, status. If you [don't], you got no girlfriend, no friends,
no money. You're a nothing. ' 268 Contrary to popular belief, inner-
city kids are dropping out of school because of drug money, not drug
addiction.269
Finally, the large amount of money at stake on the streets fosters
"drug-related violence. '270 This includes, inter alia, random shootings,
homicidal "ripoffs" (i.e., a feigned drug deal consummated by murder
and theft), "rubbing-out" competitors, and executions of government
informants and witnesses. 271 Such "drug-related violence" will be re-
visited below. 272
B. Governmental Approaches to Narcotics Reduction
Economic analysis of narcotics prohibition is not rocket science but
a simple matter of supply and demand. If there is a demand for nar-
cotics, a supply will eventually emerge free of serendipity. If the sup-
ply is occluded by sheer paramilitary force, a new source will
263. Shenk, supra note 9, at 33. According to Baltimore's mayor, Kurt Schmoke, young
children:
especially those living in the inner city, are frequently barraged with the message that
selling drugs is an easy road to riches-far easier than hard work and good grades.
Drug pushers, with their wads of money, become envied role models for young people
seduced into joining the illegal trade. In many cities, small children act as lookouts and
runners for drug pushers, just as they did for bootleggers during Prohibition.
Schmoke, supra note 187, at 516.
264. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition, supra note 250, at 942.
265. Id.
266. Id.; Ethan A. Nadelmann, Shooting Up: Crime and the Drug Laws, NEW REPUBLIC, June
13, 1988, at 16, 17.
267. Shenk, supra note 9, at 34.
268. Id.
269. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 43 (editorial of Joseph D. McNamara).
270. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 650.
271. Id.
272. See infra notes 503-38 and accompanying text.
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percolate from the drug underworld.273 Thus, regardless of the
amount spent to wage the War on Drugs, the "invisible hand" of sup-
ply and demand ensures that the force of this money is neutralized.
In the past quarter-century, two general methods to abate domestic
consumption of drugs have been discussed and attempted: supply-
side reduction and demand-side reduction. 274
1. Supply-Side Reduction
Supply-side tactics have been historically favored by American law
enforcement and have received the vast majority of governmental
funding. 275 Efforts at supply-side reduction employ military and po-
lice forces to (1)'eradicate foreign and domestic drug production, (2)
seal the borders from narcotics traffic, and (3) apprehend and prose-
cute drug dealers. 276 In other words, supply-side tactics aim to reduce
consumption by limiting the amount of drugs available on the streets.
For example, assume that "S" represents the amount of drugs sup-
plied at any given price, "D" represents the amount of drugs de-
manded at any given price, "Q" represents the equilibrium quantity
(the amount of drugs consumed given S and D), and "P" represents
the equilibrium price (the average price of drugs given S and D). As-
sume further that supply-side tactics (e.g., United States Customs cap-
tures a cocaine flotilla) have reduced the amount of drugs entering the
country, "shifting" the supply curve from S to S'. In theory, the price
of narcotics should rise from P to P and-here is the important
part-the quantity of drugs consumed should drop from Q to Q'. One
need not consult John Maynard Keynes to confirm the appropriate
analysis: If there are less drugs on the market, the price should in-
crease. This is not a startling result; Americans have been witness to
this phenomenon all too often with other products (e.g., the price of
273. According to Professor Arnold Trebach, "'[w]henever there is a demand for an illicit
[drug,] in time a supply appears .... and when one source of supply is cut off, another soon
replaces it in sufficient volume to satisfy the demand."' Andrew Hacker, Is the War on Drugs a
Mistake?, FORTUNE, Sept. 14, 1987, at 141, 144; see also Church et al., supra note 226, at 14
(stating that jailing a kingpin would not make a dent in drug smuggling).
274. See Tonry, supra note 259, at 66.
275. Steven Jonas, Solving the Drug Problem: A Public Health Approach to the Reduction of
the Use and Abuse of Both Legal and Illegal Recreational Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 775-
76 (1990).
276. See Tonry, supra note 259, at 66 ("[S]upply reduction approaches are source-country pro-
grams (crop eradication, financial support to other countries' drug law enforcement agencies,
and extraterritorial assignment of American military and law enforcement personnel), interdic-
tion programs (border patrols, air and marine surveillance and apprehension of importers, and
baggage inspection at entry points), and law enforcement efforts at local, state, federal, and
international levels aimed at arresting and punishing those involved in drug trafficking.").
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gas before and after an OPEC oil embargo). If drug-war efforts in-
crease the possibility or duration of imprisonment, these costs of do-
ing business should accrue to the narcotic consumer in the form of
increased drug prices.277
SUPPLY-SIDE REDUCTION (CONJECTURE)
Drug Price
Q' < - Q Drug Quantity
Contrary to economic theory, the price of drugs has fallen while the
quantity consumed has increased-in spite of concerted and expensive
supply-side enforcement efforts.278 Eleven-figure drug-enforcement
budgets have resulted in little, if any, decline in casual drug use, no
abatement of addiction rates, and an increase in per capita narcotic
consumption.279 According to the National Institutes of Health, illicit
277. See id at 69 ("If drugs are getting scarcer, simple economic theory tells us they should
become more costly. If the risks of arrest and incarceration associated with drug sales are in-
creasing, simple economic theory tells us that those increased costs should be passed along and
drugs should become more costly.").
278. See Galiber, supra note 75, at 847; Jonas, supra note 275, at 776, 784-85; Ostrowski, supra
note 13, at 675-77; Schmoke, supra note 187, at 575; Edward Barnes, Drugs: Apocalypse Now,
LIFE, Sept. 1989, at 18, 20; Benoit, supra note 251, at 33; Crack Kills, NAT'L REV., Feb. 5, 1988, at
20; Jarvik, supra note 230, at 387; Kleiman, supra note 254, at 14-15; Charles Murray, How To
Win the War on Drugs: The Drug-Free Zone Solution, NEW REPUBLIC, May 21, 1990, at 19;
Opening Crack, ECONOMIST, June 11, 1994, at 53, 56; Riga, supra note 251, at 6; Sniffing Victory,
supra note 11, at A31; Wisotsky, supra note 11, at 17.
279. See Shenk, supra note 9, at 33 ("The fact is we have done a very poor job discouraging
drug use with the blunt force of law. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent on drug control in
the last several decades have yielded only a moderate decline in the casual use of marijuana and
cocaine. But there has been no decrease in hard-core addiction. The total amount of cocaine
consumed per capita has actually risen. And even casual use is now creeping up.").
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drugs are as available now as they were in 1975.280 Further, in spite of
redoubled drug-enforcement efforts, narcotics have become even
more accessible in recent years.2 81 The marijuana supply has literally
increased by tons; the purity and availability of heroin has skyrock-
eted; and the D.E.A. has admitted that cocaine remains "readily avail-
able in virtually all major U.S. metropolitan areas.1282
Supply-side efforts have failed and will continue to fail for one sim-
ple reason-the supply of narcotics is too overwhelming. Current ef-
forts are akin to dredging Lake Michigan one gallon at a time.
According to Ernest Van Den Haag of the Heritage Foundation, drug
agents seize less than ten percent of narcotics introduced into the
United States.283 Miami's mayor has argued that the figure is closer to
one percent. 84 Further, economist Peter Reuter of the Rand Corpo-
ration has opined that even if supply-side efforts were doubled, only a
3.4% increase in street price might be expected.2 85 Moreover, the de-
mand for narcotics is relatively inelastic-Americans will demand
roughly the same amount of narcotics regardless of fluctuations in
price. 286
Although the supply curve is the same as before, the demand curve
is vertical-representing the inelasticity of demand. The problem is
manifest: The quantity of drugs consumed is unaffected by efforts to
reduce the supply (represented by the shift from S to S').287 Accord-
280. Legalizing Drugs: Just Say Yes, NAT'L REV., July 10, 1995, at 44, 48 (interview with
Michael S. Gazzaniga) [hereinafter Legalizing Drugs].
281. Id. at 50.
282. Id. at 48-49. According to one source:
National Institutes of Health studies show that perceived availability has remained con-
sistently high for marijuana since 1975. As it has for cocaine. Furthermore, from 1988
to 1992 drug availability, by and large, increased-despite the war on drugs. There was
a 2.5 metric-ton increase in marijuana, with a peak in 1989-90. Cocaine, according to
the Drug Enforcement Administration as of 1993, "remained readily available in virtu-
ally all major U.S. metropolitan areas." Heroin is available, and its purity has in-
creased .... As far as drug availability is concerned, the drug war has been a total
failure. [And although t]he risk of arrest has certainly increased-since 1985 drug ar-
rests have gone up from 718,000 to 1,247,000 a year [sic] the perceived risk of arrest is
... [still] ignored by drug users.
Id.
283. Douglas L. Heerema, Drug Use in the 1990's, Bus. HORIZONS, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 127,129.
284. Crack Kills, supra note 278, at 20.
285. Lieber, supra note 245, at 44.
286. Id.; Duke, supra note 14, at 576, 600; Galiber, supra note 75, at 848; The Quack Epidemic,
NEw REPUBLIc, Nov. 14, 1988, at 7, 8.
287. More accurately, the demand for narcotics is relatively inelastic for the operative range of
drug prices. In other words, consumer demand would be relatively unaffected by a fifty percent
increase in price (which, by the way, would be a remarkable feat for drug enforcers). If, how-
ever, drug prices increased by 100,000 percent, a substantial decrease in drug consumption would
certainly follow. However, given the seemingly limitless supply of narcotics flowing across our
1997] OUR VIETNAM 521
SUPPLY-SIDE REDUCTION (REALITY)
Drug Price
S.'< S
D
Q Drug Quantity
ing to one commentator, "[e]lementary economics suggests that a sup-
ply of drugs will be available so long as there is a demand. ' 288 When
demand is unaffected by price, elementary economics becomes an in-
exorable rule: Supply-side reduction efforts will be futile.
2. Demand-Side Reduction
Demand-side strategies seek to persuade drug abstinence rather
than dispense draconian punishment. Education and treatment are
the means to the drug-reduction ends. 289 While demand-side tactics
remain largely untried by drug warriors, education and treatment
have had resounding success in reducing alcohol and nicotine use.290
For example, community- and school-based anti-smoking campaigns,
cooperative business-employee health programs, and the steady in-
crease in nonsmoking public forums have helped to reduce adult
smoking by twenty-eight percent from 1965 to 1987.291 One might ex-
pect a similar reduction in drug use if demand-side tactics were given
priority over supply-side interdiction and criminalization. However,
only five percent of current government expenditures goes to drug
borders, price increases of the latter variety are dubious at best. For the purposes of the drug
war, therefore, demand should be considered inelastic.
288. Boggess, supra note 247, at 189.
289. Tonry, supra note 259, at 66.
290. Jonas, supra note 275, at 776-77.
291. Id.
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education.292 Congress simply has been unwilling to fund treatment
and education programs adequately.293 As long as the supply-side
"money pit" is fully and exclusively embraced by federal officials, suf-
ficient funds will be unavailable to test demand-side reduction
programs.
C. Costs of Criminalization and Benefits of Legalization
If nothing else, economic analysis can provide a "bottom line"-an
estimate of the costs and benefits of narcotics criminalization. For the
professional and amateur economist, these figures provide the most
damning evidence against the effectiveness of the drug war.
1. The Costs of Drug Warfare
In 1973, Congress allocated $100 million (not billion) for the
fledgling drug war. 294 A decade later in 1983, the national drug en-
forcement budget had soared to $1.3 billion.295 In 1996, the federal
government budgeted between $14-17 billion on direct enforcement
efforts. 296 Since the early eighties, the federal bureaucracy has spent
well over $100 billion on anti-drug programs.297
Congressional drug enforcement expenditures are just the tip of the
proverbial iceberg. In 1990, the Defense Department spent approxi-
mately $1 billion for airplanes, helicopters, boats, and tracking devices
in order to intercept foreign narcotics. 298 International drug efforts
(e.g., crop eradication or foreign government assistance) also have
been estimated to require another $1 billion per year.299 Since 1989,
drug-related cases have commanded at least half of the criminal court
docket,300 consuming at least $30 billion in court costs.30 1 It is esti-
mated that it takes anywhere from $20,000 to $40,000 a year to incar-
cerate a drug offender, costing the American public at least $75 billion
292. See, e.g., IMPACT AND FEASIBILITY, supra note 229, at 25 (summarizing the testimony of
Marvin Miller, which noted that only five percent of the nation's $10 billion antidrug budget was
allotted to education programs and that nothing was allotted to treatment programs).
293. Id.
294. Duke, supra note 14, at 574.
295. Shenk, supra note 9, at 35.
296. Id.; The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 40, 44 (editorial of Kurt Schmoke and
Robert W. Sweet, respectively).
297. Riga, supra note 251, at 6; Should Drugs Be Legalized?, supra note 11, at 80.
298. Boaz, supra note 16, at 621.
299. Legalizing Drugs, supra note 280, at 47.
300. IMPACT AND FEASIBIUTY, supra note 229, at 12 (testimony of Mayor Marion Barry, Jr.);
Eliot Marshall, Drug Wars: Legalization Gets a Hearing, SCIENCE, Sept. 2, 1988, at 1157, 1158;
The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 35 (editorial of William F. Buckley).
301. Benoit, supra note 251, at 33.
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per year.302 Victims of drug-war violence require at least $1 billion in
medical aid,303 while victims of drug-related theft suffer $10 billion in
property losses per year. 3°4
Experts estimate that the total expenditure of public funds for the
drug war, whether federal, state, or local, comes to a whopping $75
billion per year. 305 This author suspects that the actual number is
closer to $100 billion annually. Then there is the real economic loss
from inflated drug prices: Ninety percent of black-market drug prices
are directly and solely attributable to drug criminalization. 30 6 The
narcotics consumer, in essence, tosses ninety percent of drug costs into
the kiln of prohibition. His money burns not for his own good or the
good of the economy but for the sake of the drug war itself.30 7
When the numbers are tallied up, the drug war costs the United
States at least $150 billion per year. This figure does not even include
some very real but unquantifiable costs, including costs from lost pro-
ductivity from drug-war deaths, lost productivity from nonviolent drug
prisoners, lost business in and "capital flight" away from inner cities,
and prohibition-created illnesses (e.g., AIDS from intravenous drug
use). The $150 billion figure, therefore, probably underestimates the
true cost of waging the drug war.
2. The Benefits of Drug Peace
By eliminating the black market, legalization would immediately in-
ject at least $70 billion into the American economy from drug-price
deflation. Organized crime, on the other hand, would take "a big pay
cut" of approximately $80 billion per year.308 Taxes from legal drug
sales would mean that the approximately $10 billion in yearly drug-
enforcement expenditures would be supplanted by a titanic revenue
302. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 35 (public money spent on drug-related of-
fenses); Wisotsky, supra note 11, at 21.
303. Benoit, supra note 251, at 33.
304. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 36 (editorial of William F. Buckley).
305. Duke, supra note 14, at 582; The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 35 (editorial of
William F. Buckley).
306. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 655-56.
307. Id.; see also Duke, supra note 14, at 583-84 ("[T]ake a common estimate of annual black
market drug sales which in 1980 was $79 billion. Because the black market price of drugs is
inflated at least ten-fold over the probable legal price, 90 percent of this figure, or about $70
billion, constitutes an economic loss caused by prohibition. The drug user (and his dependents)
is deprived of the purchasing power of 90 percent of the money he spends on illegal drugs with-
out any net benefit accruing to the economy as a whole. Current estimates place American drug
consumption at about $100 billion per year.").
308. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 685-86.
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influx. 309 A ten-dollar-per-ounce tax on marijuana, for example,
would secure $20 billion in revenues at present consumption. 310
There are also latent benefits from ending the drug war and
refocusing our efforts. Legalization might result in the release of be-
tween 75,000 and 300,000 nonviolent prisoners serving narcotics-re-
lated sentences.311 This would mean more otherwise-productive
citizens in our workforce, more parents at home instead of in jail, and
more cell space for truly violent criminals. Moreover, medical treat-
ment and prevention are much more economically efficient than
criminalization; money spent on treatment is seven times more likely
to stem drug addiction than imprisonment.31 2 Further, while it costs a
city about $160,000 to run a needle-exchange program, one syringe-
infected AIDS victim will require upwards of $120,000 per year in
public assistance.313 By preventing only two drug users from con-
tracting HIV, a needle-exchange program more than covers its
costs. 314
So what is the bottom line? What would Americans save from drug
legalization as compared to the current system? After factoring in ex-
pected changes in consumption and the relocation of government ex-
penditures, one expert has argued that "the net social gain of drug
peace is $25.25 billion. '315 Theodore Vallance, former planning chief
of the National Institutes of Mental Health, concluded that drug legal-
ization would save the United States $37 billion per year. 31 6 Professor
James Ostrowski estimates that the net economic gain would be
around $75 billion.317 This author, on the other hand, believes that
the costs of legalization (e.g., increased consumption) roughly cancel
out the unquantifiable costs of our current regime; therefore, the en-
tire $150 billion economic cost of drug warfare would benefit society
under drug peace. While experts may differ on the correct figure, they
309. See Benoit, supra note 251, at 34 ("[I]nstead of having an outflow of $10 billion from the
Treasury, you have an inflow of $10 billion or more.").
310. Branch, supra note 224, at 26.
311. Duke, supra note 14, at 590; Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 685.
312. See The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 37 (editorial of William F. Buckley)
("[O]ne dollar spent on the treatment of an addict reduces the probability of continued addic-
tion seven times more than one dollar spent on incarceration.").
313. See id. (editorial of Kurt Schmoke).
314. Id. ("[T]aking care of just one adult AIDS patient infected through the sharing of a
syringe is $102,000 to $120,000. In other words, if just two addicts are protected from HIV
through the city's needle exchange, the program will have paid for itself.").
315. Richard Dennis, The Economics of Legalizing Drugs, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1990,
at 126, 130.
316. Legalizing Drugs, supra note 280, at 50 (reaching the "startling conclusion that legalizing
drugs could save society approximately $37 billion a year").
317. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 670.
524 [Vol. 46:483
OUR VIETNAM
all agree that the benefits from legalization far outdistance any con-
ceivable gain from criminalization.318 In total, our society would eco-
nomically benefit to the tune of at least $25 billion and possibly as
much as $150 billion.
III. MEDICINE
To be confirmed a drug addict is to be one of the walking dead ...
The teeth have rotted out; the appetite is lost and the stomach and
intestines don't function properly. The gall bladder becomes in-
flamed; eyes and skin turn a bilious yellow. In some cases mem-
branes of the nose turn a flaming red; the partition separating the
nostrils is eaten away-breathing is difficult. Oxygen in the blood
decreases; bronchitis and tuberculosis develop .... Sex organs be-
come affected. Veins collapse and livid purplish scars remain. Boils
and abscesses plague the skin; gnawing pain racks the body. Nerves
snap; vicious twitching develops. Imaginary and fantastic fears blight
the mind and sometimes complete insanity results. Often times, too,
death comes-much too early in life.... Such is the torment of being
a drug addict; such is the plague of being one of the walking dead.
-Justice William 0. Douglas319
Drug abuse looks and sounds like a medical, public-health problem.
Addiction behaves like a disease, destroying the habitu6's mind and
body. Drug abusers and their families seek help from health care ex-
perts, not unlike those who are afflicted with grave, yet socially ac-
ceptable, maladies. After years of research and treatment, the
medical community has unanimously concluded that addiction is a dis-
ease requiring medical and psychological treatment. 320 However, the
only remedy palatable to national politicians is punishment.
"Medicine has been given a back seat in this country's so-called war
on drugs[,]" according to one commentator. 321 This is not to suggest
that government does not have a legitimate interest in drug regula-
tion. It does.322 Whereas current regulations on, for example, oral
318. Cf. id.; Dennis, supra note 315, at 130; Legalizing Drugs, supra note 280, at 50.
319. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 672 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
320. See, e.g., Paul Cotton, "Harm Reduction" Approach May Be Middle Ground, 271 JAMA
1641, 1641 (1994) ("Effective therapy is the key to breaking the cycle of hard-core addictive drug
use.") (citing Lee Brown, the "White House drug czar").
321. Id. ("Dealing with drug addiction was once primarily the purview of physicians. But
since the initiation of prohibition in the early part of this century, and especially since the 'war
on drugs' was declared in the 1970's, drug use, abuse, and addiction have been treated primarily
as crimes and only secondarily as a public health problem.").
322. See Avram Goldstein & Harold Kalant, Drug Policy: Striking the Right Balance, Sci-
ENCE, Sept. 28, 1990, at 1513 ("[M]ost governments are required, by public consensus and de-
mand, to protect against numerous avoidable hazards and not merely to warn them to possible
dangers. The U.S. Pure Food and Drugs Act, enacted in 1906, set up the technical machinery,
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birth control or antibiotics, stem from a realization that the medically
naive could not appreciate and evaluate the risks inherent in such
drugs,323 narcotics are governed by a blanket prohibition which ig-
nores relative differences and dangers.
A gross and inflexible regime, however, is precisely what could be
expected from the nation's capital. Science is summarily disregarded
by federal officials when designing and implementing narcotics legisla-
tion.324 America's current drug policy "reflects a battle fought sev-
enty years ago between the medical profession and law enforcement,"
contends Dr. Rex Greene, a clinical professor of medicine at the Uni-
versity of Southern California.325 "Medicine lost the challenge to the
Treasury Department's use of regulations to control the practice of
medicine and prohibit physicians from treating addiction with
drugs. ' 326 This is more than a mere unenlightened historical accident.
When drug addiction is viewed as a disease-as science says it must
be-the practice of jailing addicts becomes nothing less than barbaric.
A. Pharmacological Effects of Drug Use
There are currently five major nontherapeutic (i.e., recreational)
drugs in the United States: alcohol, tobacco, cocaine, heroin and ma-
rijuana. 327 The American "drug problem," however, has been viewed
as two "black and white" issues rather than an allied concern with a
kaleidoscope of differences. 328 "The 'good,' or at least the 'OK,' drugs
are those which are currently legal, while the 'bad' drugs, those which
are considered the sole cause of 'The Drug Problem,' are those which
are currently illegal[,]" opines Dr. Steven Jonas, professor of prevent-
ative medicine at SUNY-Stony Brook.329 However, as Dr. Jonas con-
cludes, "there are no scientific, epidemiological or medical bases on
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for assessing drug hazards, forbidding over-the-
counter sale of the more dangerous drugs, requiring manufacturers to report on unanticipated
adverse reactions, and exercising control over drug distribution.").
323. Id.
324. See John Horgan, Ignorance in Action: Politicians Hear but Do Not Heed Scientists' Ad-
vice on Drug Abuse, Sci. AM., Nov. 1988, at 17 ("'Politicians view science as irrelevant when it
comes to dealing with drug abuse."') (quoting Karst Besteman, former deputy director of the
National Institute on Drug Abuse).
325. Rex Greene, Towards a Policy of Mercy: Addiction in the 1990s, 3 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 227, 234 (1991).
326. Id.
327. Jonas, supra note 275, at 758-59.
328. Greene, supra note 325, at 234.
329. Jonas, supra note 275, at 753 (citation omitted).
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which the legal distinctions among the various drugs are made-only
historical and political ones. '330
Disinformation on the proximate effects of drug use, driven by
drug-war propaganda, is an unfortunate and erroneous basis for pub-
lic hysteria. Like their medicinal cousins, recreational drugs produce
physical and psychological changes in the user which can be measured
and anticipated. Alcohol is a central nervous system depressant that
can reduce anxiety, impair concentration, and delay physical reac-
tions.331 Tobacco's active ingredient, nicotine, stimulates the nervous
system, increases concentration, relieves tension and fatigue, and in-
creases heart rate and blood pressure.332 Cocaine increases blood
pressure, heart rate, breathing, and body temperature; gives the user
feelings of euphoria and illusions of increased sensory awareness and
mental and physical strength; and decreases hunger, pain, and fa-
tigue.333 Marijuana creates heightened senses, gives feelings of eu-
phoria and relaxation, and increases the heartbeat. 334 Heroin induces
euphoria, relieves pain, and can induce sleep.335 These descriptions,
out of necessity, are gross generalizations. The main point, however,
does not require a medical treatise: These drugs, whether legal or ille-
gal, are neither demonic nor saintly-they are merely organic chemi-
cals from rather banal flora.
330. Id.
331. See id. at 762 ("The effects of alcohol are well known, but in clinical terms, it: produces
dose-related impairment of motor functions, coordination, reflex responses, tracking perform-
ance, judgment, and consciousness, as well as divided attention.... [T]here is an exaggeration of
mood and related behavior that may be manifested by conviviality, depression, or aggression.")
(citation omitted).
332. See id. at 761 ("As with all recreational drugs, cigarette tobacco is mood altering. When
smoked, it 'produces arousal... and relaxation.... [S]moking helps (smokers] concentrate and
lifts their mood.... Smokers commonly report pleasure and reduced anger, tension, depression,
and stress."') (citation omitted).
333. See id. at 762 ("[Cocaine] produce[s] a neurochemical magnification of the pleasure ex-
perienced in most activities... alertness and a sense of well-being.., lower anxiety and social
inhibitions, and heighten[ed] energy, self-esteem, sexuality, and the emotions aroused by inter-
personal experiences.... [H]igher doses intensify the pharmacologic euphoria [and] the user
focuses increasingly on intense euphoric internal sensations-withdrawing, over time, from what
began as a social experience.") (citation omitted).
334. See id. ("The user [of marijuana] experiences a pleasant heightening of the senses and
relaxed passivity. In moderate doses the substance can cause short lapses of attention and
slightly impaired memory and motor functioning. Heavy users have been known to become
socially withdrawn and depersonalized and have experienced distortions of the senses.") (cita-
tion omitted).
335. See id. at 762-63 ("The primary mood-altering effect of heroin is the inducement of eu-
phoria. It can also act as a tranquilizer, a mood elevator, a pain killer, and as the provider of a
,mainline rush' following intravenous injection. Addicts have reported feeling both relaxed and
relieved of worry after injecting heroin.") (citations omitted).
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This is not to say that these drugs are benign when abused. The
effects of cocaine, heroin or marijuana misuse or abuse can be severe
and life threatening. 336 With that said, the effects of using these three
illicit drugs are relatively innocuous. Based on an extensive and ex-
haustive study on cocaine use and abuse, Drs. Lester Grinspoon and
James Bakalar determined that "[t]he dangers of cocaine are not of
the nature or degree that the law now implies and the public now
assumes. ' 337 Other professionals have made similar findings, conclud-
ing that cocaine use is generally benign and nonaddictive.338 Numer-
ous medical studies have concluded that regular consumption of
heroin has few injurious physical or psychological consequences. 339
As for marijuana, there is no evidence that casual use harms the con-
sumer in any medically significant manner.340 Decades of American
use and centuries of worldwide consumption have evinced no deleteri-
ous effects on mental and physical health.341 The search for "reefer-
madness" is analogous to Don Quixote's battle with the windmill-gi-
ants-if reality is wanting, delusions will suffice.
Of the five recreational drugs, only alcohol and tobacco are legal.
Seventy-five different diseases and conditions have been linked to al-
cohol use and abuse, including alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver, the
336. See Shenk, supra note 9, at 37 ("Cocaine can cause heart attacks in people prone to
irregular heartbeats, such as basketball [player] Len Bias, and seizures in people with mild epi-
lepsy; it's even more dangerous mixed with alcohol and other drugs. Heroin can lead to intense
physical dependence-withdrawal symptoms include nausea, convulsions, and loss of bowel con-
trol. Even marijuana can be psychologically addictive; smoking too much dope can lead to re-
spiratory problems or even cancer.").
337. LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, COCAINE: A DRUG AND ITS SOCIAL EVOLU-
TION 232 (Revised ed. 1985).
338. See DUKE & GRoss, supra note 74, at 70-71 ("Most users of cocaine suffer no serious
physical or social problems from it. That is why even people who should have known better
trumpeted it during the seventies as a nonaddictive, harmless drug. Before the crack era, only a
fraction of cocaine users developed dependence upon cocaine.").
339. According to renown drug expert Edward Brecher, "[t]here is ... general agreement
throughout the medical and psychiatric literature that the overall effects of opium, morphine,
and heroin on the addict's mind and body under conditions of low price and ready availability
are on the whole amazingly bland." BRECHER, supra note 18, at 27.
340. Barnett, supra note 50, at 2593.
341. As for marijuana:
Approximately 100 million Americans over the past three decades have smoked (or
eaten) marijuana. Millions of these have used marijuana on a regular, almost daily
basis for decades. Despite these massive numbers of long-term users, no reliable evi-
dence has appeared that such use has any adverse effects on their physical health. ...
Other societies have used marijuana for centuries. Yet in no society has any official or
respected study found serious adverse physical effects on humans from smoking mari-
juana. Indeed, in no less than nine official investigations of the problem, in both the
United States and elsewhere, none have found any significant adverse effects on human
health, even mental health.
DUKE & GROSS, supra note 74, at 51.
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eighth leading cause of death in the United States.342 Alcohol is not
merely an intoxicant; it is a human poison. Numerous gastrointestinal,
cardiovascular, glandular, and neurological disorders stem from alco-
hol's noxious qualities.343
Tobacco (read "nicotine") is often viewed by society as a somewhat
less dangerous drug because it is nonintoxicating. It is gravely mis-
leading, however, to equate intoxication with risk. Cigarette smoking
is a predominant source of various cancers (bladder, esophageal, kid-
ney, laryngeal, lung, and pancreatic cancers) and diseases (cerebrovas-
cular, coronary artery, peripheral vascular, and pulmonary
diseases). 3"4
Comparisons between legal and illegal drugs are enlightening. To-
bacco is one hundred times more lethal per capita than cocaine, while
marijuana has yet to produce a single toxic fatality. 345 Tobacco is at
least ten times more addictive than cocaine and is a substantially
harder habit to kick than crack.346 In fact, among the five major rec-
reational drugs, tobacco is both the most addictive and the most perni-
cious to human health.347 According to those who have been addicted
to both tobacco and heroin, tobacco was demonstrably more onerous
to quit.348 As for alcohol, no drug, legal or illicit, has invoked as much
342. Jonas, supra note 275, at 767.
343. DuKE & GRoss, supra note 74, at 34. Indeed, the harm caused by alcohol consumption
can be extreme:
The adverse health consequences of chronic heavy drinking are staggering. When
taken in large quantities-perhaps three or four ounces per day-alcohol is a poison
.. . [with] pernicious effects on the human body .... It causes three types of liver
damages.... Regular alcohol use can precipitate esophagitis, exacerbate peptic ulcers
and increase the risk of gastrointestinal cancer and pancreatitis. Chronic alcohol abuse
contributes to cardiac dysfunction and other cardiovascular disorders, including hyper-
tension. Alcohol also adversely affects immune, endocrine and reproductive func-
tions.... Heavy, prolonged alcohol consumption also takes a terrible toll on the human
brain, causing dementia, blackouts, seizures, hallucinations and peripheral neuropathy.
Id. (citations omitted).
344. Jonas, supra note 275, at 765-66. Jonas described the impact of cigarette smoking as
follows:
If it were not for cigarette smoking, there would be little lung cancer or chronic ob-
structive pulmonary disease in this country. Additionally, cigarette smoke also effects
the health of non-smokers. Non-smokers, particularly children, who live or work in
confined spaces with smokers, involuntarily inhale smoke and "show a higher rate of
pathology than non-smokers" living or working in quarters without smokers. This ef-
fect of cigarette smoking has been referred to as "passive smoker's syndrome."
Id. (citations omitted).
345. Id.
346. Morley Jefferson, Cross Fire in the Drug War: Aftermath of a Crack Article, NATION,
Nov. 20, 1989, at 592.
347. Barnett, supra note 50, at 2600.
348. DuKE & GROSS, supra note 74, at 26.
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American crime and violence as the venerated liquid intoxicant.349
For generations, alcohol has legally devastated entire communities
and cultures without even a hint of governmental concern. 350
Contrary to what our government told us when it imposed drug pro-
hibition, most illegal recreational drugs have no pharmacological
properties that produce violence or other criminal behavior. Her-
oin and marijuana diminish rather than increase aggressive behav-
ior. Cocaine-or cocaine withdrawal-occasionally triggers
violence but usually does not. Very little crime is generated by the
mere use of these drugs, especially in comparison to alcohol, which
is causally related to thousands of homicides and hundreds of
thousands of assaults annually.351
This gross hypocrisy of the American drug regime can be captured
in two sentences. Every twenty-four hours, one thousand people are
arrested for simple marijuana possession.352 During that same span of
time, one thousand people die from tobacco and alcohol use.353
The above figures are not intended to suggest that illegal drugs are
safer than their legal counterparts; they are not. Heroin and cocaine
can cause addiction and death, just like alcohol and tobacco can.
However, as argued by Baltimore mayor Kurt Schmoke, "no rational
person would advocate criminalizing tobacco.... Alcohol prohibition
...proved to be one of the worst social experiments ever under-
taken. '' 354 People understand that alcohol or tobacco prohibition
would be impossible to enforce and unreasonable, given that alcohol
and tobacco are "used by most consumers in moderation, with little in
the way of harmful effects" 355 and "for most people [alcohol] adds to
the enjoyment of life in ways that are not at all destructive. '356
These same arguments, however, support complete drug legaliza-
tion. In order to justify a distinction between the legal drugs-nico-
tine and tobacco-and the illegal drugs-marijuana, heroin, and
cocaine-one would have to show that the latter group is more likely
349. Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?, supra note 40, at 41.
350. See id. at 45 ("One would be hard pressed to argue that its role in many Native American
and other aboriginal communities has been any less destructive than that of illicit drugs in
America's ghettos.").
351. Duke, supra note 14, at 575 (citations omitted); see also Barnett, supra note 50, at 2601
(reciting the conclusion of Steven Duke and Albert Gross that alcohol is more conducive to
violence than either cocaine or heroine); Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 651 (noting that most
drug-related crime stems from "territorial disputes" and not from the use of drugs).
352. Richard Cowan, How the Narcs Created Crack: A War Against Ourselves, NAT'L REV.,
Dec. 5, 1986, at 26, 30 [hereinafter Cowan, How the Narcs Created Crack].
353. See id.
354. Schmoke, supra note 187, at 521-22.
355. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition, supra note 250, at 944.
356. Scheer, supra note 5, at 49.
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to overpower the consumer's free will, 357 either through higher addic-
tion rates or a causal connection to violence. However, neither of
these phenomena is a "demonstrable medical complication[ ] of these
substances. ' 358 In other words, people are not more likely to become
addicted or violent due to illicit, rather than licit, drug use.359 In fact,
the exact opposite is true; people are more likely to become addicted
to nicotine and to become violent under the influence of alcohol than
with marijuana, cocaine, or heroin.360 Thus, the historic delineation
between licit and illicit drugs is merely history untrammeled by mod-
ern science and irrefutable logic. 361 America's current system is sim-
ply in medical denial. Most people who use drugs lead normal,
unhabituated lives. The few people who become addicted require
medical treatment, not an involuntary "vacation" in a correctional
facility. 362
B. Long-Term Medical Effects of Drug Use
Once the rhetorical demons are exorcized from illicit drugs (e.g.,
"reefer-madness" has the same validity as southern claims of "co-
caine-crazed Negro rapists"), one question still remains: What are the
long-term effects of drug use? Unfortunately, strident legal restrictions
have prevented definitive answers; medical research on drug use has
become a secondary victim of the drug war. However, medical studies
to date have shown few harsh side effects from long-term drug use
(not to be confused with long-term abuse).
All research has found that marijuana is relatively benign and that
moderate use has no long-term adverse physical or psychological ef-
fects on otherwise healthy individuals.363 Claims of damage to repro-
357. See Greene, supra note 325, at 232.
358. Id.
359. See id. at 234-35 (noting that "addictiveness is more user-specific than drug-specific").
360. See supra notes 349-51, 353 and accompanying text (discussing the connection between
violence and alcohol).
361. See Greene, supra note 325, at 234-35 ("[Llong-standing societal distinctions between
legally prescribed and illegal drugs are traditional and arbitrary .... Societal beneficence by fiat
has degenerated into casuistry and caprice, arbitrarily restricting dangerous drug-related behav-
iors but not other forms of equally dangerous activities.... Tortured legal distinctions between
various drugs are simply a matter of custom and tradition with no logical reference to harmful
consequences. There is no compelling argument to show that alcohol and tobacco should receive
preferential treatment over the pantheon of illegal dangerous drugs. Rather, their legal status
suggests only that they are more popular and that prohibition would again be a failure.") (cita-
tions omitted).
362. See Scheer, supra note 5, at 49.
363. Richard Cowan, Pot-Talk: Is Decriminalization Advisable?, NAT'L REV., Apr. 29, 1983,
at 492 [hereinafter Cowan, Pot-Talk]. One study found "reduced gas exchange capacity" in fif-
teen chronic pot users. Cynthia Cotts, Condoning the Legal Stuff?, NATION, Mar. 9, 1992, at 300.
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ductive organs have been completely rebuffed. 364 Physical addiction
to marijuana appears to be unlikely, with no reported cases of mari-
juana withdrawals or obsessive drug-seeking behavior.365 As dis-
cussed above,366 no empirical study has found debilitating medical or
psychological effects from regular heroin use.367 Again, this is not to
suggest that people cannot get hooked on heroin-they can. Heroin is
addictive. However, heroin is less addictive than nicotine.368 More-
over, addiction does not necessitate destitution. Instead, as argued
below, 369 the converse is more likely: Destitution leads to addiction.
As for cocaine, most users suffer no negative long-term mental or
physical effects. 370 Like consumers of marijuana and heroin, only a
slight fraction of all users develop some form of cocaine depen-
dence.371 "But what about crack?," drug warriors often retort. The
portrayal by government officials and the media might lead one to
believe that crack is some deadly foreign contagion seeping from an
unknown source. It is not:
None of the subjects, however, had any serious respiratory problems: "[W]e are not suggesting
that smoking marijuana.., will necessarily produce symptomatic or disabling respiratory impair-
ment." Cowan, Pot-Talk, supra, at 493 (citing Donald Tashkin of the University of California
Los Angeles).
364. See Cotts, supra note 363, at 301 ("[S]cientists have injected a lot of pregnant monkeys
with THC, the key psychoactive chemical in marijuana, but they've yet to come up with hard
evidence.").
365. Jonas, supra note 275, at 764.
366. See supra note 339 and accompanying text (demonstrating benign, short-lasting effects on
otherwise healthy, moderate, illicit drug users).
367. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 74, at 62; see also Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition, supra note
250, at 944 ("[D]espite the popular association of heroin use with the most down-and-out in-
habitants of urban ghettos, heroin causes relatively little physical harm to the human body. Con-
sumed on an occasional or regular basis under sanitary conditions, its worst side effect, apart
from the fact of being addicted, is constipation. That is one reason why many doctors in early
20th-century America saw opiate addiction as preferable to alcoholism and prescribed the for-
mer as treatment for the latter where abstinence did not seem a realistic option.") (citation
omitted).
368. See Barnett, supra note 50, at 2600.
369. See Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 700-01.
370. See DUKE & GROSS, supra note 74, at 70-72.
371. Prohibitionists frequently cite animal studies which have demonstrated that captive rats
"will starve themselves to death if provided with unlimited cocaine." Nadelmann, Drug Prohibi-
tion, supra note 250, at 944. What they fail to mention is "that these addicted rats-if returned
to pleasant, socialized rat environments ("rat parks")-lose all interest in drugs." Greene, supra
note 325, at 46. In fact:
[Tihere is overwhelming evidence that most users of cocaine do not get into trouble
with the drug. So much of the media attention has focused on the relatively small
percentage of cocaine users who become addicted that the popular perception of how
most people use cocaine has become badly distorted.... [Evidence] suggests that only
a small percentage of people who snort cocaine end up having a problem with it. In
this respect, most people differ from captive rats.
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[Crack] is simply cocaine that has been mixed with baking soda,
water, and then boiled. What this procedure does is to permit co-
caine to be smoked .... [A]ny drug ingested in that way-i.e., ab-
sorbed by the lungs-goes more efficiently to the brain, and the
result is a quicker, more intense experience. That is what crack
gives the consumer. But its impact on the brain is the same as with
plain cocaine .... 372
So, what are the true facts about crack? The National Institute of
Drug Abuse found that crack is not "highly addictive. '373 Numerous
studies have concluded that any inherent addictive quality of crack is
no greater than that of other drugs. 374 In fact, crack is less addictive
than tobacco and, contrary to popular belief, crack dependence can be
successfully treated. 375 Further, like heroin, addiction to crack is pre-
dominately determined by the user's environment, lifestyle, and predi-
lection, rather than the drug's intrinsic pharmacological effects. 376
Prohibitionists often argue that experimenting with illegal drugs will
lead to abuse.377 This claim, however, appears to be grounded in
moral propaganda rather than scientific analysis. According to Dr.
Jonathan Shedler of Adelphi University, "It's absolutely not the case
that experimentation leads to abuse. ' 378 One of the most convincing
pieces of evidence has been available for a quarter of a century. Reli-
able estimates asserted that eighty percent of the American soldiers in
Vietnam were using marijuana, while forty percent were experi-
menting with heroin.379 In a study commissioned by President Nixon,
Dr. Lee Robbins of Washington University tested nearly 14,000 re-
turning GI's for drug use.380 A few months later, she retested for drug
use, and the "results were crystal clear."' 381 More than ninety percent
of the wartime users ceased drug consumption "cold turkey" without
372. The Federal Drugstore: Interview with Michael S. Gazzaniga, NAT'L REV., Feb. 5, 1990,
at 34, 34 [hereinafter The Federal Drugstore].
373. Jonas, supra note 275, at 765 (citation omitted).
374. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 700; see also Michael Gazzaniga, Just the Facts, Fellas, NAT'L
REV., Apr. 1, 1990, at 44 ("There are no scientific data that crack is more addictive. Dr. Shigla
Murphy, who is carrying out a NIDA-sponsored research project in Oakland, maintains that the
stereotype is incorrect. Just as many people walk away from crack as from other drugs, she
finds.").
375. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 700-01.
376. Id. at 700.
377. Mark S. Gold, Legalize Drugs: Just Say Never, NAT'L REV., Apr. 1, 1990, at 42.
378. Sileo, supra note 259, at 6.
379. See The Federal Drugstore, supra note 372, at 40.
380. Id.
381. See id.
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any adverse effects.382 Follow-up studies found that the soldiers con-
tinued to be drug free years after returning home. 383
What Dr. Robbins' study suggests-and what other studies have re-
iterated-is that drug consumption levels go up and down, but the
rate of addiction is fairly constant.384 Currently, there are around six
million "steady users" (i.e., non-casual consumers) of illegal drugs,
with less than twenty percent suffering from symptoms of addiction.38 5
Per capita, drug abuse has not shifted much, going up as much as it
has gone down, in spite of increased drug war efforts. 386 This fact is
not surprising to experts like Michael Gazzaniga, a professor at
Dartmouth Medical School, who argues that "[t]here is a base rate of
drug abuse, and it is achieved one way or another. '387 Consumption
in a community might go up during a period of "high stress," but the
addiction rate is constant.38 8 The vast majority of users simply discon-
tinue consumption once the "stress" dissipates. 389 Contrary to drug-
war propaganda, only a minute fraction (less than one percent) of
those who have tried illicit narcotics experience the indicium of addic-
tion.390 Experts now recognize that among all drug users, those few
who become addicted have psychological disorders which predate
their introduction to narcotics.391
C. Causes of Drug Abuse and the Futility of Incarceration
If the drug itself is not the major cause of addiction, then what is?
The Health and Public Policy Committee of the American College of
Physicians has argued that "drug use alone is not the major factor in
the development of addiction[, but] other medical, social, and eco-
382. See id.
383. See id.
384. Id. at 40-41.
385. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 44 (editorial of Robert W. Sweet).
386. Id.
387. The Federal Drugstore, supra note 372, at 37.
388. See id. at 40-41.
389. See id. ("Drug consumption can go up in a particular population, fueled by stress, but the
rate of addiction doesn't go up no matter what the degree of stress. Most people can walk away
from high drug use if their lives become more normal.").
390. See The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 36 (editorial of William F. Buckley)
("Americans who abuse a drug ... are a very small percentage of those who have experimented
with a drug, or who continue to use a drug without any observable distraction in their lives or
careers. About such users one might say that they are the equivalent of those Americans who
drink liquor but do not become alcoholics, or those Americans who smoke cigarettes but do not
suffer a shortened lifespan as a result.").
391. Gonzales, supra note 242, at 104 (quoting GOODMAN & GILMAN: THE PHtARMACOLOGI-
CAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS (Alfred Goodman Gilman et al., eds., 6th ed. 1980)).
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nomic conditions seem to play an important role. ' 392 Among all po-
tential factors influencing drug use and abuse, only a few appear to
have a causal or catalytic connection.
First, age affects drug use (but not necessarily abuse), with eighteen-
to twenty-five-year-olds using drugs three times as often as those over
the age of twenty-six.393 Drug consumption is a form of antisocial be-
havior typical of risk-seeking adolescents and young adults. 394 Drug
use is often described as an ignorant, parental defense mechanism.
Many young drug users appear to be "just going through a phase"
which subsides with maturity.
Second, the ex ante psychological health of the drug user affects
drug abuse. A comprehensive study tracking children from age three
to twenty-three found that the vast majority of those who experi-
mented with drugs suffered no adverse social or scholastic effects. 395
Of those who did become addicts, all experienced pre-consumption
psychological disorders-low impulse control, general despondence,
and social withdrawal. 396 Other studies have found that drug abusers,
as compared to simple drug users, tended to suffer from poor family
relationships, emotional immaturity, general denial, low self-esteem,
and a variety of other psychiatric disturbances.397 A number of scien-
tists have expanded on this research, suggesting that many addicts are
taking drugs as a form of "self-medication." 398 Rather than Prozac or
Ritalin, some addicts are seeking psychological solace through drugs
that are more accessible than their licit-but-prescription-required
brethren. 399 It is both appalling and pathetic to think that the incar-
392. Drug Therapy for Severe, Chronic Pain in Terminal Illness, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.,
Dec. 1983, at 872.
393. Gazzaniga, supra note 374, at 44.
394. See Jarvik, supra note 230, at 388 ("Drug use is a form of risk-taking that peaks during
the teen years; adolescence is also the peak age for certain types of criminal behavior. There are
many theories, but not many facts, to explain this age-related phenomenon. Adolescence is also
the time when the level of androgenic hormones rises. A variety of antisocial behaviors, includ-
ing illicit drug-taking, have been correlated with high testosterone levels.") (citations omitted).
395. Sileo, supra note 259, at 6.
396. See id. ("[T]hree elements in their psychology made them susceptible: poor impulse con-
trol; unhappiness-they were anxious, distressed or depressed; and alienation-they had few
friends, they weren't invested in anything like sports or family relations.").
397. Jarvik, supra note 230, at 388.
398. Id.
399. See Cotton, supra note 320, at 1644 ("Some studies suggest that more than two thirds of
patients with drug disorders also have a mental disorder, and that almost a third of those with a
mental disorder also have a drug problem. [The National Institute of Drug Abuse] recently
funded a study of the possibility that some cocaine abusers suffer from attention deficit disorder.
They may be self-medicating with cocaine 'in the same way we give ritalin to kids[,]' says Her-
bert D. Kleber, M.D., medical director of the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at
Columbia University.").
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cerated, but otherwise noncriminal, drug addict may have only been
trying to chase the demons from his head and that both his addiction
and psychological disturbance could be ameliorated with modern
psychotropic drugs and caring therapy.
A third factor that contributes to drug abuse is the culture or
ethnicity in which the drug user was raised and/or currently resides.
For example, Asian-American and Jewish communities generally con-
sume large quantities of alcohol without ruinous consequences. 400 Na-
tive-American communities, in contrast, have been shattered and
crippled by alcohol abuse.401 Moreover, this phenomenon of ethnic
vulnerability or relative immunity to addiction has repeated itself on
every continent.402 The cultural and ethnic context in which drugs are
consumed influences whether addiction will follow-regardless of
legal constraints.
The strongest factor influencing drug use and addiction-and the
most important for the purposes of this article-is socioeconomic sta-
tus. A study of adolescent heroin addicts in the 1950's found that the
vast majority were from impoverished communities.4 03 Subsequent
empirical studies have confirmed the direct connection between pov-
erty and drug consumption.40 4 For example, recent data shows that
while narcotic consumption in affluent Caucasian communities has
dropped precipitously over the past few years, drug use in poor minor-
ity communities remains steady and staggering.40 5 Social inferiority,
poverty, and hopelessness are the antecedents to the urban drug prob-
lem. "Many of those users see nothing but a bleak future before
them. They have little to lose by drug abuse, and thus, they proceed
to lose it. '' 406 It is the penniless indigent, hopeless and downtrodden,
who seeks relief through intoxication.
One should not confuse destitution with the impetuous proxy of
race and ethnicity. A Defense Department study found that African-
American soldiers had lower drug-consumption rates than their Cau-
400. Greene, supra note 325, at 231 (citation omitted).
401. Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?, supra note 40, at 45.
402. See Greene, supra note 325, at 231 ("France leads the Western World in per capita con-
sumption of alcohol, mostly wine, and has the highest rate of alcoholism (about 15%). The
United States and West Germany have similar rates of consumption, about one-half that of
France. Though Germans drink beer and Americans distilled spirits .... they both have a 9%
rate of alcoholism. In contrast, Israel, as a consequence of longstanding Judaic sacramental tra-
ditions, has both the highest percentage of active drinkers and the lowest rate of alcoholism.")
(citation omitted).
403. Riga, supra note 251, at 7.
404. Id. at 6.
405. Duke, supra note 14, at 606 (citation omitted).
406. Id.
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casian counterparts.4 07 However, African-Americans outside of mili-
tary egalitarianism-and typically subjected to de facto segregation
and disproportionate poverty-are far more likely to use drugs than
Caucasian civilians.408 What this demonstrates is that the drug di-
lemma is not racial or ethnic, but economic. 40 9 People become addicts
not because they are African-American or Hispanic but because they
are impoverished. Unfortunately, race, poverty, and drug abuse in
our country are intimately intertwined, allowing the great American
bigot to argue illogically that people use drugs because they are Afri-
can-American or that Hispanics are poor because of their race. The
dynamics of inner-city poverty and addiction do not reduce to racist
tautologies. Understanding comes from compassion and deep intel-
lectual thought-commodities which are in short supply around the
drug war.
There are drug warriors who understand the correlation between
drug abuse and age, mental health, culture, and socioeconomic status.
However, even the cognizant prohibitionist finds a silver lining in dra-
conian punishment. The threat of criminal punishment dissuades ad-
dicts from actively pursuing their drug. This argument, however, is
not just dubious on its face; it is demonstrably false. As opined by the
mayor of Baltimore, Kurt Schmoke, "addictions are, for most users,
lifetime afflictions that are impervious to the criminal justice system's
threat of punishment." 410
The perverse irony of the current regime has gone largely unno-
ticed. Those who need the protection allegedly provided by drug
criminalization also happen to be the least daunted by the penal con-
sequences.41' Addicts have drug-seeking personalities which ignore
not only the law but all inordinate risks and costs. Damage to their
physical and economic well-being is summarily disregarded. The psy-
chological relief that the addict receives from drug consumption sim-
ply outweighs the potential costs of incarceration and bodily injury.
407. The Federal Drugstore, supra note 372, at 38.
408. Id. As Gazzaniga noted:
If you live in poverty and frustration, and see few rewards available to you, you are
likelier than your better-satisfied counterpart to seek the escape of drugs, although the
higher rate of consumption does not result in a higher rate of addiction. Virtually every
study finds this to be the case with one possibly interesting twist. A recent Department
of Defense study showed that drug use in the military was lower for African-Americans
than for Caucasians, the reverse of civilian life[, while i]t is generally agreed that the
military is the only institution in our country that is successfully integrated.
Id.
409. Riga, supra note 251, at 6.
410. Schmoke, supra note 187, at 511.
411. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 677.
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Short of (and possibly including) government-imposed torture, crimi-
nal sanctions will not deter the hard-core addict.412 "He [the hard-
core addict] is pitiful," as Justice Douglas so eloquently articulated in
Robinson v. California.413 The addict will continue to use drugs de-
spite the law, economic ruin, social ostracism, and physical deteriora-
tion; yet, society throws the addict in jail even though incarceration is
"utterly counterproductive," punishing the socially and economically
impoverished who must traverse an already formidable road to recov-
ery.414 "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy" 415 -
except for the drug addict, for he shall obtain a mandatory minimum
sentence in a federal penitentiary.
D. Death
"Drugs kill" is a common drug-war aphorism, conforming nicely to
each new front (e.g., "Crack kills"). In one sense, the statement is
true-drug consumption can result in death. Of course, that is true
about cholesterol or driving a car. What the American public needs to
know is how dangerous illicit drugs are compared to their licit coun-
terparts and whether the deaths attributed to drug consumption are
caused by intrinsic qualities of the drugs or by prohibition.
Every year, approximately 390,000 Americans die from cigarette
smoking; over 150,000 die from the effects of drinking alcohol; close to
3,000 people die from cocaine and heroin combined;416 and no one has
ever reported a marijuana-induced death.4 17 Surprised? This author
certainly was, given the nationwide campaign warning the public of
412. See id. at 677-78. Ostrowki made explicit the agrument that most addicts are not de-
terred by the threat of prosecution:
Obviously, for them [the hard-core addicts], the subjective benefits of drugs outweigh
the costs of criminal penalties .... [Moreover, e]ven without criminal penalties, many
drug users continue to use drugs in the face of the severe physical penalties drugs im-
pose on their bodies. Again, they simply consider the psychic benefit of drug use to be
more important than the harm the drugs do to their bodies. The fact is that drugs
motivate some people-those who most need protection from them-more than any
set of penalties a civilized society can impose, even more than some less-than-civilized
societies have imposed. This is why the undeniable seductiveness of drugs, usually
thought of as a justification for prohibition, actually argues for legalization. If drugs are
so seductive, the laws will fail to deter millions of drug users and will greatly increase
the social costs of their drug use.
Id.
413. See supra note 323 and accompanying text (noting that certain drugs such as birth control
pills and antibotics are regulated because those who are not medically trained are unable to
appreciate the risks associated with using the drugs).
414. Greene, supra note 325, at 229.
415. Matthew 5:7.
416. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 686 (citations omitted).
417. Id. at 652.
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these morbid drugs. That is just standard operating procedure in the
drug war-why give facts when blind hysteria can muster greater
support?
The whole truth about drug-related deaths, however, is much more
damning to prohibitionists than the above numbers reveal. Drug pro-
hibition kills nearly 8,000 people per year. 418 Note the distinction:
Drug prohibition, not drug use or abuse, causes 8,000 deaths per year.
At least 2,400 people die each year from adulterated narcotics419-a
phenomenon which is unheard of in the legal drug market and is di-
rectly caused by the clandestine nature of the black market. More-
over, any student of history could have foreseen this tragedy. Alcohol
prohibition earlier in this century resulted in countless deaths and in-
juries, as consumers were unable to discern between safe "moon-
shine" and poisonous "rotgut. '420
The heroin "overdose" is merely the modern-day version of wood-
alcohol blindness. Eighty percent of all deaths ascribed to cocaine
and heroin consumption are directly attributable to the black market,
not intrinsic drug traits.421 Moreover, even the twenty percent attrib-
uted to intrinsic qualities of drugs might be an overstatement. For
example, Len Bias, college basketball phenomenon and N.B.A. pros-
pect, died from a treatable cocaine overdose.422 Fearing law-enforce-
ment intervention, Bias' friends sought medical aid only after the star
athlete's third seizure.423 Their concern was not unwarranted; post-
hospitalization arrests by drug-enforcement agents are not uncom-
mon.424 Who knows how many people like Len Bias would have been
saved without the omnipresent threat of criminal sanction?
418. Id. at 654 (citation omitted).
419. See Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition, supra note 250, at 942 ("Many marijuana smokers are
worse off for having smoked cannabis that was grown with dangerous fertilizers, sprayed with
the herbicide paraquat, or mixed with more dangerous substances. Consumers of heroin and the
various synthetic substances sold on the street face even more severe consequences, including
fatal overdoses and poisonings from unexpectedly potent or impure drug supplies. In short,
nothing resembling an underground Food and Drug Administration has arisen to impose quality
control on the illegal drug market and provide users with accurate information on the drugs they
consume.").
420. See The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 36 (editorial of William F. Buckley)
("When alcohol was illegal, the consumer could never know whether he had been given rela-
tively harmless alcohol to drink-such alcoholic beverages as we find today in the liquor store-
or whether the bootlegger had come up with paralyzing rotgut.").
421. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 654.
422. See id. at 669 (citing Examiner Confirms Cocaine Killed Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1986,
at D25, col. 3).
423. See id. (citing Bias Said to Suffer Seizures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1986, at A50, col. 3).
424. See id.
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"Legalization," according to prohibitionist Congressman Robert
Garcia, "fails to consider the spread of AIDS through intravenous
drug use.'425 Providing clean needles to heroin addicts, argues Con-
gressman Sterling Johnson, "sends out erroneous signals that conflict
with any and all efforts to put an end to the use of harmful illicit
drugs. 426 Are these statements true? Sure, if one believes ignorance is
better than knowledge, or message consistency has a higher value than
human life.
The National Commission on AIDS has strenuously advocated the
lawful availability of hypodermic syringes.42 7 It found that one-third
of child and adult cases and two-thirds of all prenatal victims con-
tracted the disease via "dirty needles. '428 The Commission was joined
by the Centers for Disease Control in concluding that needle ex-
change programs and general availability of syringes does not inspire
drug use.42 9 Rather, legal barriers to clean needles only encourage the
rapid transmission of the virus.430 In some cities, as many as seventy
percent of new AIDS cases result from dirty needles.4 31 Overall, one
quarter of a million intravenous drug users have been infected with
AIDS.432 Further, some 3,500 AIDS-related deaths are caused each
year by dirty needles-more than the total number of fatalities from
heroin and cocaine combined.4 33 3,500 people will die each year be-
425. IMPACT AND FEASIBILrry, supra note 229, at 10 (testimony of the Honorable Robert
Garcia).
426. Id. at 15 (testimony of the Honorable Sterling Johnson).
427. Wisotsky, supra note 11, at 21.
428. Id. In the words of Wisotsky:
['Ihe] most outrageous example in this catalog of wrongs against public health care is
the nearly universal American refusal to permit established addicts to exchange used
needles for sterile ones in order to prevent AIDS transmission among intravenous drug
users. In 1991, the National Commission on AIDS recommended the removal of legal
barriers to the purchase and possession of intravenous drug injection equipment. It
found that 32% of all adult and adolescent AIDS cases were related to intravenous
drug use and that 70% of mother-to-child AIDS infections resulted from intravenous
drug use by the mother or her sexual partner. Moreover, the commission found no
evidence that denial of access to sterile needles reduced drug abuse, but concluded that
it did encourage the sharing of contaminated needles and the spread of the AIDS virus.
Id.
429. See id.; Shenk, supra note 9, at 36.
430. See Shenk, supra note 9, at 36 ("[Similarly,] in 1994 the Centers for Disease Control
issued a report concluding that needle exchange does not encourage heroin use, but does dramat-
ically reduce HIV transmission. The report explicitly recommends that the federal ban be lifted.
The Clinton Administration suppressed the report, but a copy finally leaked. Now, officials deny
its basic finding.").
431. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 41 (editorial of Baltimore mayor, Kurt
Schmoke).
432. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 655.
433. Id. at 652-53.
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cause the government does not want to "send the wrong message."
Whatever self-serving excuse is given, the true "message" is clear: An
amphitheater full of American citizens will die each year because their
government is more concerned about appearances than their lives.
Prohibition's yearly death count also includes another 2,025
murders per year from black-market violence and murders incident to
street crime. 434 One just does not see liquor store owners gunning
down their competitors or nicotine distributors delivering "Columbian
neck-ties. '435 In contrast, the modern-day Al Capone wages turf-war-
fare on the streets of Watts or the Bronx every day. When black-
market homicides are included, the macabre irony of drug prohibition
becomes clear. The War on Drugs-which was supposed to save
lives-kills nearly 8,000 men and women each year.436 This may even
be an underestimate; Nobel-laureate Milton Friedman has placed the
body count at about 10,000 Americans per year.437
ANNUAL DEATHS CAUSED BY DRUG PROHIBITION
4 3 8
Murders incident to street crime 1,200
Black market murders 825
Drug-related AIDS 3,500
Other diseases due to dirty needles ?
Poisoned drugs/no quality control 2,400
Loss of medical use of illegal drugs ?
Total 7,925
E. Pain and Fear
One of the most disconcerting aspects of drug prohibition is that
"marijuana is more easily acquired by a 16-year-old who should not
use it than by a sixty-year-old cancer or glaucoma patient who needs
it. '' 439 For those Americans who suffer debilitating, life-threatening,
or terminal illnesses, medically- and morally-correct treatment man-
dates the maximum amelioration of pain. Opiates are unmatched at
relieving the physical agony of some terminal diseases.440 Marijuana
434. See id. at 655 (noting that annually there are 1,200 murders incident to street crime and
825 black-market murders).
435. A "Columbian neck-tie" is a favored method of simultaneously murdering an enemy or
competitor and leaving a message for the deceased's cohorts. It involves slitting the victim's
throat and pulling his tongue through the laceration-resulting in one of the most gruesome
sights imaginable.
436. See Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 654 (positing that there are 7,925 deaths caused annually
by drug prohibtion) (citation omitted).
437. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 43 (editorial of Joseph D. McNamara).
438. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 655.
439. Cowan, Pot-Talk, supra note 363, at 495.
440. See The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 38 (arguing that patients choose to suffer
"debilitating and demoralizing pain" rather than to take a proper dose of opiates).
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provides otherwise unattainable physical and mental solace from the
symptoms of, among others, cancer, multiple sclerosis, glaucoma, and
AIDS." 1 More than seventy-five percent of the American public be-
lieves that illegal narcotics should be available for medical purposes;
yet, the federal government has balked at such suggestions and refuses
to fund research toward these ends.442 Prohibitionists worry that me-
dicinal use of opiates or marijuana would be "the back door to legali-
zation. ' '443 This may or may not be true, but prohibiting these drugs
from the sick and dying is tantamount to denying food to the starving.
When the government sentences terminally ill Americans to either ex-
cruciating pain or a prison cell, any claim to moral authority is
relinquished.
The youngest victims of the drug war are the babies who are
harmed by their mothers' prenatal drug use. According to Congress-
man Lawrence Coughlin, "over 50 percent of the child abuse fatalities
involved parents who heavily used cocaine. Cheaper, legal cocaine
would result in more children dying and more babies being born ad-
dicted. ' 444 While this author has no information to contradict the
Congressman's first sentence, the Pennsylvania Representative's latter
statement is mere sophistry. This a priori logic is precisely what per-
petuated the spread of AIDS among drug users. The drug war has
inhibited the dissemination of accurate information on the effect of
drug use during pregnancy, leaving many expectant mothers (particu-
larly inner-city minority mothers) in the dark about the necessity of
prenatal drug abstinence. Rather than preventing pregnant women
from using crack, the current laws only discourage mothers from get-
441. Id. (editorial of Ethan Nadelmann). As Nadelmann wrote:
Perspective can be had from what is truly the most pervasive drug scandal in the United
States: the epidemic of under treatment of pain. "Addiction" to (i.e., dependence on)
opiates among the terminally ill is the appropriate course of medical treatment. The
only reason for the failure to prescribe adequate doses of pain-relieving opiates is the
"opiaphobia" that causes doctors to ignore the medical evidence, nurses to turn away
from their patients' cries of pain, and some patients themselves to elect to suffer
debilitating and demoralizing pain rather than submit to a proper dose of drugs. The
tendency to put anti-drug ideology ahead of compassionate treatment of pain is appar-
ent in another area. Thousands of Americans now smoke marijuana for purely medical
reasons: among others, to ease the nausea of chemotherapy; to reduce the pain of
multiple sclerosis; to alleviate the symptoms of glaucoma; to improve appetite danger-
ously reduced from AIDS. They use it as an effective medicine, yet they are technically
regarded as criminals, and every year many are jailed.
Id.
442. Id.
443. Cowan, Pot-Talk, supra note 363, at 495.
444. IMPACT AND FEASIBILIrY, supra note 229, at 5 (testimony of the Honorable Lawrence
Coughlin, quoting Pennsylvania Attorney General Leroy Zimmerman).
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ting help because they impose fear of imprisonment or having their
newborns taken away by state welfare officials.
Those who do seek treatment are often turned away. One survey
found that eighty-five percent of poor, drug-addicted pregnant women
were turned away after seeking medical help.445 Nationally, only ten
percent of pregnant drug users are eligible for treatment and gui-
dance.446 It is truly pitiful that innocent babies suffer not only from
the ignorance and desperation of their mothers but also from the cal-
lous intransigence of the American government.
F. The Hope of Treatment and Research
Drug treatment programs work-in spite of political claims ("they
are too expensive") and moral arguments ("addiction results solely
from a lack of will or moral character"" 7) to the contrary. Today, the
unanimous consensus of drug experts is that government resources are
best spent on treatment and education instead of criminalization. 448
A Rand study concluded that treatment is at least seven times more
effective than criminal punishment in reducing drug use. 4 9 The Na-
tional Institute of Drug Abuse concurred, finding that one dollar of
treatment yields three dollars in enhanced productivity to the econ-
omy and four dollars in reduced tax burden to the public. 450
Medically, drug treatment programs have proven to be the only ef-
fective method of reducing abuse and dependence. For the heroin ad-
dict, hope comes in the form of methadone-a synthetic heroin-
substitute which can abate and, in some cases, defeat addiction.451
445. Shenk, supra note 9, at 36.
446. Id. Shenk descibed the pregant user's plight:
Lee Brown, White House director of drug policy control, often talks of visiting crack
babies in the hospital to shame those who would liberalize drug laws. But, like many
addicts, pregnant women often avoid treatment and health care because they fear
arrest. Although it's hard to believe, those who do seek help-for themselves or their
unborn children-are often turned away. David Condliffe, who was the director of
drug policy for New York City in the late eighties, conducted a survey that found that
85 percent of poor, pregnant crack addicts looking for treatment were refused every-
where they tried. Nationwide, treatment is available for only 10 percent of the 300,000
pregnant women who abuse illegal drugs. This is perhaps the greatest moral horror of
our current policy-and it should shame everyone from President Clinton on down.
Id.
447. Horgan, supra note 324, at 17.
448. Duke, supra note 14, at 588.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. See The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 39 (editorial of Ethan Nadelmann)
("Methadone is to street heroin more or less what nicotine chewing-gum and skin patches are to
cigarettes. Hundreds of studies, as well as a National Academy of Sciences report last year, have
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Nearly eighty percent of heroin addicts treated through methadone-
maintenance programs stay off of the drug.452 Further, in spite of
near-sighted criticism, local programs have been remarkably success-
ful in reintegrating their patients into society.453 The scientific evi-
dence simply cannot be ignored. Methadone treatment is directly
correlated to the cessation of criminal and misanthropic conduct. 454
An economic analysis is also persuasive to the legalization move-
ment. A desperate heroin addict might annually commit $40,000 to
$50,000 in crime or cost the state $35,000 each year for incarcera-
tion.455 In contrast, methadone treatment only costs about $3,000 per
year per addict.456 Cocaine-treatment programs have also been suc-
cessful, mostly through psychiatric therapy.457 A methadone-type
substitute for cocaine is still forthcoming, largely due to underfunding
and bureaucratic obstacles, but preliminary research has been promis-
ing.458 As compared to cocaine or heroin, marijuana is not physically
addictive and is rarely found to be mentally addictive.4 59 Those who
do suffer mental "withdrawals" from marijuana can be effectively
concluded that methadone is more effective than any other treatment in reducing heroin-related
crime, disease, and death.").
452. Horgan, supra note 324, at 17.
453. See Benoit, supra note 251, at 35 ("Dr. Robert Newman, president of New York City's
Beth Israel Medical Center, which has the largest heroin treatment center in the nation[, says
that methadone programs] are often accused of failing because they substitute one drug for
another, methadone for heroin. This makes Newman fume. 'If somebody has epilepsy,' he says,
'and is treated for it with Dilantin, nobody would say, 'All you've done is substitute Dilantin for
the seizures." . . . [A]bout 50% of Newman's clients have full-time jobs. At the time they en-
rolled, only 10% to 15% were working. Also, he says, '[tihere are some in school, and some
part-time employed, but the overall majority are [sic] productively employed."').
454. See Greene, supra note 325, at 235 ("A compelling body of literature shows that there is
a simple dose-response relationship between blood levels of methadone and the abandonment of
antisocial behaviors."); see also Goldstein & Kalant, supra note 322, at 1519 (stating that the
reduction of street crime by addicts enrolled in methodone programs is well documented).
455. Cotton, supra note 320, at 1644.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Jarvik, supra note 230, at 390. As Jarvik reported:
[C]ocaine cravings after withdrawal are reported to be reduced by a variety of agents,
especially antidepressants. One investigator found that desipramine reduced cocaine
craving for several weeks in cocaine-withdrawn patients who were not depressed, yield-
ing a "window of opportunity" for behavioral therapy; depot flupenthixol decanoate,
which has mixed antipsychotic and antidepressant properties, also reduced cocaine
craving. Pharmacologic agents that are still under investigation include other tricyclic
antidepressants, fluoxetine, buspirone, bromocriptine, clonidine, carbamazepine, and
several others.
Id.
459. Cotton, supra note 320, at 1644.
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treated through standard psychological counseling.460 Overall, drug
treatment programs have prevented crime by subduing antisocial be-
havior, while simultaneously ameliorating the lives of the addicted. 461
The problem is not efficacy because drug programs are successful,
particularly when compared to incarceration. 462 The problem is fund-
ing. Federal and state governments refuse to finance adequate treat-
ment programs, opting instead for escalating criminal enforcement. 463
Only one in ten cocaine and heroin addicts in New York and Oakland
is able to receive treatment because there are six-month waiting lists
to receive treatment. 464 Dr. Robert Newman of Beth Israel's metha-
done clinic rejects nearly one hundred heroin addicts per month be-
cause of federal restrictions.4 65 "The extraordinary thing," says Dr.
Newman, "is that these people apply knowing that there isn't treat-
ment available, knowing that there is a [long] waiting list. '466
The direct effects of underfunding-increased waiting time and
monetary costs for the addict-create substantial obstacles to effective
treatment. When drug addicts ask for help today, there may be no
tomorrow. "One of the differences between drug users and us is time
scale," argues David Turner, director of the Standing Conference on
Drug Abuse.467 "We want things immediately, but we can cope with
delay. An addict is used to taking heroin and getting immediate relief.
It's not surprising that if he is told he can have an appointment in four
weeks, he will probably forget about it.'"468 When the cost of treat-
ment is borne by the addict-an individual who is likely destitute from
his addiction-treatment becomes a "luxury" for only those who can
afford it.469 Nevertheless, bureaucrats continue to cut drug-treatment
budgets in spite of immense public support for such programs470 and
460. See id. (arguing that "network therapy in which family and friends cooperate with clini-
cians in cajolling patients to quit is probably the best therapy for marijuana dependancy").
461. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition, supra note 250, at 940.
462. Duke, supra note 14, at 588.
463. See Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition, supra note 250, at 940-41 (discussing the increased
costs of antidrug law enforcement).
464. IMPACT AND FEASIBIITY, supra note 229, at 6 (testimony of the Honorable Fortney H.
Stark).
465. See Benoit, supra note 251, at 35.
466. Id.
467. Andrew Kupfer, What To Do About Drugs, FORTUNE, June 20, 1988, at 41.
468. Id.
469. See William Schwartz, Drug Addicts with Dirty Needles, NATION, June 20, 1987, at 844
("Prior to the Reagan Administration's budget cuts of 1981, methadone treatment was free in
New Jersey. In 1980, 8,703 addicts enrolled in the program, but by 1984, when methadone treat-
ment cost $50 to $170, only 3,075 became involved.").
470. Tonry, supra note 259, at 25-26.
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the aforementioned medical evidence. 471 "Therapy is too important
to leave to the criminal justice system," argues University of Southern
California's Dr. Greene.472 Would Hippocrates, himself, not agree?
IV. THE LEGAL SYSTEM
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repul-
sive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight devia-
tions from legal modes of procedure.... It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon.
-Justice John Marshall Harlan473
In its haste to gain ground on the amorphous drug-war adversary,
the U.S. government has forgotten, or ignored, the boundaries of its
own charter. Every American is a signatory to an agreement limiting
the coercive powers of government; it is called the United States Con-
stitution. Through slow accretions of police power annexed from the
Bill of Rights, the drug war has resulted in a de facto (but certainly
not de jure) constitutional amendment. Experts and scholars have
lumped court decisions, congressional legislation, and executive action
into a single aphorism: the "drug exception" to the Bill of Rights.474
Rather than serving as the ardent sentinel of the Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court has both approved and fostered the
truncation of Americans' civil liberties.4 75
The Court during the past decade let police obtain search warrants
on the strength of anonymous tips (Fourth and Sixth Amendments).
It did away with the need for warrants when police want to search
luggage, trash cans, car interiors, bus passengers, fenced private
property and barns (Fourth). It let prosecutors hold drug offenders
471. Another casualty of budget cuts is medical and scientific research-research that could
provide answers and hope for the future. Given adequate funding:
[N]eurochemical and neurobiologic research will yield new understandings about the
mechanisms of the drug addictions. In the future, as in the past, such knowledge can be
counted on to produce novel diagnostic, predictive, and therapeutic interventions. Spe-
cifically, learning more about the neurobiology and pharmacology of reward will lay a
sounder basis for therapy. Testing for genetic vulnerability might permit better target-
ing of prevention efforts to those who are most vulnerable. Novel pharmacologic treat-
ments that need to be developed include a long-acting agonist to supplant cocaine
(analogous to methadone in opiate addiction), long-acting antagonists or immunization
procedures, and drugs to facilitate detoxification and suppress craving. Finally, we
need the patience to fund and carry out very long-term studies on the effectiveness of
prevention education strategies.
Goldstein & Kalant, supra note 322, at 1519.
472. Greene, supra note 325, at 235.
473. United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
474. Barnett, supra note 50, at 2612.
475. Dan Baum, The Drug War on Civil Liberties, NATION, June 29, 1992, at 886, 888.
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without bail (Eighth). It permitted the confiscation of property
before a suspect is charged, let alone convicted (Fifth). It let prose-
cutors imprison people twice-at the state and federal levels-for
the same crime (Fifth). It let police fly as low as 400 feet over
houses in their search for marijuana plants (Fourth). It allowed the
seizure of defense attorneys' legal fees in drug cases (Sixth). It al-
lowed mandatory urine testing for federal employees (Fourth).
And [it] let stand a sentence of mandatory life without parole for
simple drug possession (Eighth).476
The Court, however, has not been unanimous in its acquiescence.
Nor has it necessarily been a partisan fight. Conservative Justice
Antonin Scalia criticized mandatory drug testing of federal employees
as an "invasion of their privacy and [an] affront to their dignity. '477
Liberal Justice John Paul Stevens has protested that the "Court has
become a loyal foot soldier" in the drug war.478 Lower courts and
singular jurists have also expressed dismay over the trampling of the
Constitution.4 79
When all is said and done, the nearsighted and deceptively ignorant
decisions of the state and federal judiciary remain the law of the land.
Drug warriors can sift through one's garbage without permission.480
Low-flying police helicopters can "snoop" into one's backyard, patio,
or garden.481 African-Americans and Hispanics can have their bodies
and automobiles searched because they fit an imaginary drug criminal
"profile. ' 482 At the American borders, rectal searches can be con-
ducted by police without a warrant, let alone probable cause.483 Even
the sacred right of free expression embodied in the First Amendment
has not been spared from the constitutional cutting block.484 Appar-
476. Id.
477. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 686 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
478. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
479. See Wisotsky, supra note 11, at 17 ("In 1991, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
declared that 'The drug crisis does not license the aggrandizement of governmental power in lieu
of civil liberties. Despite the devastation wrought by drug trafficking in communities nation-
wide, we cannot suspend the precious rights guaranteed by the Constitution in an effort to fight
the 'War on Drugs." In that observation, the court echoed a 1990 ringing dissent by the chief
justice of the Florida Supreme Court: 'If the zeal to eliminate drugs leads this state and nation to
forsake its ancient heritage of constitutional liberty, then we will have suffered a far greater
injury than drugs ever inflict upon us. Drugs injure some of us. The loss of liberty injures us
all."').
480. Galiber, supra note 75, at 841.
481. Id. at 842.
482. Duke, supra note 14, at 589.
483. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 665 (citation omitted).
484. One commentator told this story in dramatic fashion:
[C]riticism [of the War on Drugs] is essentially forbidden speech. Thomas Kline of Post
Falls, Idaho, got a swift lesson in the dangers of speaking out when he wrote a letter to
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ently, the mentality of the drug warrior does not allow for trifling con-
cepts like free speech or bodily integrity. As one commentator noted:
"Our society was once one in which the very thought of men and
women being strip-searched and forced to urinate in the presence of
witnesses was revolting. '485
There was also a time where the adage "the punishment should fit
the crime" was a fundamental principle of justice supported by the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.486 The drug war has skewed some Americans' sense of propor-
tionality and fairness. America's prisons are overflowing with
nonviolent drug offenders, often serving longer sentences than the
"typical" first-degree premeditated murderer.487  Even worse,
thousands of rapists, armed robbers and child molesters are being re-
leased to make room for recently convicted drug addicts.488 Where
has America's sense of priorities gone?
Another form of drug-war punishment-asset forfeiture-has also
been released from the moors of proportionality. For example:
On April 30, 1988, the Coast Guard boarded and seized the motor
yacht Ark Royal, valued at $2,500,000, because 10 marijuana seeds
and two stems were found on board .... The $80,000,000 oceano-
graphic research ship Atlantis II was seized in San Diego when the
the editor of the Coeur d'Alene Press... advocating the legalization of marijuana. A
couple of days later, agents of the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement (IDLE)
searched the garbage can behind his house-which is legal without a warrant-and
found three grams of pot stems. On the strength of that evidence, they got a warrant,
found seventeen joints in Kline's house and busted him. "We'd do the same thing
again," said Wayne Longo, the IDLE agent in charge of the investigation, reached by
telephone at his desk in Coeur d'Alene. "It's not that often that we see people writing
in saying they're using dope." Of course, Kline's letter says nothing about his using
marijuana; it's strictly an argument for legalization. Longo, however, wasn't interested
in quibbling. "Look," he said. "I've commented on this all I'm going to." And he
hung up.
Baum, supra note 475, at 888.
485. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 666.
486. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
487. Shenk, supra note 9, at 35. Shenk articulated this descrepency as follows:
[T]hanks to mandatory minimum sentences, the system is overloaded with non-violent
drug users and dealers, who now often receive harsher penalties than murderers, rap-
ists, and serious white collar criminals. Solicited by an undercover DEA agent to find a
cocaine supplier, Gary Fannon facilitated the deal and received a sentence of life with-
out parole. Larry Singleton raped a teenager, hacked off her arms between the wrist
and elbow, and left her for dead in the desert. He received the 14-year maximum sen-
tence and served only eight years. This disparity is not the exception in modem law
enforcement. It is the rule. Non-violent drug offenders receive an average 60 months
in jail time, five times the average 12-month-sentence for manslaughter convicts.
Id.
488. See Scheer, supra note 5, at 49.
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Coast Guard found 0.01 ounce of marijuana in a crewman's shaving
kit.... A Michigan couple returning from a Canadian vacation lost
a 1987 Mercury Cougar when customs agents found two marijuana
cigarettes in one of their pockets. No criminal charges were filed,
but the car was kept by the government.4 89
The worst is yet to come. After the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Michigan v. Bennis,490 innocence is no longer a con-
stitutionally mandated defense against having one's property
seized.491 In oral argument, the state government even conceded that
its forfeiture program would allow for the uncompensated seizure of a
stolen car because the thief, not the legal owner, was caught with nar-
cotics in the vehicle.492 In spite of its draconian possibilities, the Court
upheld the state program in toto.493
The high courts of other countries have refused to follow the path
blazed by the American judiciary. For example, a German appellate
court decriminalized the possession of marijuana and hashish, finding
that "[i]ntoxication, like eating, drinking and sex, is one of the funda-
mentals of mankind. ' 494 Two years ago, the Columbian Constitu-
tional Court legalized the personal use of small quantities of
recreational drugs based on the citizenry's right to "free development
of the personality. ' 495 These decisions are powerful reminders of
America's civil libertarian roots and of the U.S. government's latter-
day rejection of individual liberty, integrity, and responsibility.496 The
United States Supreme Court, however, foreclosed all civil libertarian
arguments against drug prohibition more than seventy years ago,497
and it is inconceivable that the current Court would be willing to re-
489. Wisotsky, supra note 11, at 20.
490. 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996).
491. See id. (upholding a long line of cases that held "that an owner's interest in property may
be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not
know that it was to be put to such use").
492. Oral Argument at *39-41, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729), avail-
able at 1995 WL 712350.
493. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
494. The Right To Get High, TIME, Mar. 16, 1992, at 43.
495. C. Torres, Legalize It?, NATION, June 20, 1994, at 857.
496. See D. Keith Mano, Legalize Drugs, NAT'L REV., May 28, 1990, at 50, 52 ("Let us say I
grow marijuana and sell my neighbor some (I haven't even crossed a state line)-what right can
the Federal Government or Vermont or Boston have to arrest me, there being no demonstrable
public danger? ... [None. B]ut, of course, Drug Prohibition has never been constitutional. ...
[It] has been, in one sense, profoundly American-an example of our naive and well-meaning,
but misapplied, hope that enough money or enough statist interference will redeem 'evil.' It has
also been profoundly un-American: Drug Prohibition violates individual freedom ... and the
Jeffersonian pursuit principle.").
497. See, e.g., United States v. Doramus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (holding that the Harrison Act
was constitutional pursuant to the federal government's taxing power).
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visit these issues. In the end, it will be the American public, not
judges or legislators, who must ask themselves whether it is willing to
sacrifice its civil liberties for the War on Drugs.
V. SOCIAL POLICY
Nor deem the irrevocable Past
As wholly wasted, wholly vain,
If, rising on its wrecks, at last
To something nobler we attain.
-Henry Wadsworth Longfellow 4 98
The noblest of all virtues is not fortuity or even foresight; it is easy
to gloat upon success. Nor is it necessarily wisdom because even the
unseasoned amateur can be witness to incomparable lucidity. Rather,
it is the ability to accept and learn from one's mistakes that makes
man the master of his environment and the architect of his own future.
"The life of the law[,]" opined the great Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, "has been experience. '499
The life of America's drug law has not been experience; it has been
moral rhetoric and dogmatism. The "essentially empirical" 500 nature
of the law has given way to political punditry; the drug war has taken
on a life independent of learned experience. It need not be this way,
however. America's finest hours have followed repentance for grave
social and political mistakes: the Emancipation Proclamation, Brown
v. Board of Education,50 1 and the withdrawal from Vietnam.
America's errors have been uniquely human, but its remorse and ame-
lioration have been divinely inspired. The time has come to reassess a
social policy which pits the nation against itself.
A. Crime, Violence, and Corruption
Dr. Lee Brown, the Clinton Administration's former "drug czar,"
testified before Congress that drugs "are behind much of the crime we
see on our streets today, both those crimes committed by users to fi-
nance their lifestyles and those committed by traffickers and dealers
fighting for territory and turf. '50 2 Dr. Brown was partially accurate.
"If these remarks had been preceded by two words, 'prohibition of,"'
498. Henry W. Longfellow, The Ladder of Saint Augustine, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF
LONGFELLOW 186-87 (Cambridge ed. 1975) (1893).
499. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
500. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 4
(1870).
501. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
502. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 47 (editorial of Steven Duke).
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retorted Yale law professor Steven Duke, "the statement would have
been correct. '50 3
The drug czar's presumption-drug use results in criminal activity-
is demonstrably false.50 4 Some studies have shown that the major il-
licit drugs-marijuana, heroin, and cocaine-do not intrinsically cause
crime.505 Further, as opined by renowned narcotics expert Arnold
Trebach, illicit drug use "is a neutral act in terms of its potential crimi-
nogenic effect upon an individual's behavior.... [T]here is nothing in
the pharmacology, or physical or psychological impact, of the drug
that would propel a user to crime. '50 6 Dr. Brown's naive causal analy-
sis belies the true nexus among drugs, crime, and violence: drug
prohibition.
A few short anecdotes can provide context and a reality check for
die-hard drug warriors:
An innocent 75-year-old African-American minister died of a heart
attack struggling with Boston cops who were mistakenly arresting
him because an informant had given them the wrong address. A
rancher in Ventura County, California, was killed by a police SWAT
team serving a search warrant in the mistaken belief that he was
growing marijuana. In Los Angeles, a three-year-old girl died of
gunshot wounds after her mother took a wrong turn into a street
controlled by a drug-dealing gang. They fired on the car because it
had invaded their marketplace. 50 7
These are the true victims of the War on Drugs, not the purported
legion of souls lost to prohibited vice. Every heroin overdose (which,
by the way, is usually caused by black-market adulteration 5°8) is
matched by a hundred drive-by murders. 50 9 Further, for every "crack
baby" (often a result of prohibition-induced fear and ignorance51°),
there are thousands of kids avoiding playgrounds because "they fear
503. Id. (emphasis added).
504. See id. ("The only possibility more daunting than [the false implication] our leaders are
dissembling is that they might actually believe the nonsense they purvey.").
505. See, e.g., TREBACH, supra note 22, at 246.
506. Id. (heroin not criminogenic); see also ERICH GOODE, DRUGS IN AMERICAN SOCIEmT 145
(3d ed. 1989) (positing that marijuana being criminogenic "receive[s] no attention even in the
most vigorous antimarijuana polemics"); GgrNSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 337, at 227 (argu-
ing that cocaine is "so seldom [related to violence that] it is not a serious crime problem").
507. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 43 (editorial of Joseph McNamara).
508. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 50, at 2604; Duke, supra note 14, at 585; Ostrowski, supra
note 13, at 652-54.
509. See Shenk, supra note 9, at 33-34.
510. Dennis, supra note 315, at 126; Duke, supra note 14, at 609; Shenk, supra note 9, at 38;
Sileo, supra note 259, at 6.
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'bullies and drug dealers.' '511 The yarns spun by Bill Bennett and Dr.
Lee Brown simply cannot beat the real horror stories on the streets.
The facts are straightforward. Half of the serious crime in America
is a result of drug prohibition (not drug use), 512 and two-thirds of all
homicides in major cities are connected to the drug trade (again, not
drug use). 51 3 The motive is equally manifest, as succinctly argued by
former police chief Joseph McNamara: "It's the money, stupid. '51 4
Prohibition raises the risks of drug transactions; the possibility of in-
carceration is factored in by the drug dealer as a cost of doing busi-
ness. Higher risks for the dealer equate to higher prices for the
consumer. An addict who would otherwise support his habit through
lawful means now turns to the only "occupation" which can bankroll
the exorbitant drug bill-crime. Moreover, drug prohibition ensures
that trade squabbles are resolved by bullets instead of conference-
room negotiations. A drug deal that has "gone sour" simply cannot
be settled in court.515
Analyzing the mind of the criminal drug user is far from complex.
Addicts who commit crime do so because (1) they are addicted, (2)
drugs are expensive, and (3) they are destitute. Prohibition fails to
affect the first element-it has had no impact on drug availability,51 6
and the specter of criminal sanction is wholly irrelevant to the ad-
dict. 517 However, prohibition causes the second element-drugs are
expensive precisely because they are illegal-and negatively impacts
511. Id. at 34 (quoting one child's reason for avoiding the playground).
512. Duke, supra note 14, at 581.
513. Sileo, supra note 259, at 9.
514. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 42 (editorial of Joseph McNamara).
515. See Boaz, supra note 16, at 629-30. According to Boaz:
Drug use does not cause violence. Alcohol did not cause the violence of the 1920s,
Prohibition did. Similarly, drugs do not cause today's soaring murder rates, drug prohi-
bition does. The chain of events is obvious: drug laws reduce the supply and raise the
price of drugs. The high price causes addicts to commit crimes to pay for a habit that
would be easily affordable if obtaining drugs was legal. The illegality of the business
means that business disputes-between customers and suppliers or between rival sup-
pliers-can be settled only through violence, not through the courts. The violence of
the business then draws in those who have a propensity-or what economists call a
comparative advantage-for violence. When Congress repealed Prohibition, the vio-
lence went out of the liquor business. Similarly, when Congress repeals drug prohibi-
tion, the heroin and cocaine trade will cease to be violent. As columnist Stephen
Chapman put it, "the real accomplices to murder" are those responsible for the laws
that make the drug business violent.
Id. (citations omitted).
516. See supra notes 229-41 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of how a black
market for illicit drugs is created).
517. See supra notes 410-15 and accompanying text (positing that drug users are not easily
deterred by the threat of criminal sanctions).
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the third. If a drug abuser was not poor before his addiction, black-
market prices can start him on his way to economic ruin. Moreover, if
the addict started out poor, petty theft often appears as the only op-
tion in his utter depravity. As for the drug thug and his gangster co-
horts; the War on Drugs is their lifeblood. Prohibition creates the
black market, which generates the money, which supports the gangs,
which deal in violence.
The money has also fostered the worst criminal in civilized society:
the crooked cop. The corruption, however, transcends the alderman
or the beat cop; federal policy makers and foreign dignitaries have
been embroiled in drug profiteering.518 Between 1983 and 1985, three
hundred high-level law-enforcement officials were accused of drug-re-
lated corruption.519 One FBI agent received a ten-year sentence for
taking $850,000 in drug bribes.5 20 A narcotics prosecutor went to jail
for accepting $210,000 and a sailboat in payoffs.5 21 A New Orleans
police officer was convicted of murdering her partner to protect a
drug-dealing confederate.52 2 A former Detroit police chief was con-
victed of skimming police "drug-buy" money.523 In 1992, New York
City uncovered its largest police corruption scandal ever, involving a
posse of law enforcement agents unofficially "busting" drug dealers
and splitting their nefarious take.52 4 The agent who arrested Panama-
nian General/drug-conspirator Mafluel Noriega was himself impris-
oned for stealing laundered drug money.5 25 The litany of official
corruption could go on forever; Americans' toleration for such crime
should not.
Dr. Steven Jonas of SUNY-Stony Brook has assessed the severity of
crime for each of the five major recreational drugs as follows:
518. See William J. Helmer, Saint Valentine's Day-The Massacre Continues: Failure of Drug
Enforcement Today Compared to Failure of Prohibition in the '20s, Mar. 1990, at 46 (on file with
author).
519. Hacker, supra note 273, at 141.
520. Branch, supra note 224, at 26.
521. Id.
522. The Drug War Is Lost, supra note 4, at 43 (editorial of Joseph McNamara).
523. Id.
524. Shenk, supra note 9, at 35.
525. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 43 (editorial of Joseph McNamara). Corrup-
tion among foreign officials, however, is much more rampant:
The presidential press secretary of Columbia, Roman Medina, was arrested for smug-
gling cocaine into Spain in his diplomatic pouch.... Three Bahamian cabinet ministers
had to resign when their association with drug trafficking was uncovered by a royal
commission. Two others were fired. Mexico is notorious for its corrupt officials, and
one of the numerous military dictators who took over Bolivia was himself a cocaine
trafficker.
Gonzales, supra note 242, at 111.
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CRIME, RANKING BY SEVERITY
5 2 6
Type of Crime Cocaine Heroin Marijuana Tobacco Alcohol
1. Drug Commerce
a. Importation, sale, High High Medium None None
and possession
b. Corruption of the High High ? None None
criminal justice
system
c. Corruption of legal High High ? None None
commerce
d. Violent crime, High Medium Low None None
commerce-related
2. Money-raising crime Medium High ? None None
3. Violation of motor ? ? Low None High
vehicle statutes
4. Violent crime, not ? ? ? None High
commerce-related
5. Product tax evasion None None Medium Low None
The most notable disparity is between the illegal drugs (cocaine, her-
oin, and marijuana) and the legal drugs (tobacco and alcohol). Drug
prohibition and the resulting black market produce this artificial dis-
tinction in crime severity-a discrepancy that would otherwise not
exist.
Would drug legalization prevent the crime, violence, and corruption?
This author answers with an emphatic "yes." Milton Friedman,52 7
George Shultz, 528 and William F. Buckley529 agree. Science has also
chimed in.530 A British study of 150 addicts found that they commit-
ted ninety-six percent fewer crimes when they had access to a low-cost
drug supply.531 "Nothing we could do would reduce violent crime
more quickly and efficiently than legalizing drugs," argues Libertarian
Party leader Douglas MacNeil.5 32 Even some prohibitionists, like
Congressman Charles Rangle, concede that legalization "would re-
duce crime. Undoubtedly that's true. ' 533 Drug-dealing gangsters
would involuntarily cede their business monopoly to the government
and its assigns. The pusher on the street could neither undercut the
calculated government price nor ensure purity to F.D.A. standards.
The economically stripped user would no longer need to steal to sup-
port his habit, and the black market would dry up, slithering back
526. This chart appears in Jonas, supra note 275, at 793. Jonas used a four-level scale as
measurement with a "" to signify "unknown."
527. See Scheer, supra note 5, at 49.
528. See id.
529. See The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 35 (editorial of William F. Buckley).
530. Opening Crack, supra note 278, at 56.
531. Id.
532. Sileo, supra note 259, at 9.
533. Id.
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under the rock of unintended consequences as the law of unfettered
supply and demand restores pre-prohibition equilibrium. 534 More-
over, legalization would free up 400,000 law-enforcement officials to
pursue serious criminals-rapists, child molesters, serial killers, etcet-
era-rather than the pitiful addict in need of medical help. 535 Instead
of releasing violent criminals to make room for convicted drug offend-
ers, legalization would open up 300,000 prison cells for the truly ma-
levolent.536 In sum, the boon to the criminal justice system simply
cannot be overestimated. 537
B. Drug Consumption
As argued above, the escalating drug war has had no effect on the
availability of narcotics. 538 A 1988 General Accounting Office report
concluded that in the 1980s: (1) drug consumption was substantial
throughout the decade; (2) the amount of cocaine consumed and its
purity doubled while the price declined thirty percent; (3) the price of
heroin decreased by twenty percent while its purity increased by one-
third; and (4) marijuana remained highly available throughout the
country and its purity continued to increase. 539 If the drug war was
534. Church et al., supra note 226, at 14. Church posits that the economic forces of legaliza-
tion would be significant:
The great promise of legalization, say its advocates, is that it would rip this cancer out
of the cities. If drugs were legal, the Government could regulate their sale and set a
low price. Addicts could get a fix without stealing, and a lack of profit would dismantle
the booming criminal industry that now supplies them. Drug gangs would disappear as
bootleggers did after the repeal of Prohibition; with them would go the current, perva-
sive corruption of police officers, lawyers, judges and politicians bribed by drug money.
Drug dealing would no longer seem to be the only way out of the ghetto for underclass
youths. Says Mayor Schmoke: "If you take the profit out of drug trafficking, you won't
have young children hiding drugs [on behalf of pushers] for $100 a night or wearing
beepers to school because it makes more sense to run drugs for someone than to take
some of the jobs that are available. I don't know of any kid who is making money
running booze." The bottom line for those favoring legalization: drug-related crime
damages society far more than drug usage itself.
Id.
535. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 36 (editorial of William F. Buckley).
536. Duke, supra note 14, at 590.
537. Or, in the words of Professor Steven Duke, "[t]he beneficial effects on crime rates can
hardly be exaggerated." Id. at 580 (citation omitted).
538. See Shenk, supra note 9, at 33 ("The hundreds of billions of dollars spent on drug control
in the last several decades have yielded only a moderate decline in the casual use of marijuana
and cocaine. But there has been no decrease in hard-core addiction. The total amount of co-
caine consumed per capita has actually risen. And even casual use is now creeping up."); see
also supra notes 229-41 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of how a black market
for illicit drugs is created).
539. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 677 (citations omitted).
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achieving its goals, drug prices would rise and drug availability, con-
sumption, and purity would fall. Obviously something is not working.
Drug addicts are not deterred by draconian punishment; people
with debilitating diseases simply do not respond to coercive force.
More importantly, drug dealers are absolutely unaffected by the
threat of criminal sanction. As argued by Baltimore mayor Kurt
Schmoke, "going to jail is just part of the cost of doing business. It's a
nuisance, not a deterrent. '540 International studies have scientifically
refuted the efficacy of criminal sanctions in deterring drug consump-
tion.541 It is even possible that drug criminalization produces a "for-
bidden-fruit effect," baiting the "id" in all of us to try drugs for the
sheer illegality. 542
Moreover, the drug war has a deleterious "substitution" effect
which has either gone unnoticed (unlikely) or been ignored (likely).
"The Iron Law of Prohibition," as it is called,543 ensures that effective
interdiction efforts against one drug will increase the supply and con-
sumption of another drug.544 Before alcohol prohibition, the United
States was largely "a nation of beer drinkers. ' 545 After prohibition,
Americans switched to hard alcohol-with its higher proof (i.e., alco-
hol concentration), simpler production, and easier concealment. 546
The Iron Law has had similar effects on illicit-drug-consumption
patterns over the past three decades. When the federal government
cracked down on marijuana in the late 1960s, dealers and consumers
switched to a relatively more dangerous drug-cocaine. 547 The same
phenomenon occurred in the 1980s, with cocaine again substituting for
marijuana.548 The Iron Law's "irresistible dynamic" also transformed
540. Church et al., supra note 226, at 14.
541. Legalizing Drugs, supra note 280, at 44 (challenging "the empirical basis for using deter-
rence as a means of controlling drug use").
542. Id. at 45.
543. See Cowan, How the Narcs Created Crack, supra note 352, at 27.
544. See Greene, supra note 325, at 235 ("Efforts aimed ... to limit the demand by restricting
the supply of one drug or group of drugs, are less effective in that they predictably stimulate
consumption of a substitute.").
545. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 48 (editorial of Steven Duke).
546. See Barnett, supra note 50, at 2608-09 ("Alcohol prohibition [led] Americans to shift
their consumption patterns away from comparatively less potent forms of alcohol such as wine
and beer-the production and distribution of which were more easily detected by law enforce-
ment-to distilled spirits, which were more concentrated, easier to manufacture in illicit stills,
and consequently more difficult to police. It has taken several decades for this Prohibition-
induced taste for 'cocktails' to abate and for the more traditional preference for wine and beer to
reassert itself-much to the chagrin of distillers.").
547. Scheer, supra note 5, at 49.
548. Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?, supra note 40, at 45 (noting that "[in the 1980's
retail purity of heroine and cocaine increased"); see also Cowan, How the Narcs Created Crack,
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the black market for cocaine, as dealers and consumers shifted from
the powdered version to a more lethal coca-based drug-crack.5 49
From beer to liquor, from marijuana to cocaine and heroin, from
cocaine to crack, the Iron Law moves synchronously with law enforce-
ment. "You have to ask what's the next drug," says Princeton Profes-
sor Ethan Nadelmann, "[aind if it turns out to be something that any
seventh-grader can make with a home chemistry set, then your whole
capacity to control it through the government just crumbles. s550
There is also a geographic version of the Iron Law due to the global
flexibility in the cultivation and production of illicit drugs. If drug
production is checked in one part of the world, a new source invaria-
bly springs from another city, nation or continent. Stamp out Hum-
boldt marijuana, and Sonoma growers pick up the slack; cut off
Columbian cocaine, and any of a number of South American produ-
cers will gladly furnish the necessary supply.55' Marijuana is literally a
weed; cocaine comes from the fast-growing and hardy coca plant; and
heroin is derived from poppies. These drugs can be produced nearly
anywhere in the world, if a demand is present.
Without the drug war, argue prohibitionists, America would be a
"nation of zombies. 5 52 "Legalization would result in the widespread
use of drugs," contends Congressman Robert Garcia.55 3 Is that true?
Would drug use and abuse spiral after legalization? If history is an
indicator, the answer is "no."
The repeal of alcohol prohibition was not followed by a mass exo-
dus from the ranks of teetotallers.554 Rather, alcohol indulgence re-
verted to a stable, pre-Prohibition consumption rate.55 5 Moreover,
the rate of alcohol addiction has remained constant for over a century
supra note 352, at 27 (arguing that strict law enforcement of marijuana is encouraging the use of
cocaine).
549. Galiber, supra note 75, at 844.
550. Benoit, supra note 251, at 35 (citation omitted).
551. See Jarvik, supra note 230, at 389 ("Curtailing the supply of demanded drugs has been
compared to squeezing a balloon: constrict it in one place and it expands somewhere else. Erad-
ication of coca, opium, or marijuana plantations does reduce use, but it may encourage produc-
tion elsewhere if demand is not reduced. An example is the expansion of the California
marijuana crop after the availability of Mexican marijuana was reduced.").
552. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 47 (editorial of Steven Duke). The phrase
"nation of zombies" was originally coined by the "ethically-challenged junior senator from New
York," Alfonse D'Amato. See Marsha J. Ferziger, Monopolies on Addiction: Should Recrea-
tional Drugs Be Patentable?, 1994 U. Cmn. LEGAL F. 471, 495 (citations omitted).
553. IMPACr AND FEASIBIrr, supra note 229, at 10 (testimony of the Honorable Robert
Garcia).
554. Ostrowski, supra note 13, at 675.
555. Greene, supra note 325, at 230.
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and a half-including the entire duration of alcohol criminalization. 556
Similarly, heroin was legal prior to 1914-yet per capita addiction to-
day is no different from the pre-Harrison Act rate.5 57
In a more recent example, the decriminalization of marijuana in
several states during the 1970's resulted in no increase in the number
of users or the level of consumption.5 8 Over the past decade, other
states have decriminalized the personal use and possession of mari-
juana with no concomitant increase in usage.5 59 Other countries have
had similar results from their legalization efforts. For example, the
Netherlands has decriminalized marijuana and heroin use since the
1970's-with only positive consequences. Every age group exper-
ienced reduced marijuana consumption, with a significant drop in
teenage use.5 60 Moreover, in the Netherlands' capital, Amsterdam,
the number of heroin addicts dropped by more than 3,000 during the
1980'S.561
The American citizenry has opined that legalization will not entice
it to start using drugs or to increase drug consumption.5 62 In one
study (corroborated by later studies), 98.3 percent of all non-drug
users said they would not try drugs if legalized.563 The survey also
556. Id. at 231. Greene expanded upon the role of alcohol in American society:
If any drug could destroy the fabric of society, alcohol would have done it by now.
Surprisingly steady rates of alcohol use in America suggest that despite ready availabil-
ity, there is no "epidemic" of alcohol addiction. Rather, we have reached a steady state
of equilibrium, in which four million pre-alcoholics provide a pool for up to 200,000
new alcoholics who replace those who die annually of alcohol-related diseases. In
other words, despite changes in per capita usage, there remains a constant rate of alco-
holism within society, dating back 150 years-again corroborating that there is a con-
stant role of addiction to all substances. There is nothing to suggest that alcohol differs
materially from illegal drugs in its ability to recruit new addicts.
Id. (citations omitted).
557. See Daniel Koshland, Thinking Tough, SCIENCE, Sept. 9, 1988, at 1273 ("[Tlhe proportion
of addicts in the population was not appreciably different than it is today.").
558. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BREAKING THE IMPASSE ON THE WAR ON DRUGS 215 (1986)
("Experience in Oregon, California, and Maine following decriminalization.., showed no signif-
icant percentage of new users or an increase in the frequency of use.") (citation omitted).
559. See Jonas, supra note 275, at 785 ("Carefully ignored in all the law enforcement propa-
ganda is the experience of the dozen or so states that have virtually legalized marijuana (among
them, Alabama, New York, Maine, California, Nebraska, Mississippi, and Rhode Island). Evi-
dence is spotty, but what there is suggest that the use of marijuana actually declines after legali-
zation.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
560. See Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition, supra note 250, at 944 ("[Clonsumption has actually
declined significantly; in 1976, 3% of 15- and 16-year-olds and 10% of 17- and 18-year-olds used
cannabis occasionally; by 1985, the percentages had declined to 2 and 6%, respectively. The
policy has succeeded, as the government intended, 'in making drug use boring."') (citation
omitted).
561. Dennis, supra note 315, at 130.
562. Gazzaniga, supra note 374, at 44.
563. Legalizing Drugs, supra note 280, at 48.
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found that occasional users would not increase their usage with legali-
zation. 564 The question for the ardent prohibitionist then becomes:
Can one believe the American public? This author believes that the
American public can be believed.
Through education and social coercion, Americans have begun to
kick the most addictive drug on earth-nicotine. Between 1965 and
1987, the proportion of adults smoking cigarettes dropped twenty-
eight percent. 565 "We have seen a substantial reduction in the use of
tobacco over the last thirty years," argues political commentator Wil-
liam F. Buckley, "and this is not because tobacco became illegal but
because a sentient community began, in substantial numbers, to ap-
prehend the high cost of tobacco to human health. ' 566 Federal Judge
Robert W. Sweet adds, "If our society can learn to stop using butter, it
should be able to cut down on cocaine. '5 67 Education and social dis-
approval are the answer, not self-righteous paternalism.
C. Race, Poverty, and Drugs
The drug war has decimated urban America, turning once produc-
tive neighborhoods into enclaves of violence and poverty, ruled by
gangsters and governed by de facto martial law.568 Throughout the
past few decades, the media has focused on urban blight as the core of
the American drug problem; minorities and inner-city neighborhoods
are characterized as the perceived source of America's drug prob-
lem. 569 Photographs showed only colored faces; words linked those
images with crime, violence, and poverty. They have produced only
564. Id.
565. Jonas, supra note 275, at 777 (citation omitted).
566. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 37 (editorial of William F. Buckley).
567. Duke, supra note 14, at 605 (citation omitted).
568. Wilson & Dilulio, supra note 259, at 21. The drug-related violence in America's largest
cities is particularly disturbing:
In south central Los Angeles, in much of Newark, in and around the housing projects of
Chicago, in the South Bronx and Bedford-Stuyvesant sections of New York, and in
parts of Washington, D.C., conditions are not much better than they are in Beirut on a
bad day. Drugs, especially crack, are sold openly on street comers; rival gangs shoot at
each other from moving automobiles; automatic weapons are carried by teenagers onto
school playgrounds; innocent people hide behind double-locked doors and shuttered
windows. In Los Angeles, there is at least one gang murder every day, Sundays in-
cluded. A ten-foot-high concrete wall is being built around ... [a] junior high school
... in order, the principal explained, to keep stray bullets from hitting children on the
playground.
Id.
569. See Tonry, supra note 259, at 52 ("Newspapers, television, and movies regularly portray
trafficking in ... [drugs] as characteristic of inner-city minority neighborhoods. Any minimally
informed person in the late 1980s knew that the major fronts in the drug wars were located in
minority neighborhoods.").
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societal malice toward the decrepit addict and the powerless inner-city
minority.570 Dr. George Annas, a professor at Boston University's
School of Public Health, summed up public sentiment this way: "Peo-
ple just hate addicts. They'd just as soon all the heroin addicts got
AIDS and died. They're not going to come out and say that, but I
think that's an undercurrent."' 571 The effect of race is undeniable. De-
spising the drug user can be easily transformed into contempt for the
inner-city minority, when all that is seen is black and brown faces.
Those in power, largely affluent and Caucasian, have waged the
drug war based on these images. The front line has been drawn in
Watts and Harlem, rather than Brentwood or uptown Manhattan, be-
cause that is where the perceived enemy (read "inner-city minority")
lives. Police browbeat the disheveled African-American man standing
on the corner of Pico and Hoover, but not the equally unkempt Cau-
casian man walking down Venice Boulevard.
Concerted law enforcement efforts in inner-city, minority communi-
ties have produced some disconcerting numbers. "Ninety percent of
today's arrests," says drug scholar Troy Duster, "involve black teenag-
ers buying and selling drugs worth less than $75."572 In Baltimore,
eighty-five percent of those arrested on drug charges are African-
American.573 Across the nation, forty-five percent of all drug arrests
involve African-Americans, 574 yet African-Americans comprise less
than thirteen percent of the American population.575
The racial discrepancy in incarceration is equally stark. Young Afri-
can-American men constitute almost half of America's prison in-
mates, but only two percent of the general population. 576 One-third
of all African-American males in the United States are officially su-
pervised by the criminal justice system "largely because of drug ar-
rests. '577 Moreover, when compared to international statistics, the
assumed "moral leadership" in the world becomes suspect and sadly
ironic. African-American males are four times less likely to be impris-
570. Schwartz, supra note 469, at 845 (noting the "profound contempt for addicts in our soci-
ety, reinforced by racism, as they are primarily black or Hispanic and poor").
571. Id.
572. Scheer, supra note 5, at 49 (quoting Troy Duster as support for the proposition that the
actual ratio of African-American users to Caucasian users is not proportional to the public's
perception of the ratio).
573. Duke, supra note 14, at 594 (citation omitted).
574. Id. at 594 (citation omitted).
575. TmE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 391 (1996).
576. Duke, supra note 14, at 595.
577. The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 43 (editorial of Joseph McNamara).
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oned in the recently desegregated South Africa than in the supposedly
"colorblind" United States.578
These numbers might be more palatable if most (or at least a major-
ity of) drug users were African-American. This, however, is not the
case. Nearly eighty percent of all drug users are Caucasian, 579 while
African-Americans comprise the majority of those arrested and incar-
cerated.580 African-Americans are, in fact, less likely than their Cau-
casian counterparts to have tried all illicit drugs except heroin.581
Caucasian Americans are doing the drugs; African-Americans are do-
ing the time.
Some experts opine that popular indifference to the plight of inner-
city minorities results from an "our kids, their kids" attitude.5 82 For
example, when drug use was denominated by the Caucasian middle
class in the 1970s, drug arrests and prison sentences were relatively
low. 583 In contrast, when drug use became synonymous with impover-
ished minorities in the late 1980s, law enforcement was uncompromis-
ingly aggressive. 584 Since then, the drug war has only become
unpopular when the Drug Enforcement Agency has focused its vast
resources on the cars, yachts, and homes of the affluent, powerful-
and Caucasian. 585 Otherwise, writes journalist and former addict
David Morrison, "who with the power to make a difference really
gives a damn? Having decamped for the suburbs, the middle classes
don't have to see the dreadful damage done." 586
In one sense, drug enforcement has evolved into a racial version of
property law's "N.I.M.B.Y." dilemma. The drug war can continue as
long as it is Not In My BackYard. In another sense, economist Rich-
578. See Duke, supra note 14, at 595 ("[O]f every 100,000 black males in the United States,
3,109 are incarcerated, while the comparable figure for South Africa is 729.") (citation omitted).
579. See Barnett, supra note 50, at 2611 (stating that seventy-seven percent of illegal-drug
users are Caucasian).
580. Id.
581. Tonry, supra note 259, at 56.
582. Alfred Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant: The American Society of Criminology
1992 Presidental Address, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1993).
583. See id. ("The decline after the 1974 peak was undoubtedly a consequence of the general
trend toward decriminalization of marijuana in the United States. A major factor contributing
to that decriminalization was undoubtedly a realization that the arrestees were much too often
the children of individuals, usually Caucasian, in positions of power and influence. Those par-
ents certainly did not want the consequences of a drug arrest to be visited on their children, and
so they used their leverage to achieve a significant degree of decriminalization.").
584. Id.
585. The drug war is only deplored "in those rare instances when the targets have been shifted
from ghetto street-corner dealers to middle- and upper-class assets such as yachts seized under
the Coast Guard's zero tolerance program." Scheer, supra note 5, at 49.
586. Shenk, supra note 9, at 9.
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ard Dennis has likened drug criminalization to a "regressive tax"
which aspires "to save relatively wealthy potential users of drugs like
marijuana and cocaine from self-destruction, at tremendous cost to
the residents of inner cities." 587 Regardless of how the drug war is
viewed, the fact remains that America acquiesces to minority commu-
nities which are violent and dilapidated precisely because of drug
criminalization.5 88 This being understood, the affluent and powerful
must eventually face the core issue: Would the War on Drugs still be
acceptable if the affluent and powerful lived in a community devastated
by drug-related crime and violence?
This question remains unanswered, with the status quo only exacer-
bating the interrelated cycles of poverty, hopelessness, crime, and
drug addiction.589 The current drug scheme ignores these cycles and
confuses the difference between acute problems and chronic dilemmas
like drug addiction. No simplistic causal analysis is possible when
grave social, economic, medical, and political issues are inculpated.5 90
As discussed above,591 it is the poverty and the hopelessness that
breeds the drug use and abuse, that pushes young African-American
and Hispanic men into the lucrative black market, and that compels
the depraved inner-city addict to steal. It is not the color of their skin
nor a flaw in their character; it is the miserable, pitiful lives that they
lead and the utter despair which clouds their every step. Mercy is
needed, but only venom is given.
Some influential African-American leaders have even deemed the
drug war to be covert genocide. For example, Louis Farrakhan, the
leader of the Nation of Islam, argues that "[t]he epidemic of drugs and
violence in the black community stems from a calculated attempt by
whites to foster black self-destruction. '592 This conspiracy theory has
become widely accepted within the African-American community.
One survey found that sixty percent of African-Americans believe
that the United States government allows or facilitates drug use in
587. Dennis, supra note 315, at 126.
588. Wilson & Dilulio, supra note 259, at 21.
589. Jarvik, supra note 230, at 387.
590. See Tonry, supra note 259, at 78-79 ("Recent crime-control policies treat crime and drug
trafficking as if they were only acute problems: apply a deterrence and incapacitation poultice
and the ailment will be cured. Inner-city crime and drug abuse and related social pathologies,
however, are not acute problems amenable to easy solutions. They are symptoms of chronic
social and economic conditions shaping disadvantaged inner-city communities and the life
chances of people within them.").
591. See supra notes 568-78 and accompanying text (arguing that "poverty" has become
synonmous with "drug use").
592. Duke, supra note 14, at 591.
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African-American communities to harm the residents.593 This might
seem laughable at first-if government officials could not cover up a
simple office burglary in 1972, it seems unlikely that decades of clan-
destine genocidal policies would go undetected. However, given
America's history, the drug war's gravely disproportionate effect on
minorities, and centuries of blatant and veiled racism by governmental
officials, the theory certainly becomes plausible to the disenfranchised
minority communities. 594
More problematic is the current appearance, if not the reality, of
official indifference to the plight of minority communities. Law pro-
fessor Michael Tonry of the University of Minnesota has argued that
government officials: (1) knew in the late eighties that drug use was
declining among middle- and upper-class Americans; (2) knew that
drug use was not declining among urban minorities; (3) knew that the
drug war would be waged almost exclusively in minority neighbor-
hoods; and (4) knew that young African-Americans and Hispanics
would be disproportionately arrested and imprisoned. 595 "By analogy
to criminal law['s mens rea requirement]," concludes Professor Tonry,
"the moral responsibility of the architects of contemporary crime con-
593. Tonry, supra note 259, at 79-80. Indeed, many African-Americans subscribe to such a
conspriracy theory:
University of Chicago law professor Norval Morris describes a seminar with black max-
imum security inmates in Stateville Prison in which patterns of race, crime, and punish-
ment were discussed; of twenty-six prisoners present, only three doubted that
American drug and crime control policies were a genocidal (their word) assault on
blacks by Caucasians. [In their 1991 book,] Thomas and Mary Edsall ... describe focus
groups held in the late 1980s under both Democratic and Republican party auspices; in
every session with black participants, the view was expressed that crime and drug con-
trol policies are a conscious effort to undermine black communities. A Democratic
pollster, Ed Reilly, similarly reported a belief among Northern urban blacks "that there
is an organized approach to keep them [blacks] isolated from mainstream America,
that the government system is rigged to keep them in poverty." A New York Times/
WCBS-TV news poll in 1990 likewise found that 29 percent of blacks (only 5 percent of
whites) thought it was true or might be true that the HIV virus was "deliberately cre-
ated in a laboratory in order to infect black people," that 60 percent (16 percent of
whites) believed it was true or might be true that government makes drugs available "in
poor black neighborhoods in order to harm black people," and that 77 percent believed
government "singles out and investigates black elected officials in order to discredit
them."
Id. (citation omitted).
594. See Duke, supra note 14, at 595 ("Blacks have suffered from bigotry, poverty, poor
health, inadequate education, and disadvantage on virtually every measure of well-being in
America since the first Africans were brought here in chains. Moreover, racism has been linked
to drug prohibition throughout its history in America. The many blacks who suspect racist moti-
vations in everything the white majority does have history on their side.") (citation omitted).
595. Tonry, supra note 259, at 51.
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trol policies is the same as if their primary goal had been to lock up
disproportionate numbers of young blacks.
596
This author does not subscribe to the genocide-conspiracy theory;
government officials have at worst been negligent and obstinate.
However, whether or not a conspiracy in fact exists is not the key
issue. In the drug war, appearances do matter.5 97 The solution to
America's racial problems lies not in affirmative action, increased wel-
fare programs, or busing kids to different schools. These merely
soften the effects of the underlying causes. It is the cycles of crime,
violence, and poverty which have enslaved inner-city minorities, cycles
which are wholly perpetuated by black-market forces and unmerciful
criminal punishment. Until these cycles are broken, there can be no
racial peace in America.
VI. TiH EXPERIMENTAL CITY
There is as much chance of repealing the Eighteenth Amendment as
there is for a humming-bird to fly to the planet Mars with the Wash-
ington Monument tied to its tail.
-Senator Morris Shepard of Texas in 1930598
Many Americans never thought that alcohol prohibition would
end.599 However, influential conservatives like Pierre du Pont and
John D. Rockefeller began to question its propriety and effectiveness
beginning in 1927, noting that alcohol was just as available after the
Eighteenth Amendment as before.600 All Prohibition did, they finally
concluded, was escalate crime and violence while filling the coffers of
Al Capone and his brethren.601 In 1933, the fourteen-year experiment
in alcohol criminalization was over,602 Capone was in jail, and the
black-market's illicit profits, crime, and violence vanished just as
quickly as they had appeared.
"History reminds us that things can and do change, that what seems
inconceivable today can seem entirely normal, and even inevitable, a
596. Id. at 74.
597. See Duke, supra note 14, at 595 ("When a society creates or permits the appearance of
racism in its criminal process, it feeds racial hatred and mistrust. That is a major evil of drug
prohibition. However it is administered, drug prohibition cannot avoid creating appearances of
racism and thus fostering racial division and mistrust.").
598. Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?, supra note 40, at 48.
599. See id. ("Until well into the 1920's most Americans regarded Prohibition as a permanent
fact of life.").
600. See Branch, supra note 224, at 24 ("It took two more years before well-financed repealers
began cranking out propaganda studies claiming that we could more than wipe out the federal
deficit by taxing alcohol instead of chasing Capone.").
601. Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?, supra note 40, at 48.
602. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI.
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few years hence," contends Professor Nadelmann of Princeton Uni-
versity.603 "So it was with Prohibition, and so it is-and will be-both
with drug prohibition and the ever-changing nature of drug use in
America. '604 The groundwork has been laid. William F. Buckley, 60 5
George Schultz,6° and Milton Friedman 60 7 represent an initial break
from orthodox dogma and a reclamation of intellectual pragmatism.
The next step, however, will require more than lively debate and polit-
ical posturing-legalization proponents will have to demonstrate that
national repeal of drug prohibition is both viable and effective.
This author believes that a brave community will have to step for-
ward, offering itself as a test-study in American drug legalization. An
initial small-scale approach makes sense given that federalism is still
alive and kicking and that citizens want intimate control over the is-
sues that affect them most.60 8 If, by chance, this "experimental city"
fails, the vast narcotics enforcement machinery would still be intact
and ready for further escalation of the drug war. The downside would
be minimized, while the upside-replication of a successful program
by other urban communities-would be substantial.
The discussion that follows offers some of the necessary ingredients
for an effective prototype. The list is certainly not exclusive; success
will depend on creativity, perseverance, and a little trial-and-error.
However, with a strong community and forward-looking leadership
(e.g., Baltimore mayor Kurt Schmoke), there is little doubt that the
"experimental city" will become "the shining city on the hill."
(1) Production and Distribution. The City should, with the help of
the federal government, acquire and dispense the drugs at public
health centers. The purity should be strictly regulated and quality
control procedures would be established. The price should be set
just below black-market cost to ensure the gradual dissipation of
the black market without unnecessary increases in consumption.
A quantity limit might be imposed on purchases to ensure that
only personal (not commercial) supplies could be acquired. Im-
poverished addicts could get their drugs at no cost. The minimum
purchase age should be twenty-one. Anyone caught selling drugs
to minors would be subject to mandatory imprisonment without
exception.
603. Nadelmann, Should We Legalize Drugs?, supra note 40, at 48.
604. Id.
605. See The War on Drugs Is Lost, supra note 4, at 35 (editorial of William F. Buckley).
606. See Scheer, supra note 5, at 49.
607. See id.
608. See Jacob Sullum, Mind Alteration, REASON, July 1994, at 42 ("[W]e live in a federal
system; ideally we want local approaches to local problems.").
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(2) Medical Treatment. All profits from sales and taxes should go to-
ward free drug abuse treatment in community clinics, modeled af-
ter programs such as the Dutch "harm prevention" programs.
Treatment would be on demand; no one should be denied assist-
ance or have to wait months for therapy. Needle exchanges could
be established to prevent the spread of AIDS. Group treatment/
enlightenment approaches (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous) should
be fully funded and staffed. Pregnant mothers at risk would be
given the highest priority. Local doctors and medical associations
could be asked to provide pro bono assistance to the treatment
centers. Addicts who suffer from chronic psychotic or violent be-
havior should be subject to involuntary civil commitment.
(3) Education. Drug awareness classes staffed with trained health ex-
perts should be required in all public schools, focusing on the facts
rather than scare tactics. The particular strategies would vary with
student age. School educators should be trained to detect ad-
dicted or high-risk children, allowing for immediate intervention.
Religious and community leaders should be called on to reeducate
and resocialize their constituents. Antidrug messages could be ex-
tensively broadcasted or published, emphasizing health facts (e.g.,
intravenous drug use is the number one way to get AIDS) and
changing social attitudes (e.g., smoking dope is not "cool"). Pub-
lic health and community centers could provide free drug-educa-
tion programs for individuals and groups.
(4) Media Regulation. All broadcast and print advertisements for
drugs should be strictly prohibited, including the marketing of cig-
arettes and alcohol. All broadcast and cable operators should be
banned from telecasting local beer and tavern promotions, and all
national beer advertisements would have to be edited-out or pre-
empted. Alcohol and tobacco billboards and displays should be
removed from public view, including those at sports and cultural
events.
(5) Law Enforcement. The police must become the "good guys" once
again. Instead of chasing drug pushers and users, law enforce-
ment should focus on the true criminal in society-the violent re-
cidivist. A massive audit of the local police department should be
the first step, purging all officers who have been tainted by cor-
ruption or who have been associated with police brutality or evi-
dence tampering. The second step should be extensive recruiting
of highly skilled officers from other parts of the country. Local
high-school seniors and college graduates could also be recruited
for a local "police corp," freeing up experienced officers from ad-
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ministrative duties and providing a pool of native applicants for
future hiring cycles. The third step should be to make the police
force the highest paid and best trained in the nation. The final
step should be comprehensive community supervision of police
priorities, decision making, and misconduct. One possibility could
be to require civilian "ride alongs" for all police vehicles. Civil-
ians could serve as neutral observers, documenting (and possibly
videotaping) all police confrontations with local citizens. Police
violence and corruption simply cannot be tolerated if legalization
is to work.
(6) Hope. The final component is somewhat amorphous; it is also the
most critical to the experiment's success. Impoverished inner-city
drug users are addicted to the short-lived sensation furnished by
narcotics: hope. If any drug policy is to succeed, the fleeting emo-
tion provided by drugs must be replaced with tangible opportuni-
ties. Any community member who seeks gainful employment
must be rewarded. Job training and placement services must be
expanded to ensure that anyone who wants work can find it. This
will require input and support from community business leaders,
local unions, and corporate executives. High-school dropouts
should be encouraged to get their degrees; community outreach
programs should stress that it is never too late to get an education.
Local community colleges should admit anyone with a high-school
diploma (or its equivalent), and financial aid should be provided
to anyone who needs it. Local universities should be encouraged
to recruit (read "reward") hard-working high-school and commu-
nity college students. In sum, all obstacles in the way of self-ad-
vancement for urban residents must be removed.
If the "experimental city" is successful, it could be imitated through-
out the nation. Other communities could adopt the successful compo-
nents amenable to their particular circumstances and ignore or modify
the less effective elements. Adoption and adaption would allow our
communities to become Justice Brandeis' laboratories of experimenta-
tion, trying "novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country."6° 9 Eventually, a national plan might be en-
acted, or perhaps legalization would stop at the bounds of federalism,
with California eliminating its black market and Utah continuing the
war. However, these issues are for later discussion, by experts far
wiser than this author. For now, America must take that first brave
609. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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step. The initial courage to stand and be heard will be the very mea-
sure of this generation.
